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Саҳар мегуфт булбул боғбонро,  
«Дар ин боғ ҷуз ниҳоли ғам нарӯяд,  
Ба пирӣ мерасад хори биёбон,  
Вале гул чун ҷавон гардад, бимирад». 
 
In the morning a nightingale told the gardener,  
“In this soil besides the seedling of sorrow nothing will grow.  
A desert thistle will reach old age  
But a flower, like a young person, may die.”  
 
Muhammad Iqbal 
 
  
4 
 
 5 
 Table of Content 
ABSTRACT 11 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 13 
NOTES ON LANGUAGE AND TRANSLITERATION 15 
DEUTSCHE KURZFASSUNG 17 
MAPS OF THE REGION 32 
ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY 34 
1  INTRODUCTION: AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE IN 
RURAL TAJIKISTAN 37 
Post-Soviet Restructuration of the Tajik Agriculture 39 
Agricultural Expertise and Political Economy in Rural Tajikistan 48 
Knowledge and Expertise in the Individualized Agriculture? 51 
Methodology: Knowledge Practices in Agriculture 52 
Structure of the Thesis: Outlook on Chapters 56 
2  KNOWLEDGE AND GOVERNANCE IN RURAL CENTRAL 
ASIA 61 
Epistemic Cultures in Agriculture and Rural Areas 62 
The Social Construction of Knowledge in Everyday Life 67 
Co-production of Epistemic Cultures 76 
Conceptualizing Governance 87 
Assemblages and Post-Soviet Meshwork Governance 94 
Summary: Meshwork Governance and Epistemic Cultures 105 
3  FARM RESTRUCTURING AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE 107 
The Individualization of the Tajik Agriculture 111 
Agricultural Information, Advice and Expertise in Rural Tajikistan 126 
Intersection: Media in Rural Tajikistan 134 
Summary: Obstacles to Individualized Expertise 137 
 6 
4  RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESIS AND 
METHODOLOGY 139 
Research Approach 140 
Field Research Methodologies 146 
5  LIVELIHOOD PROVISION IN THE ZARAFSHAN VALLEY 
  153 
Livelihood Provision and Demographic Development in the 
Zarafshan Valley 161 
Intersection: The Household of Hokima, Female Farmer 179 
Access to Arable Land 181 
Zarafshani’ Agriculture as Limited Access Order 188 
Summary: Challenges to Rural Livelihood Provision 196 
6  THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE AS CRISIS 
OF EXPERTISE 199 
Agricultural Information and Expertise in Zarafshani Rural 
Communities 200 
Restrained Investments in Seed Potatoes 209 
Considering the Dehqon Farm 220 
Summary: Crisis of Expertise 228 
7  NEGOTIATING NORMATIVE SYSTEMS: BOBOGI ACCESS 
ARRANGEMENTS 231 
Bobogi Access Arrangements: Values and Moralities 232 
 Intersection: Mualimi Russi and his Wife 239 
Local Governance through Parallel Normative Systems 248 
Intersection: Darvonho, Guard of the Graveyard 255 
Summary: Access Arrangements as Meshwork Governance 261 
8  ARIZA LETTERS TO MANOEUVER MESHWORK 
GOVERNANCE 265 
Ariza Interventions in Agricultural Processes 266 
Intersection: Public Request to Remove the Army Camp 269 
 7 
Forum Shopping with Ariza Letters 276 
Letter Writing as Political Steering 282 
Summary: Ariza Letters as Knowledge Practice 290 
9  SHIFTING EPISTEMIC CULTURES IN THE ZARAFSHAN 
VALLEY 293 
Marginalization of Agricultural Expertise 294 
Knowledge Practices to Manoeuver Limited Access Orders 297 
Shifting Epistemic Cultures in the Zarafshan Valley 307 
10  EPISTEMIC CONDITIONS AND AGRICULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT 315 
Reshaping Epistemic Conditions 321 
11  BIBLIOGRAPHY 325 
 
 
 
  
 8 
Maps 
Map 1  The commonwealth of independent states, CIS. Source: 
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/cis_central_asia_pol_
95.jpg (accessed 12/2016). ......................................................................... 32 
Map 2  Topography of Tajikistan and its political context of Central Asia. 
Source: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/tajikistan_rel01.jpg  
(accessed 01/2016). .................................................................................... 33 
Map 3  Topography of Tajikistan and the Zarafshan Valley. Sources: 
google/maps.com (accessed 01/2016) and 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/tajikistan_rel01.jpg 
(accessed 01/2016). Modified by the author. ............................................. 54 
Map 4  Topography of the Zarafshan Valley. Source: google/maps.com  
(accessed 01/2016). .................................................................................. 153 
Map 5  Administrative division of the Zarafshan Valley. Source: 
Welthungerhilfe Tajikistan, modification by the author. .......................... 158 
 
 
Figures 
Figure 1  Post-Soviet transformation of the Tajik agricultural sector with its 
impact on epistemic cultures and agricultural expertise. Source: The 
author. ......................................................................................................... 55 
Figure 2  Temperatures and precipitation in Madrushkat village in the 
upper Zarafshan Valley. Source: Meteorological office in Madrushkat 
village, modifications by the author. ......................................................... 155 
Figure 3  Temperatures and precipitation in the city of Panjakent in the 
lower Zarafshan Valley. Source: 
http://www.worldweatheronline.com/panjakent-weather-
averages/sughd/tj.aspx  (accessed 01/2016). ........................................... 156 
Figure 4  Scheme of administrative and local governance structures in the 
Zarafshan Valley. Source: The author. ...................................................... 251 
 
 
 9 
Tables 
Table 1   Organizations involved in local governance processes in the 
Zarafshan Valley. Source: Own observations and Shaumarov (2008, Figure 
9), Roche (2005) and Stephan (2010). ...................................................... 160 
Table 2  Access to natural resources and livelihood strategies. Source: Own 
calculations based on Welthungerhilfe, DFID et al. (2008), interviews and 
the jamoat statistic office. ........................................................................ 162 
Table 3  Relational scheme of the distribution of rural stakeholders. Source: 
Author’s compilation................................................................................. 169 
Table 4  Distribution of arable land in the three administrative districts 
along the Zarafshan River. Source: Own calculation based on Tajik Farm 
Diary (2013). .............................................................................................. 174 
Table 5  Relational comparison of households and provision of livelihoods 
in the Zarafshan Valley. Source: Data compiled by the author, based on Ege 
(2008). ....................................................................................................... 176 
Table 6  Individual or family dehqon farms in the research communities at 
the end of 2012. Source: Author’s compilation based on Welthungerhilfe, 
DFID et al. (2008), own calculations and the jamoat statistic office. ....... 221 
Table 7  Zarafshani knowledge practices related to normative systems. 
Source: The author .................................................................................... 309 
  
  
 10 
Photographs 
Photograph 1 Irrigated land plots in the upper Zarafshan Valley near 
Revomutk village. Source: The author. ..................................................... 154 
Photograph 2  Dry mountain vegetation near Soosun village. Source: The 
author. ....................................................................................................... 157 
Photograph 3  Apricot trees in the central Zarafshan Valley near Ayni. 
Source: The author. ................................................................................... 161 
Photograph 4  The kitchen garden of Osunmurod in Garibak village. Source: 
The author. ................................................................................................ 165 
Photograph 5  Cattle pasture on rice fields in the lower Zarafshan area near 
Panjakent. Source: The author. ................................................................. 166 
Photograph 6  Potato field in the upper Zarafshan Valley near Revomutk 
village. Source: The author. ....................................................................... 168 
Photograph 7  Pasture above Garibak village. Source: The author. .......... 188 
Photograph 8  Cutting germinated seed potatoes of local variety. Brown 
spots in the centre indicate the poor quality of seeds. Source: The author.
 ................................................................................................................... 217 
Photograph 9  The Panjakent wife with her daughter. Source: The author.
 ................................................................................................................... 239 
Photograph 10  Re-enacting the procedure of kalidi Islom. Source: The 
author. ....................................................................................................... 247 
Photograph 11  Asleddin, the former chief of the village committee. 
Source: The author. ................................................................................... 259 
Photograph 12  Majlisi [village assembly] in the lower Zarafshan area. 
Source: The author. ................................................................................... 270 
Photograph 13  Ritualized Compliance: Gestures of modesty performed by 
elite farmers during a visit of the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon. 
Source: Welthungerhilfe Tajikistan, Sadriddin Dshuraev. ......................... 278 
Photograph 14  Public relations of the Panjakent corruption department. 
Source: The author. ................................................................................... 286 
 
  
 11 
Abstract		
In the context of the post-Soviet restructuration of agriculture 
throughout Central Asia, the present thesis addresses farmers 
approach to knowledge, taking the example of marginal 
mountainous areas in northern Tajikistan. Against the background 
of agricultural individualization processes in remote rural areas as 
the Zarafshan Valley, the study scrutinizes how farmers’ approach 
and make use of knowledge to maintain agricultural livelihoods. The 
primary subjects of the study are thus individualized agricultural 
expertise and knowledge practices in everyday rural livelihood 
provision.   
Departing from the perspective on knowledge and expertise in 
everyday agricultural praxis, the research integrates governance 
processes, which are conceptually considered being co-produced 
together with knowledge. Due to its volatile and uncertain 
outcomes, I conceptualize governance processes in rural Tajikistan 
as meshwork arrangements. Under the conditions of the 
neopatrimonial authoritarian state, the individualisation of Tajik 
agriculture unfolded as limited access order (LAO). LAO are political 
arrangements where the ruler or aligned elites limit the access to 
opportunities and resources for other political or economic actors. 
Such political economy allowed only for protracted agro-economic 
performance in remote mountainous areas as the Zarafshan Valley. 
Despite the almost complete individualization of local farm 
households, only a few of them are actually market-oriented 
producers.  
The present research relates Zarafshani farmers disregard for 
agricultural expertise with the noticeable attention to knowledge 
practices that potentially manoeuvre governance arrangements. 
Against the background of uncertain meshwork governance 
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arrangements and LAO, the individualization of agriculture did not 
create the conditions that farmers invest in agricultural expertise. 
The research proves that the reluctant agro-economic development 
in remote rural areas in Tajikistan is not linked to missing 
agricultural expertise, but to the dominance of governance matters, 
which farmers need to address in order to maintain rural 
livelihoods.  
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Deutsche	Kurzfassung	
Die vorliegende Arbeit entstand aus dem zunächst unspezifischen 
Herangehen an die Frage welches Wissen mobilisieren tadschikische 
Kleinbauern in marginalen ländlichen Gegenden um ihren 
Lebensunterhalt zu sichern? Die post-sowjetische Individualisierung 
der Landwirtschaft brachte die grundlegende Restrukturierung des 
Wirtschaftssektors, aber auch Veränderungen der lokalen 
Politikgestaltung, sozialer Ordnung und Lebensgrundlagen 
(livelihoods). Vor diesem Hintergrund widmet sich die vorliegende 
Untersuchung der Frage, wie sich Wissen in der tadschikischen 
Landwirtschaft nicht als epistemische Verlustgeschichte entwickelt, 
d.h. als Abfall der hochspezialisieren kollektiven Landwirtschaft zur 
Subsistenzwirtschaft, sondern als Ressource individualisierter, 
privatwirtschaftlich orientierter Agrarbetriebe. Die Feldforschung 
entlang des Zerafshan Flusses in Nord-Tadschikistan belegt die 
Marginalisierung landwirtschaftlicher Expertise. Aufgrund fehlender 
wirtschaftlicher Anschlussmöglichkeiten fragen speziell Kleinbauern 
Agrar-Expertise nicht nach; ungewisse lokal-politische Prozesse 
verhindern Investitionen in Expertise zur Steigerung der 
landwirtschaftlichen Produktion und Vermarktung. Diese Situation 
erscheint als Wandel epistemischer Kulturen, mit negativen 
Auswirkungen für die lokale landwirtschaftliche Produktion. 
Kleinbauern fokussieren auf Wissenspraktiken, welche potentiell 
Einfluss auf die lokale Politikgestaltung nehmen. Diese Veränderung 
epistemischer Kulturen ist eine Reaktion auf ein volatiles politisches 
Umfeld und Herrschaftspraktiken, welche von begrenzten 
Zugangsordnungen (LAO) und meshwork governance (Flechtwerk-
Herrschaft) geprägt sind. Zur Sicherung des Lebensunterhaltes 
versuchen landwirtschaftliche Akteure in erster Linie, Einfluss auf 
Politikentscheidungen zu nehmen.   
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Hintergrund, Problemlage und Fragestellung 
Trotz politischer Stabilität, wirtschaftlichem Aufschwung und 
steigender landwirtschaftlicher Produktion in den 
Hauptanbaugebieten sind abgeschiedene (Hoch-)Gebirgs-Täler in 
Tadschikistan weitgehend von Armut geprägt. Die Mehrheit der 
Haushalte in entlegenen Gebieten bestreitet ihren Lebensunterhalt 
durch Arbeitsmigration in Kombination mit landwirtschaftlicher 
Subsistenzwirtschaft. Speziell in marginalen Gebieten ist die 
landwirtschaftliche Produktion und die gesammte wirtschaftliche 
und soziale Anbindung weit unter das vor-sowjetische Niveau 
gefallen. Dennoch besteht in Folge des demographischen Wandels, 
fehlender wirtschaftlicher Alternativen und politisch motivierter 
Verknappung eine starke Nachfrage nach natürlichen Ressourcen 
(race to access). Jedoch wirtschafteten zum Zeitpunkt der 
Feldforschung im Zarafshantal im Norden Tadschikistans nur wenige 
Haushalte marktwirtschaftlich orientiert.  
Restrukturierung der Tadschikischen Landwirtschaft 
Die Individualisierung der Landwirtschaft bezeichnet 
Transformationsprozesse in ländlichen Gegenden, bei denen 
kollektive Organitationen und Institutionen in kleinere Strukturen 
(wie Hoflandwirtschaften) umgewandelt werden. Gegenwärtig 
werden die meisten Flächen im Zarafshantal von kleinbäuerlichen 
Familienbetrieben (smallholder farm households) bewirtschaftet, 
welche im Durchschnitt aus etwa sieben Personen bestehen und 
etwa 0,5 Hektar bewässertes Agrarland zur Verfügung haben. Mit 
Blick auf die ländliche Entwicklung im Zarafshantal erscheinen 
fehlende Investitionen in marktorientierte Produktion und eine 
desolate Infrastruktur, etwa nicht vorhandene Irrigations-, 
Lagerungs- oder Transport-Infrastruktur, als zentrale Hindernisse. In 
diesem Umfeld stagniert die Produktion der Kleinbauern auf 
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niedrigem Niveau. Angebote für landwirtschaftliche Beratung sind 
gering und finden nur wenig Interesse. Zentralstaatliche Politik-
Entscheidungen wie Agrar-Reformen werden von den Kommunen 
unterschiedlich implementiert, d.h. die Individualisierung der 
Landwirtschaft als Restrukturierung kollektiver Strukturen findet in 
den Sub-Regionen Tadschikistans unterschiedlich statt. Zudem darf 
der Prozess der Individualisierung der Landwirtschaft nicht über die 
Aufrechterhaltung limitierter Zugangsordnungen (LAO) in 
Tadschikistan täuschen. Der freie Handel mit landwirtschaftlicher 
Nutzfläche (arable land) ist faktisch unmöglich, Land ist nach wie vor 
im Besitz des Staates.  
Politikgestaltung und Limitierte Zugangsordnungen 
(LAO) in Zentralasien 
Regelungen bezüglich des Zugangs zu natürlichen Ressourcen 
(access) wie Land und Wasser sind für die Landwirtschaft zentral. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit übernimmt den Begriff limited access orders 
(LAO) als limitierte Zugangsordnung von North et al. (2012) zur 
Beschreibung von Zwangsregelungen innerhalb lokaler 
wirtschaflicher Abläufe. Tadschikistan wird als neopatrimonialer 
autoritärer Staat charakterisiert, politische Machtresourcen 
basieren auf der Verteilung von Abschöpfungsmöglichkeiten (rents) 
wie Regierungsanstellungen, Landrechten, Wirtschaftsmonopolen 
oder dem Patronisieren geschlossener Arbeitsmärkte (Driscoll 
2015). Landverteilungen als Teil staatlicher Reformen im Rahmen 
des Individualisierungsprozesses der Landwirtschaft verliefen in 
Tadschikistan uneinheitlich und führten zur ungleichmäßigen 
Verteilung von Ressourcen. Oft sind diese Regelungen und 
Entscheidungen nicht dauerhaft. Im Spannungsfeld von 
zentralstaatlichem Regieren und sub-regionalen 
Herrschaftsprozessen fällt die lokale Politikgestaltung ambivalent 
aus (Christophe 2005; Markowitz 2013). Das Regierungshandeln der 
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Zentralregierung ist neopatrimonial, d.h. der Staat ist auf den 
Präsidenten zugeschnitten, welcher mit Hilfe von Klienten, d.h. 
subordinierten Eliten und lokalen Gefolgsleuten herrscht. Herrschaft 
und Regierungshandeln (governance) findet statt, wenn 
Entscheidungen getroffen und implementiert werden. Neo-
patrimoniale Netzwerke dominieren die Relationen zwischen 
Zentrum und Peripherie und sichern die Machtressourcen lokaler 
Eliten. Damit verbunden sind lokale Zugangsordnungen (LAOs), 
welche in erster Linie die Abschöpfungsmöglichkeiten der Eliten 
sicherstellen, anstatt staatliche Reformen und Interventionen 
sicherzustellen. Dies hat zur Folge, dass zentralasiatische Staaten 
Schwierigkeiten haben, die eigene Agrarpolitik in ländlichen 
Regionen zu implementieren. Staatliche Organisationen fallen als 
Garanten zentral festgelegter Ordnungen aus, an deren Stelle eine 
ultraflexible Assemblage von Prozessen, Netzwerken, Institutionen 
und Organisationen treten welche auf verschiedene normative 
Systeme rekurrieren (meshwork). Die vorliegende Arbeit 
konzeptualisiert diese Prozesse als spezielles post-sowjetisches 
Herrschaftsmodell, bei welchem sich der Präsident zum Erhalt 
seiner Macht auf politische Ambiguität stützt und diese selbst 
befördert. LAO stützen neopatrimoniale Herrschaftssysteme und 
beziehen sich auch auf die Einschränkung der öffentlichen Meinung 
und Formierung von Öffentlichkeit insgesamt. Daraus ergeben sich 
Kommunikationsnormen, Rituale und Sprachregelungen (hegemonic 
narratives) über welche Macht ausgeübt, d.h. Herrschaft 
implementiert wird.  
Fragestellung 
Vor diesem Hintergrund widmet sich diese Forschungsarbeit dem 
Wissen welches von ländlichen Haushalten als relevant für die 
eigene Lebensgrundlage erachtet wird. Nach dem Ende der 
Kollektivwirtschaft veränderten sich die bisherigen 
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Wissensbeziehungen in der tadschikischen Landwirtschaft. Die 
Forschung belegt Probleme in Zugang und Anwendung von 
landwirtschaftlicher Expertise in Tadschikistan. Dabei hat gerade 
landwirtschaftliche Expertise für die Entwicklung ländlicher Räume 
eine wichtige Funktion (Assche and Hornidge 2015). Welche 
Wissensbestände werden von den lokalen bäuerlichen Betrieben 
(farm households) in abgelegenen tadschikischen Anbaugebieten als 
wichtig erachtet um den Lebensunterhalt sicher zu stellen? 
Kleinbauern sind sehr zögerlich in Bezug auf Investitionen in 
Innovationen. Welches Informationen und welche Agrar-Expertise 
werden von den Bauern nachgefragt und implementiert?  
Theoretische Überlegungen: Wissen, Lokale 
Politikgestaltung, Epistemische Kulturen 
Zur Bearbeitung der Fragestellung werden die Begriffe Wissen, 
epistemische Kulturen und lokale Politikgestaltung (local 
governance) erläutert. Wissen ist mit Verweis auf Berger/Luckmann 
als sozial konstruiert (socially constructed) begrifflich gefasst (1984), 
d.h. Wissen ist alles das, was als solches von der Gesellschaft 
anerkannt wird. Wissen wird mit Bezug auf Landwirtschaft und 
ländliche Gebiete im Rahmen dieser Forschungsarbeit hauptsächlich 
aus zwei Perspektiven betrachtet: Eng gefasst als Agrar-Expertise, 
d.h. technisches Anwendwissen. Demgegenüber stehen 
angewandtes Alltagswissen (everyday knowledge) oder 
Wissenspraktiken (knowledge practices) lokaler Gemeinschaften. 
Dieses theoretische Konstrukt beschreibt relationale Kategorien 
durch welche sich die vorliegenden Fragestellungen analysieren 
lassen. Entlang dieses Ansatzes drückt der Verweis auf Wissen aus, 
wie sich soziale Gemeinschaften etwas selbst erklären, d.h. es 
handelt sich um Glaubenssysteme, Werte, moralische Muster, nach 
denen Menschen ihr soziales Umfeld sinnhaft verstehen. Diese 
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Wissensbestände bzw. Wissenspraktiken liegen in lokalen 
Gemeinschaften jeweils anders vor, da lokal entsprechend anders 
konstruiert wurde. Wissen wird gemeinsam mit politischen 
Prozessen ko-produziert, d.h. es entsteht untrennbar von 
Politikgestaltung und Macht. Im Anschluss an frühere Ansätze der 
Wissenssoziologie (Schütz, Scheler), welche nach der Verteilung von 
Wissen in der Gesellschaft fragen, widmen sich STS (Science and 
Technology Studies) dem Einfluss von Macht und Politik auf die 
Entwicklung von Wissensbeständen.  
Lokale Politikgestaltung als Meshwork Governance 
Die Politikgestaltung in den ländlichen Gebieten Tadschikistans 
rekurriert auf verschiedene normative Systeme. In Tadschikistan 
existieren auf lokaler Ebene mindestens drei normative Systeme 
parallel: Staatliche Regelungen und Gesetze, lokale Werte und 
Traditionen sowie die Regeln des Islam. Die gleichzeitige 
Assemblage (Versammlung), dieser normativen Systeme in der 
lokalen Politikgestaltung verursacht Unsicherheiten (uncertainties), 
da Entscheidungen unterschiedlich ausfallen, kaum wiederholbar 
und schwer voraussehbar sind. Innerhalb der vorliegenden 
Forschungsarbeit wird die lokale Politikgestaltung in Tadschikistan 
als Flecht- bzw. Netzwerk Herrschaft (meshwork governance) 
konzeptualisiert. Meshwork Politikgestaltung bezeichnet das 
Zustandekommen von Entscheidungen und der Implementation von 
Beschlüssen aus dem momentanen Zusammentreffen (assemblage) 
unterschiedlicher Institutionen, Prozesse und Authorities. 
Herrschaft (governance) ist definiert als Entscheidung und dem 
Implementieren der Entscheidung (Mielke et al. 2011). In lokalen 
politischen Prozessen in Tadschikistan liegen Macht und 
Durchsetzungsvermögen (assertiveness) meist in den Händen von 
patrimonial kooptierten wirtschaftlichen und administrativen Eliten, 
sowie lokalen Autoritäten. Die Politikgestaltung auf lokaler Ebene 
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gestaltet sich in diesem Sinn als Netzwerk-Prozess (meshwork) aus 
staatlichen Interventionen und lokalen Übereinkünften 
überlappender Institutionen, Prozesse oder Organisationen, durch 
welche die Akteure Interessen formulieren, Konflikte lösen oder sich 
in Rechte und Pflichten fügen. Charakteristisch für meshwork 
Politikgestaltung sind Unvorhersehbarkeit von Entscheidungen 
sowie deren kaum realisierbare Wiederholung.  
Epistemische Kulturen  
Aufbauend auf den Sozialkonstruktivismus entwickelt Knorr-Cetina 
das Konzept epistemischer Kulturen, zur Beschreibung wie die 
Gesellschaft in einem bestimmten Bereich `weiß was sie weiß´ 
(1999: 1). Epistemische Kulturen definieren und bewerten Wissen 
und verdeutlichen damit, wie Wissen in der Gesellschaft verankert 
ist. Nicht alle Wissensbestände werden innerhalb einer 
Gemeinschaft gleich wertgeschätzt, d.h. epistemische Kulturen 
unterscheiden sich untereinander und sind unterschiedlich 
hierarchisch strukturiert. Als analytisches Programm beschreiben 
epistemische Kulturen die Bedingungen und erläutern die 
Entwicklung von Wissen in bestimmten thematischen Feldern. Zum 
einen werden verschiedene Bedingungen für die soziale 
Konstruktion von Wissen reflektiert. Zum anderen vermitteln 
epistemische Kulturen und Wissenskulturen den ideell-
ideologischen Hintergrund zur Konstruktion von Wissen. In 
Zentralasien sind Wissenskulturen vorherrschend, welche von 
sowjetischen, neopatrimonialen oder islamischen Werten und 
Moralitäten (values and moralities) bestimmt sind. Epistemische 
Kulturen determinieren unterschiedlich das Entstehen bestimmter 
Wissensbestände. STS widmen sich den Entstehungsbedingungen 
einzelner Wissensbestände mittels Fragen wie durch 
Politikgestaltung und Machtverhältnisse epistemische Kulturen 
etabliert, stabilisiert und perpetuiert werden. Die Gestalt 
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epistemischer Kulturen ist nicht willkürlich, ebenso wie die 
Arrangements, welche die Konstruktion epistemischer Kulturen 
bestimmen. Epistemische Kulturen helfen, politische Regimes zu 
stabilisieren. Nationale Wissenskulturen setzen bestimmte 
Institutionen, Organisationen, Werte und Prozesse über andere. Die 
Gestalt epistemischer Kulturen ist geprägt durch nationale 
Wissenskulturen, wird jedoch, bspw. in der Landwirtschaft, ko-
produziert von lokalen Werten, Ethiken und Macht-Konstellationen. 
Zentral ist hierbei die Berücksichtigung eines „co-productionist 
thinking” (Jasanoff 2004). STS übernimmt bei der Betrachtung von 
Wissen und Wissenskulturen die Konzeption einer analytisch 
untrennbaren Beziehung zwischen Herrschaft (governance), Wissen 
und Macht, welche sich in lokalen Ordnungen manifestiert (Mielke 
et al. 2011; Mielke 2017).  
Ergebnisse der Feldforschung 
Die Feldforschung entlang des Zarafshan Flusses zeigt, dass 
landwirtschaftliche Expertise vornehmlich lokal besorgt wird. Lokale 
Kleinbauern sind weder an überregional agrar-technischem Wissen 
angeschlossen, noch daran interessiert, da sie nicht oder nur 
spärlich marktorientiert produzieren. Landwirtschaftliche 
Produktion ist für den überwiegenden Teil der lokalen Haushalte 
lediglich Subsistenz zum Lebensunterhalt. Fehlende wirtschaftliche 
Anreize und Schwierigkeiten, ein Einkommen durch 
landwirtschaftlichen Produktion zu erzielen, bilden das 
Haupthindernis für die Aufnahme und Umsetzung 
landwirtschaftlicher Expertise.   
Krise Landwirtschaftlicher Expertise 
Zwei Fallbeispiele verdeutlichen die Schwierigkeiten der 
Kleinbauern im Zarafshantal im Umgang mit speziellem 
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Agrarwissen: Zum einen die Schwierigkeiten im Abschätzen von 
Investitionen in private dehqon Betriebe, d.h. die Unklarheit 
bezüglich administrativer Prozesse und der involvierten Kosten. Zum 
anderen die Entscheidungsfindung bezüglich Investitionen, etwa 
Kartoffelsaatgut. Anbieter von Kartoffel-Expertenwissen oder 
Informationen aus der Distrikt-Administration werden von den 
Bauern mit Misstrauen betrachtet. Die Glaubwürdigkeit 
(creditibility) bestehender zentralstaatlicher Agrar-Organisationen 
wie dem Landwirtschaftsdepartment (agroprom), Bildungs- und 
Forschungseinrichtungen ist massiv gesunken. Auf lokaler Ebene 
besteht Nachfrage nach externer Expertise, allerdings wird dieses 
Wissen nicht implementiert, solang die Qualität der 
Wissensbestände nicht durch Vertrauenspersonen verbürgt werden 
kann. Insgesamt besteht lediglich geringe Bereitschaft der Bauern in 
Zugang und Anwendung von Wissen zu investieren.  
Wissenspraktiken: Bobogi Regelungen  
Große Nachfrage besteht allerdings nach Wissen, welches potentiell 
in die lokale Politikgestaltung eingreift. Im Kontext unklarer und 
ambiguer meshwork Entscheidungsprozesse wird mittels 
Wissenspraktiken versucht bspw. Zugang zu landwirtschaftlichen 
Ressourcen (access) zu erlangen. In sub-regional unterschiedlichen 
Prozessen appellieren die Akteure an mehrere Institutionen zugleich 
(forum shopping). Lokale Zugangsregelungen wie bobogi-
Arrangements zeigen, wie Bedeutung lokal über narrative 
Mobilisierung von Referenzen zum Islam, Familie und Tradition 
konstruiert wird. Die Macht solcher Bedeutungskonstruktionen wird 
evident, wenn landwirtschaftliche Politikentscheidungen vollständig 
an religiöse Institutionen wie kaliddi Islom verlagert werden.  
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Ariza Beschwerde-Briefe 
Die entgegengesetzte Wissenspraktik zu bobogi Forderungen stellen 
Eingabe- oder Beschwerdebriefe an regionale und nationale 
Autoritäten und Organisationen dar. Der Gebrauch von 
Eingabebriefen (complaint letters), sogenannte ariza, dient dazu 
lokale Übereinkünfte durch den Verweis auf zentralstaatliche 
Gesetze, politische Prozesse und administrative Regelungen 
auszuhebeln. Ariza Briefe beziehen in lokalen Prozessen den Staat 
als Machtfaktor ein indem sie an das normative System des Staates 
appellieren. Soliche Eingabebriefe sind zugleich individuelle 
Machmittel. Eine Besonderheit sind lokale Vielschreiber, 
sogenannte arizaboz, welche regelmäßig staatlichen Stellen 
unterrichten, d.h. Nachbarn faktisch denunzieren und damit 
erheblichen Einfluss auf lokale Entscheidungen nehmen.  
Diskussion der Ergebnisse 
Die Ergebnisse der Forschung lassen sich im Wesentlichen in drei 
Punkten zusammenfassen: Krise und Marginalisierung 
landwirtschaftlicher Expertise, Herausbildung und Durchsetzung 
politikbezogener Wissenspraktiken und dem Wandel lokaler 
epistemischer Kulturen.  
Krise und Marginalisierung Landwirtschaftlicher 
Expertise 
Durch die aus der Feldforschung gewonnenen Einblicke in 
landwirtschaftliche Unterhaltsstrategien ergibt sich, dass der 
bisherige Umgang mit Agrar-Expertise der vor allem durch die 
sowjetische Kollektivwirtschaft geprägt war, nicht weiter zu tragen 
kommt. Vor dem Hintergrund weitverbreiteter Armut sind die 
Bauern gezwungen auf die Sicherstellung ihrer Lebensgrundlage 
(livelihood) zu fokussieren. Dies geschieht jedoch nicht durch 
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landwirtschaftliche Intensivierung, sondern eine Kombination aus 
Subsistenzwirtschaft und Arbeitsmigration. In Folge wird Agrar-
Expertise marginalisiert zugunsten von Kontextwissen der 
Politikgestaltung, d.h. um die Teilnahme an politischen und 
wirtschaftlichen Prozessen sicherzustellen. Kleinbauern fragen auf 
lokaler Ebene lediglich die Expertise erfahrener Bauern ab, externe 
Beratung (agricultural advice) hingegen wird, da lokal kaum 
nachprüfbar, skeptisch beurteilt und nicht implementiert. 
Willkürliche Eingriffe von Behörden in lokale Haushalte erfolgen 
mittels wage formulierten Gesetzen und administrativen 
Regelungen. Am Beispiel der Beschwerdebriefe ariza zeigt sich, dass 
agrar-technisches Wissen wertlos bleibt, solange der politische 
Kontext mögliche Veränderungen, d.h. Innovationen, nicht zulässt. 
So schneiden Bauern bspw. keine Aprikosenbäume, da die Legalität 
dieser Praxis von den Distrikt-Autoritäten explizit im Unklaren 
gehalten und potentiell geahnded wird. Somit schalted das Wissen 
um Sanktionen das Wissen vom nötigen Gehölzschnitt aus. 
Staatliche Regelungen, wie beispielsweise die Reform der dehqon 
Farmen, wurden von den regionalen Behörden lange ignoriert und 
von Bauern kaum umgesetzt. Lokal wird Wissen somit eingesetzt 
um die Durchsetzungskraft von Institutionen im alltäglichen Leben 
zu beurteilen, d.h. zu bestimmen ob sie sanktionieren oder nicht.  
Schwierigkeiten im Umgang mit landwirtschaftlicher Expertise 
resultieren aus dem Misstrauen gegenüber externer Expertise. 
Vertrauen und Bürgschaft für Wissensbestände sind zentrale 
Kriterien für deren Anwendung. Dieses Vertrauen bezieht sich fast 
ausschließlich auf Personen und Institutionen des lokalen Umfelds.   
Politikbezogene Wissenspraktiken 
Limitierte Zugangsordnungen (LAO) sind Bestandteil staatlicher und 
sub-regionaler Herrschaftsmechanismen in Tadschikistan, 
bestimmen den lokalen Agrarsektor im Untersuchungsgebiet. 
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Aushandlungsprozesse über den Zugang zu landwirtschaftlicher 
Nutzfläche gestalten sich als Wettbewerb zwischen lokalen 
Institutionen, wie bspw. bobogi, und die staatlichen 
Gesetzgebungen der Landreform. Eventuelle Entscheidungen der 
Netzwerk-Politikgestaltung (meshwork governance) sind volatil 
(forum shopping) oft mit unbeständigen Ergebnissen.  
Lokale Akteure greifen deshalb auf Wissenspraktiken zurück, wie 
das Mobilisieren von Religion im Falle von bobogi Forderungen oder 
das Verfassen von ariza Briefen. Diese Wissenspraktiken entwickeln 
konkreten Einfluss auf lokale Prozesse der Politikgestaltung (local 
governance processes). Der Verweis auf bobogi bildete in vielen 
Gemeinden des Zarafshantals bisher ein starkes Argument in 
Aushandlungsprozessen, durch welches Macht mobilisiert werden 
kann. Demgegenüber ist der Einfluss von ariza Eingabebriefen 
schwer einschätzbar. Ariza Briefe sind Versuche der Kommunikation 
und Einflussnahme auf den Staat, sie erwirken potentiell direkte 
Reaktionen von der Distriktadministration und zentralen 
Regierungsstellen. Durch faktische oder vermeintliche 
überregionale Unterstützung können sich ariza-Anliegen in lokalen 
Netzwerkprozessen verstärken und durchsetzen. Allerdings zeigt 
nur ein geringer Teil von ariza Briefen Wirkung. Erfolgreiche ariza 
Interventionen sind meist das Werk von professionellen 
Briefschreibern (arizaboz), welche als Informanten in Symbiose mit 
der Staatsmacht agieren.  
Wandel Epistemischer Kulturen  
Diese Beispiele belegen, dass lokale Akteure Wissensbestände 
abwägen und fallweise entscheiden. Die Feldforschung belegt die 
Notwendigkeit der Bauern sich für den Erhalt der eigenen, 
individualisierten Hoflandwirtschaften zu engagieren. 
Aufmerksamkeit und Konstruktion von Wissen wenden sich im 
Zarafshantal v.a. den unsicheren und schwer vorhersehbaren 
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Prozessen der Politikgestaltung zu. Wissenspraktiken versuchen, 
damit verbundene Unsicherheiten, d.h. konkrete Risiken für den 
landwirtschaftlichen Lebensunterhalt, zu reduzieren. Mit Blick auf 
die Aushandlung des Zugangs zu landwirtschaftlicher Nutzfläche ist 
im Zarafshantal insbesondere das Wissen von indigenen 
Traditionen, lokalen Werten und vom Islam relevant, wie im Falle 
der bobogi Forderungen belegt, während die staatliche 
Gesetzgebung keine zentrale Rolle einnimmt. Diese Ergebnisse 
machen den Wandel epistemischer Kulturen im Zarafshantal von 
vormals sowjetisch-strukturiertem, landwirtschaftlichem 
Expertenwissen zu individualisierten Wissenspraktiken deutlich. 
Dieser Wechsel wirkt sich jedoch negativ auf die landwirtschaftliche 
Produktion aus. Der Blick auf die Lebensgrundlage ländlicher 
Haushalte (rural livelihoods) sowie die verzögerte ökonomische 
Entwicklung der tadschikischen Gebirgs-Landwirtschaft zeigt, dass 
hier landwirtschaftliche Wissensproduktion und lokale 
Politikgestaltung in einem negativen ko-produktiven Verhältnis 
stehen. Wissen wird aufgewendet zur Kompensation von politischer 
Ambiguität, d.h. Meshwork-Arrangements. Die Unsicherheit bzgl. 
Entscheidungen und politischen Prozessen verursachen ein starkes 
Interesse der Bauern an Resilienz durch politische Absicherung, wie 
etwa die Intensivierung von Netzwerk-Verbindlichkeiten (patron-
client relations). Aufgrund dieses politischen und ökonomischen 
Umfelds entwickeln sich gegenwärtig die epistemischen Kulturen im 
Zarafshantal entlang lokaler Politikgestaltung und 
Machtverhältnisse. Im Zuge dessen verliert Agar-Expertise an 
Bedeutung.  
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Schlussfolgerung: Entwicklungsperspektiven 
Tadschikischer Kleinbauern 
Mit Blick auf die Eingangshypothese, welche die Bedeutung agrar-
technischer Expertise für die kleinbäuerlichen Haushalte im 
Zarafshantal in Frage stellte, belegen die Daten der Feldforschung, 
dass die Bauern Alltagswissen und Wissenspraktiken derzeit als 
besonders relevant für die landwirtschaftliche Lebensgrundlage 
halten. Wissen und Gesellschaft wurden entlang Jasanoffs Diktum 
des „co-productionist thinking” (2004) als gemeinschaftlich 
produziert analysiert. Die Entwicklung von Wissenspraktiken 
korreliert mit der Ambiguität lokaler Meshwork-Politikgestaltung. 
Kleinbauern im Zarafshantal konzentrieren sich nicht auf 
ökonomisches Wachstum sondern auf Resilienz, d.h. Fähigkeiten 
mit Mangel umzugehen. Diese Unterhaltsstrategie erfordert 
spezielle Anstrengungen bezüglich der Politikgestaltung, d.h sie 
bewirkt in der Konsequenz die Akkumulation von Wissensbeständen 
und –praktiken welche sich auf die Politikgestaltung richten und 
nicht landwirtschaftlich produktiv genutzt werden können. 
Agrartechnische Expertise für Innovationen im Produktionsprozess 
ist dadurch in Entstehung und Anwendung behindert. In Folge 
geringer Anwendung und Nachfrage sind Verfügbarkeit und Qualität 
von landwirtschaftlicher Expertise ungenügend und halten nicht 
Schritt mit politischen, sozialen und ökonomischen Veränderungen.  
Lokale epistemische Kulturen sind gegenwärtig nicht auf 
landwirtschaftlicher Expertise gerichtet. Stagnierende Produktion in 
entfernten Gebirgsregionen resultiert nicht aus fehlendem Wissen, 
sondern aus der fehlenden politischen und wirtschaftlichen 
Begründung für agrarische Innovationen. Zur Steigerung 
landwirtschaftlicher Produktivität ist der Ausbruch aus dem 
`negativen´ ko-produktions Zyklus von politikorientierten Wissen 
nötig. Dies erfordert die Stabilisierung lokaler Politikgestaltung, d.h. 
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durch die Reduktion von Meshwork-Regelungen und Klärung der 
Reichweite normativer Systeme. Mit Bezug auf die Landwirtschaft 
ist insbesondere die Vorhersehbarkeit von Entscheidungsprozessen 
von Bedeutung. Auf lokaler Ebene müssten Rechte und Freiräume 
der Bauern besser gesichert werden, sodass diese in 
landwirtschaftliche Innovationen investieren. Ohne Zweifel kollidiert 
eine solche Politik mit Tadschikistans gegenwärtiger neo-
patrimonial-autoritärer Staatsräson. Die gegenwärtige 
Herrschaftspraxis des Staates basiert auf der Rolle regionaler und 
lokaler Machthaber, wogegen staatliche Administration und 
Exekutive kein normatives Korrektiv bilden. Für internationale 
Entwicklungskooperationen ergibt sich aus den 
Forschungsergebnissen insbesondere die Schlussfolgerung, dass die 
schleppende Transformation der tadschikischen Landwirtschaft 
nicht dem Mangel an landwirtschaftlicher Expertise geschuldet ist. 
Entwicklungsinterventionen müssen regionale und lokale 
Organisationen und Institutionen in die Lage versetzten Fragen des 
Zugangs zu landwirtschaftlichen Ressourcen anzusprechen und 
unter Einbeziehung der verschiedenen normativen Systeme zu 
regeln. Kooperationen sollten einerseits die Expertise von Bauern 
fördern sowie andererseits wirtschaftliche und politische Prozesse 
auf regionaler und provinzieller Ebene begleiten. Letztere 
Maßnahmen betreffen insbesondere die Bildung von 
Standardprozeduren und Formaten, nach denen lokale Konflikte 
abgearbeitet werden können.  
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Maps	of	the	Region	
 
 
Map 1  The commonwealth of independent states, CIS. Source: 
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/cis_central_asia_pol_
95.jpg (accessed 12/2016). 
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Map 2  Topography of Tajikistan and its political context of Central Asia.
1
 
Source: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/tajikistan_rel01.jpg  
(accessed 01/2016). 
                                                          
1 The term Central Asia denotes in this research mainly the five post-Soviet 
republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyztan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhistan. 
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Acronyms	and	Glossary	
Agroprom Agricultural department at provincial or district level 
Amri ma’ruf Laymen talking about everyday phenomena to 
convince people about Islam 
Ariza  Notification or complaint letter to the authorities 
Arizaboz Person that frequently writes ariza letters 
Ayni City in the Tajik Zarafshan Valley; capital of a 
homonymous district 
Bobogi  Property claim referring to assets belonging to 
ancestors, i.e. synonym for ‘property of the 
grandfathers’ 
Brigadir Leader of a farm working group in the Soviet 
collective kolkhoz/ sovkhoz farm system 
Collective 
farming 
Until circa 2010 and beyond so called collective 
deqhon farms integrated most households and 
arable land in Zarafshani rural communities 
Dehqon farm
  
Private and independent, i.e. non-collectively 
organized farm household 
Dushanbe Capital city of the Republic of Tajikistan 
Extension Conceptual approach to transfer specialized 
agricultural information and expertise to farmers 
ha Hectare, i.e. 10,000 m2 
hh Household, farm household 
Hokim  Tajik ruler or chief, often used to refer to the district 
chief 
Hukumat Notion for the district administration 
Individualiza-
tion 
Post-Soviet process of dismanteling collective 
agricultural structures 
Islam Prevailing religious belief in Tajikistan with the 
Qur'an as Holy Scripture  
Jamoat Rural municipality often consisting of several villages 
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Kalidi Islom Islamic key or the key to Islam. A decision-making 
procedure based on prayers 
KGB Commonly used abbreviation to refer to the Tajik 
state security committee GKNB 
Khujand   Capital city of Sughd province 
Kolkhoz Soviet self-administrated collective farm enterprise 
Kŭhistoni 
Mastchoh 
District in the upper Zarafshan Valley 
LAO Limited access order, economic and political 
classification introduced by North et al. (2012) 
Leskhoz Forest administration, previously Soviet collective 
forestry enterprise 
Mahalla Local neighbourhood association, smallest self-
governing body in Tajikistan 
MoA Ministry of Agriculture 
NGO Non-governmental organization and INGO for 
international non-governmental organization 
Nohiya Tajik notion for the sub-provincial district, with the 
hukumat as administrative center 
PAKM  Potato Association Kŭhistoni Mastchoh; local NGO of 
the upper Zarafshan area 
Post-Soviet Refers to the collapse of the USSR. Notion for the 
period since Tajik independence 1991  
Viloyat  Tajik notion for province, e.g. viloyati Sughd, Sughd 
province 
Raísi  Chief 
Remittances
  
Payments from workers abroad to households at 
home 
Shuroi deha
  
Tajik term for the local village board; village self-
governing body 
Smallholder 
  
Farm households with average or below average 
access to arable land 
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Somoni  Tajik currency. The average exchange rate of Tajik 
Somoni at the time of field research was at 1€ = 6 to 
6,45 Somoni 
Sotiq  Local square measure in Tajikistan. One sotiq equals 
a 1/100 of a hectare, i.e. 10m2  
Sovkhoz Former Soviet collective farm under provincial or 
national administration 
STS Science and technology studies 
Tinji  Tajik expression for wellness, happiness, 
peacefulness 
USSR  Union of Socialist Soviet Republics 
Welthunger-
hilfe 
WHH, German INGO, active in Tajikistan and the 
Zarafshan Valley 
Zarafshan 
Valley 
Mountainous and isolated sub-region in northern 
Tajikistan along the Zarafshan River, divided in three 
administrative districts, Sughd province 
ZEF Center for Development Research, University of 
Bonn 
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1  Introduction: Agricultural Knowledge in 
Rural Tajikistan 
The present thesis addresses how farmers approach knowledge in 
order to maintain individualized agricultural livelihoods in marginal 
mountainous areas in Tajikistan. Departing from the explicit 
perspective on knowledge and expertise in everyday agricultural 
praxis, the research integrates governance processes, which are 
conceptually considered being co-produced together with 
knowledge. The primary subjects of the study are thus post-Soviet 
individualized agricultural expertise and knowledge practices in the 
context of everyday rural livelihood provision.   
Rural livelihoods in marginal agricultural areas in Tajikistan struggle 
with the insufficient economic viability of local agriculture 
(Welthungerhilfe 2012b). Significant parts of the population in 
remote places as the Zarafshan Valley live below the national 
poverty line (WFP 2015), while agricultural production in 
mountainous agricultural areas stagnates on low level 
(Welthungerhilfe 2012b, 2015). Extension interventions as transfer 
of expertise by NGOs and international organizations experience 
difficulties and insufficient results in Tajikistan (Shtaltovna 2016). 
Previous research outlines that the transition from the collective 
Soviet agriculture to individualized production is a challenge to 
farmers’ livelihoods in all post-Soviet Republics of Central Asia. In 
remote mountainous regions former, highly specialized collective 
production systems ceased to exist, although market-oriented full-
time farm enterprises are still the exception. Marginal agricultural 
areas in Tajikistan face challenges deriving from massive 
demographic changes, limited natural resources, distance to 
markets and uncertain governance arrangements, which lead to a 
situation where farming is not the main source of income of the 
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majority of rural households (Bliss 2008; WFP 2017). By scrutinizing 
the unfolding individualization of agricultural production in remote 
rural areas, the present research follows farmers’ approaches to 
knowledge to maintain agricultural livelihoods. The concept of 
epistemic cultures is introduced to identify the knowledge 
considered relevant by farmers, analysing how particular knowledge 
assets transform and develop within local communities. The 
research seeks to clarify how individualized farm households 
organize livelihoods and agricultural production. How is agricultural 
expertise available, approached and used in post-Soviet Tajik farm 
restructuring processes? Taking into account the moderate demand 
and supply of external agricultural advice, the research asks which 
knowledge is actually mobilized by farmers to ensure their 
individualized agricultural livelihoods? 
Three central findings emerge from field research in the Zarafshan 
Valley in northern Tajikistan. Firstly, there is a crisis of agricultural 
knowledge and expertise. Currently, farmers’ knowledge requests 
and practices are not geared to agricultural production. Large assets 
of previously available agricultural expertise are dismissed as not 
useful and have been lost. New sources of agricultural expertise and 
information are not always available or not trusted. Secondly, 
farmers turn to knowledge practices, which are oriented towards 
governance arrangements, especially concerning access to natural 
resources. In an economic context which is characterized as limited 
access order LAO, governance processes determine the chances of 
pursuing a farming livelihood. Thirdly, the research findings 
underline how epistemic cultures in rural communities are 
developing away from specialized agricultural expertise. Local 
epistemic cultures, in order to settle everyday agricultural affairs, 
have changed in rural Tajikistan. In comparison to the previous 
collective agricultural system, expertise and technical advice appear 
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in crisis, as they are hardly requested and trusted. Thus, current 
epistemic cultures emerge together with the post-Soviet agricultural 
restructuration processes; however, the economic individualization 
does not translate into intensified requests for agricultural 
expertise. The findings demonstrate that farmers do not link agro-
economic development to expertise. Instead, epistemic cultures in 
the Zarafshan Valley shift towards governance oriented knowledge 
practices.  
Post-Soviet Restructuration of the Tajik Agriculture 
The post-Soviet restructuring processes in Tajikistan’s agricultural 
sector widely replaced collective farming with individual 
production.2 Dismantling Soviet kolkhozes and sovkhozes3 started as 
early as the end of 1980’s on local initiative, (Roy 1999, 2007) and 
continued differently throughout the various sub-regions of 
Tajikistan. Since 1992, a series of laws regarding access to land and 
the structure of agricultural farm enterprises have come into 
existence (Caccavale 2005; Hofman 2013). Land reform processes 
and restructuration of farm enterprises have been pursued since 
then with the intention to dissolute collective farm structure and 
individualize agricultural production (Nekbakhtshoev 2016; Sehring 
2009; Tuychi 2014). However, the implementation of land reform 
legislation in Tajikistan is sub-regionally highly diverse. Significant 
differences occur between cotton and non-cotton areas or high and 
low land areas (Hierman and Nekbakhtshoev 2017; Robinson et al. 
2008), for instance with regard to the protracted dismantling of 
                                                          
2 The notion post-Soviet in this study refers basically to chronological 
coherence with the period starting after the collaps of the Soviet Union.  
3 Kolkhoz and sovkhoz were the main types of farm enterprises in the former 
USSR. The termes stand for state controlled collective farming.  
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collective dehqon farms (Hofman and Visser 2014).4 The post-Soviet 
transformation of the agriculture sector released uncertainty among 
farmers and rural dwellers about economic perspectives and 
livelihoods (Dörre and Schütte 2014; Finke 2004; Kraudzun 2016; 
Kreutzmann and Watanabe 2016).  
Agricultural production and output in the Zarafshan Valley is 
characterized by underperformance of farming systems and does 
not provide for the livelihoods of most smallholder households 
(Welthungerhilfe et al. 2008; Welthungerhilfe 2012b, 2012a). 
Despite the individualization of agricultural structures, there is still 
only a very small number of clearly market orientated full time 
private farming enterprises. The majority of rural households in the 
Zarafshan Valley is practising subsistence farming combined with 
non-agricultural income, i.e. remittances that are supplied by family 
members working in the cities or abroad (RuralPovertyPortal 2012; 
The World Bank 2014).5 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Tajik government pursued different policies to individualize the 
agricultural sector. Development theories correlate the privatization 
and individualization of property with increased production 
efficiency (Rizov 2004; Verdery 2004), although, the post-Soviet 
individualized agriculture of Tajikistan did not follow this paradigm. 
                                                          
4 After the dissolution of the kolkhoz/sovkhoz system each member of the 
collective farm was entitled to a quota of land, which usually consisted of a set 
of land-use rights, i.e. shares of irrigated land, unirrigated land, garden land and 
other kinds of land. Despite the completely individual farming that ensued, 
most farmers remained members of the succeeding collective dehqon farm. The 
new collective dehqon farm kept the machinery, buildings and parts of the land 
and livestock for its use.  
5 Poverty headcount rate in Tajikistan has fallen from 72 % in 2003 to 47 % in 
2009, while extreme poverty declined from 42 to 17 % during the same period. 
About 5 million people, approx. 73 % of the Tajik population, live in rural areas 
(2010). About half of them were considered as poor in 2010 
(RuralPovertyPortal 2014). About 50 % of the country’s annual GDP comes 
from remittances. Predominantly young men from rural areas migrate either 
seasonally or long-term (The World Bank 2014: 1). 
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Farmers remain reluctant to start fully market-oriented farming 
businesses. Nominally the Tajik agricultural sector continues to 
grow (Lerman and Sedik 2009a; The World Bank 2014: 9f), however 
this development applies only partially to remote and marginal 
agricultural areas such as the Zarafshan Valley. In the Zarafshan 
Valley, as elsewhere in Tajikistan, economically viable agricultural 
production is realized only by a very small group of local elite 
farmers (Akramov and Shreedhar 2012; ICG 2011; IMF 2012). 
Various factors are complicating the productivity of agricultural 
production systems in Tajik remote rural areas. Farming households 
must cope with harsh natural conditions, limited access to arable 
land, poor infrastructure and distance to markets. Income from 
agriculture is low; most rural households rely on remittances from 
family members working outside the village. Smallholder farmers 
are not able to maintain full time agricultural livelihoods. As 
consequence, a significant part of the local working power, i.e. 
mainly male household members, have left rural communities. This 
entails that many smallholder households are led by women. 
Female lead households in Tajikistan often do not enjoy the same 
room for manoeuver in village affairs as their male counterparts 
(Harris 2012; Mukhamedova and Wegerich 2014).  
Rural Economies as Limited Access Orders 
The individualization of the Tajik agricultural sector takes place 
against the background of a neopatrimonial authoritarian state and 
policy-making. This situation explains inconsistencies of the 
transformation process in the sense that self-proclaimed 
development goals of the Tajik government such as privatization 
and economic reforms did not fully take hold. North et al. provide a 
framework to address the problem of different development paths 
and patterns of political economy (2012: 4). Departing from the 
assumption that every country needs to settle the issue of who 
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controls violence,6 the authors identify “different social orders, 
distinct patterns of organizing society that allow us to 
simultaneously understand the operation of political, economic, and 
other systems” (North et al. 2012: 2). Accordingly, the framework 
classifies states in various access orders, i.e. from limited access 
orders LAO on one end to open access orders OAO on the other 
end, with intermediate steps in between.7 In the view of North at 
al., open access orders are a few Western democracies that ensure 
open access and competition. “Limited access orders solve the 
problem of violence by using the political system to create and 
allocate rents, arising from arrangements such as government 
contracts, land rights, monopolies on business activities, and entry 
to restricted job markets” (North et al. 2012: 2). This concept of LAO 
resembles a highly Western perspective as full open access orders 
display a mere theoretical ideal type situation (Chibba 2010). Also, 
market inconsistencies and democratic deficits in Western countries 
are not sufficiently considered in the framework. The somewhat 
schematic conception presented by North et al. (2012) is used in the 
present research to indicate the situation of permanent interlinkage 
of the state administration, economic and political actors in the 
context of post-Soviet Central Asia. Following North et al.(2012), the 
patterns of societal organization in several Central Asian republics 
as i.e. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan qualify 
as limited access order (Petrick and Pomfret 2016). The complicated 
and contradictory processes of the individualization of the Tajik 
                                                          
6 “In particular, this concept allows us to understand how society controls 
violence, the form of its institutions, the nature of its organizations—especially 
who can form them—and the dynamics of its economy. All of human history has 
had only three social orders in our framework” (North et al. 2012:2). For critical 
applications of this concept see: Melville and Mironyuk (2016) and Grabowski 
(2017). 
7 In fact, the concern of the paper is to understand what makes countries shift 
from one access order to another (North et al. 2012).  
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agricultural sector provide a case for a LAO.8 “LAO are political 
arrangements in which the ruler or the coalition in power limits the 
access to opportunities for other political or economic 
organizations. The dominant coalition uses the organizations under 
its own control to create and distribute rents [..]” (Petrick and 
Pomfret 2016: 17). This mechanism is confirmed by Driscolls 
analysis of the Tajik warlords coalition game to maintain power 
(Driscoll 2015). It is in this regard that changes to the agricultural 
sector in the post-Soviet Central Asia are delicate as they require 
the patronage of the president to mobilize sub-regional and local 
clients. Changes in the agricultural sector are linked to access 
regulations, which are the domain of sub-regional elites. Due to the 
neopatrimonial features of the Central Asian states, change 
processes and centralized reform efforts release insecurity at local 
level. Local rulers possess significant leverage to control and 
subordinate farmers what obliges the central government to 
respect their interests too. Petrick and Pomfret identify a deadlock 
between the centre and periphery as particularity of the Soviet 
heritage and ask how agricultural policy making is possible within 
the limited access orders of Central Asia (2016).  
Political Economy and Agricultural Policies in Central 
Asia as LAO 
Although the former Soviet republics of Central Asia have 
comparable political systems and were classified as neopatrimonial 
LAO’s, the countries are pursuing different paths of individualizing 
                                                          
8 Tajikistan still maintains significant laws, regulations as well as Soviet legacies 
to control and steer agricultural production and commercialization. Farm land 
is property of the state. Laws are often used to limit farmers room for 
manoeuver, not to guarantee rights. In the cotton sector, mandatory national 
production aims, so called norma, enforce monopolies in the cotton industry, 
crop quotas and manipulate farm debts (Hofmann 2017). 
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the agricultural sector,9 with different types of agricultural policies 
being implemented (Petrick and Pomfret 2016). Referring to 
economic output, the Kazakh model of authoritarian, bureaucratic 
modernisation (Petrick and Pomfret 2016: 19f) has realized best 
results throughout the region.10 While the Kazakh path of 
authoritarian modernisation appears a viable option to develop the 
rural economy, Tajikistan’s agricultural policies, however, as 
comparable LAO case have had significantly less impact on 
agricultural production. Deviant agricultural development may be 
explained by the weakness of the Tajik leadership, which fails to 
exercise power over the entire national territory (Driscoll 2015; 
Heathershaw 2009). The sub-regionally selective implementation of 
the Tajik land reform is a case in point: “When development policy 
advice threatens the logic of stability in limited access orders, these 
societies often resist or sabotage the recommended measures” 
(North et al. 2012). In the case of Tajikistan, this consideration 
implies to recognize that specific agricultural policies formulated in 
the centre are never meant to be implemented on local level, but 
serve stabilizing arrangements of elites “coalition game” (Driscoll 
2015). Due to the centre-periphery power sharing in the 
neopatrimonial state, local leaders have significant leverage to 
derail reform efforts. Nekbakhtshoev identified the collective farm 
managers as main opponents to “decentralized land reform 
strategy” (2016: 56). No doubt, incentives of the diverse groups of 
local actors to push forward or derail agricultural individualization 
are very different. Liberal policies, as land privatization and open 
access to markets and resources potentially means a limitation of 
                                                          
9 Within the framework of North et al. (2012) development within LAOs is 
anticipated. Kazakhstan possibly applies to the category of Basic LAO—
Competitive Clientelist (North et al. 2012: 10). 
10 The figures available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/tajikistan/gdp-
from-agriculture underline the diverse development. Data retrieved 01/2017.   
 45 
the leaders’ power base, as the resources for the own network are 
reduced  (Markowitz 2016: 517). A consequence of this 
constellation is the deadlock of agricultural policies on national level 
as the ruler or the coalition in power is primarily occupied to 
maintain the status quo.11 Agricultural restructuration and 
economic profitability are not necessarily central concerns of rulers 
in LAO regimes. The interests of elites may contradict with the 
efforts of authoritarian modernisation, e.g. as indicate experiences 
from the restructuration of the Tajik cotton sector (Hofman and 
Visser 2014; Nekbakhtshoev 2016; Van Atta 2008). Implementing 
change processes to individualize the cotton sector failed and went 
astrain in the various Tajik sub-regions. While the central 
government imposes reform policies, sub-regional distribution of 
power and interests may not be conducive to agricultural 
restructuring. Heathershaw underlines that local leaders eventually 
have the last word on how policies are implemented: “An emphasis 
on personal `authority´ necessitates that practices that are de jure 
codified are de facto dependent on the person who implements 
them” (2009: 112). 
Race for Assets: Restrained Agricultural Markets in 
Tajikistan  
Characteristic of limited access orders is the subsequent “race for 
assets” (Petrick and Pomfret 2016: 18) which creates collateral 
damage to the states’ individualization efforts. From a rural 
perspective, the neopatrimonial political system in Tajikistan seems 
primarily occupied to ensure elites’ privileged access to rural assets. 
The individualization of the Tajik agricultural sector turned out 
favourably only for a few rural elites and their clients. As in other 
                                                          
11 “How rural economies are governed matters because it alters the balance of 
power between rulers and local elites by determining which set of actors 
controls the flow of rents” (Markowitz 2016: 516).   
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post-Soviet republics, individualization of the Tajik agriculture, 
“materialized partly as an unintended by-product of state 
withdrawal, privatization rules were implemented only cautiously. 
After all, state actors had an interest in foggy rules, as they 
weakened the bargaining power of outsiders and prevented the 
possible persecution of those who benefited from dubious deals ” 
(Petrick and Pomfret 2016: 18). Sub-regional coalition parties of the 
president may interfere directly in social and political processes, 
putting ad hoc decisions before legally binding directives. The 
implied lack of the rule of law contributes and enables the 
deliberate creation of uncertainty, starting at the president and 
trickling down to lower tiers administration and local elites. This is a 
common governance practice in post-Soviet rural societies, which 
provides for the representatives of the state and their clients ways 
to demonstrate power and gain additional income (Christophe 
2005, 2006; Trevisani 2011). Due to the repeated and inherent 
contradictions of laws and regulations, it is difficult not to get in 
conflict with legislation in everyday life (Heathershaw 2009: 112). 
This situation creates uncertainty and is part of the specific post-
Soviet type of political domination to maintain ambivalent rules and 
regulations. The resulting ambiguity is at best double twisted, i.e. 
ambivalence about national laws combined with uncertainty about 
state administration and local institutions (Christophe 2005). On the 
one hand side the rural population deliberately remains in a status 
of “legal illiteracy” (Sehring 2006: 95), while at the same time the 
significance and assertiveness of local organizations and institutions 
is fluctuating. State authorities maintain their dominant role 
without actually being present. In rural areas local elites assume 
functions of the state. Since state agencies often rule contradictory 
and ambiguously, farmers or businessmen are coerced to arrange 
protection [Russ.: krisha] for their assets through elites that are 
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powerful enough to remove ever-imminent administrative obstacles 
(Christophe 2006; Driscoll 2015: 52, 102). Requests from individual 
actors in rural areas cannot count on support by state organizations 
and are required to manoeuver to resort to patron-client relations. 
Such relations are in itself resources of power and eventually 
patrons may provide assistance in individual governance processes 
(Boboyorov 2013a). However, in return for getting under the 
umbrella of powerful patrons – who are not seldom part of the 
public administration and thus representatives of the state – 
individuals are required to agree and promote the ideology and 
ruling paradigm of the state and government (Heathershaw and 
Herzig 2012). Such sub-cutan interrelations explain why crisis and 
insecurities in the political centre structures the reproduction of the 
system in the periphery (Erdmann and Engel 2006). The immanent 
intersection of the state ideological programme with everyday 
governance processes is characteristic for agricultural LAO and the 
post-Soviet political economy in particular. Resulting ambiguity and 
unaccountability have eminent impact on the agricultural 
individualization.  
“[P]rivatization in Central Asia, when implemented, does not 
mean at all the creation of a new class of individual actors, 
market-oriented and supporting democracy and direct 
representation. In fact, almost everywhere it seems that so-
called privatization has respected the traditional networks 
and solidarity groups” (Roy 1999: 119f).  
Following this perspective corroborates that in the current state of 
agricultural restructuration the individualization of assets has been 
disparate and incomplete. Reforms to individualize agriculture 
unfolded sub-regionally different and provoked farmers’ race for 
assets (Kandiyoti 2007; Nekbakhtshoev 2016; Van Atta 2008).   
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Agricultural Expertise and Political Economy in Rural 
Tajikistan 
Against the background of protracted economic growth and 
challenging livelihood provision the research analyzes the role of 
knowledge in the individualized agricultural production among 
Zarafshani farmers in northern Tajikistan. Knowledge is, with 
reference to Berger and Luckmann (1984), socially constructed. 
Agricultural knowledge and expertise in the Tajik Zarafshan Valley is 
thus all the knowledge that farmers consider relevant to agriculture. 
For analytical reasons this research destinguishs various knowledge 
assets, mainly agricultural expertise and knowledge practices that 
manage everyday life. Both categories are indicative and 
occasionally overlap. Access to agricultural expertise has profoundly 
changed since Tajik national independence. In course of the collaps 
of the Soviet kolkhoz and sovkhoz system, many of the institutional 
networks between experts, advisory personnel, research 
organizations, administration and policy makers ceased to exist 
(Shtaltovna and Mandler 2012). Agricultural expert knowledge that 
was integrated in Soviet research structures, is either lost or 
became outdated (Evers and Wall 2006; Morgounov and Zuidema 
2001), while Tajik national research programms drastically 
shortened (Beniwal et al. 2010). Agricultural offices coordinated by 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) exist on different state levels, 
however are not always available and hardly considered a source 
for reliable information and advice (Bakozoda et al. 2011; Van Atta 
2014). Farmers may select from a few sources for agricultural 
knowledge as external NGO and iNGO who potentially offer 
specialized advice. In a limited way also the available media is a 
source of agricultural information. Research points out that services 
are often of poor quality and not up to farmers’ requests 
(Shtaltovna 2016). Farmers in remote areas of Tajikistan are 
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reluctant to invest in market-oriented production and innovation. 
Reluctant production and innovation among farmers were usually 
interpreted as lack of fit of extension and advisory services to the 
specific Tajik conditions (Engel and Simonetti-Techert 2015). 
Further, the discontinuity of external assistance programmes and 
projects create not only short-sighted results, but raises also little 
expectations on the site of farmers (MEDA 2006). Farmers request 
timely answers to agro-economic and political questions, which are 
not provided by the extension services available (Engel and 
Simonetti-Techert 2015: 5; Shtaltovna 2016). Considering the 
protracted agricultural development in remote rural areas and 
subsequent poverty illustrates that extension efforts and advisory 
projects failed to generate knowledge and develop locally adapted 
agricultural innovations (Mandler 2010; Shtaltovna and Mandler 
2012). Agricultural extension practitioners aim for the “window of 
opportunity” (Hornidge et al. 2016; Roeling 2009) that allows to 
innovate, release investments and implement innovations. With 
reference to the particular challenges of advisory services, research 
indicated that the lack of agricultural innovation in post-Soviet 
countries results from adverse governmental policies paired with 
the absence of economic incentives (Mandler 2016; Petrick and 
Pomfret 2016).  
Knowledge Structured by the Political Economy 
Implicit to the assumption of positive interlinkages between 
economic privatization and increased productivy is the belief that 
access to knowledge and information will trigger agricultural 
innovations which subsequently lead to production gains and 
improved livelihoods (Hoffmann et al. 2009; Roeling 2009; Sanginga 
2009). Although this logic generally holds true for capitalist 
economic environments, the Tajik neopatrimonial authoritarian 
political context appears to spoil and slow down the process of 
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progressive distribution of innovations. Local farmers operate 
economically and politically in circumstances described as LAO, 
monitored by neopatrimonial state authorities and local elites 
(Boboyorov 2013a; Harris 2012; Heathershaw 2009; Lemon 2016a, 
2016b; Roche and Heathershaw 2010). LAO conditions effectively 
stall agricultural innovation efforts (Mandler 2016) as state and 
powerful elites may easily interfere in the public sphere and 
domains of knowledge production where they promote own 
perspectives and programmes (Amsler 2007). On local level state 
and sub-regional elites are able to limit the political and public 
sphere accessible for rural dwellers. Thus, limited access means to 
diminish farmers prospects and incentives to approach information 
and advisory services up to the point that market-oriented 
production is deliberately abandoned (De Danieli and Shtaltovna 
2016). Van Assche underlines that in the post-Soviet states of 
Central Asia and the Caucasus specific agricultural knowledge 
cannot be separated from general dispositions of power and is 
unthinkable from governance (2016). I use a definition of 
governance as decision making and implementation of decisions 
(Mielke 2012). More specifically, in the context of Tajik rural areas a 
conceptualization of meshwork governance (Delanda 1995; Ingold 
2011) is applied which captures the diversity of post-Soviet 
governance practices. The notion of meshwork refers to the non-
binary character of either state rulings or local governance. 
Meshwork governance arrangements describe decisions and 
implementations through the simultaneous assemblage of 
institutions, processes, authorities (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 
2003). Governance unfolds through various arrangements as 
competing and overlapping normative systems that refer to local 
traditions, the Tajik legislation and state ideology or refer to the 
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public understanding of Islam. Thus, such decisions are 
unpredictable and difficult to replicate.  
Epistemic cultures outline the context to particular assets of 
knowledge, i.e. how knowledge is present or absent in certain fields 
or sub-regions. Local epistemic cultures emerge co-produced by 
governance processes and the social construction of knowledge in 
rural areas. 
In the process of agricultural restructuration, some knowledge 
assets are growing while others are thwarted or simply fall out of 
interest. There is very little research available on knowledge in rural 
areas of Central Asia, especially in relation to the governance 
arrangements in place. With regard to the development 
perspectives of rural Tajikistan, this aspect is important and still 
under-researched, for which reason the present thesis seeks to 
close this gap. The research starts from the assumption that the 
individualization of the Tajik agriculture changed smallholders 
approach to agricultural knowledge. The post-Soviet transformation 
of agricultural knowledge structures forced farmers to develop an 
individual approach to agricultural expertise.   
Knowledge and Expertise in the Individualized 
Agriculture?  
The present research addresses farmers approach to agricultural 
expertise, information preferences and knowledge practices in the 
context of uncertain political conditions and transforming rural 
livelihoods. The research is going beyond the analysis of extension 
interventions in Tajikistan, considering farmers’ everyday 
knowledge practices to run their households. Agricultural 
restructuration is not perceived as economic process, but outcome 
of political changes and sub-regional power arrangements. In the 
course of the individualization of the Tajik agriculture, farmers have 
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to rely on self-dependent agrarian knowledge. The research seeks 
to clarify: How individualized farm households organize livelihoods 
and agricultural production? How is agricultural expertise and 
knowledge available, approached and used? 
To capture the dynamics released by agricultural individualization, I 
adopt to a perspective on epistemic cultures that subsumes all 
assets of knowledge which farmers’ link to agriculture. Local 
epistemic cultures, i.e. local cultures of knowledge production and 
sharing, describe how knowledge assets are situated in society, how 
they are created and warranted. This perspective provides insights 
about the value and significance that a community draws to 
particular assets of knowledge. How did rural epistemic cultures 
develop in the context of agricultural individualization in 
Tajikistan? Which knowledge is requested and mobilized by 
farmers to ensure individualized agricultural livelihoods? 
Methodology: Knowledge Practices in Agriculture 
Parting from the initial problem statement of economically 
depressed agricultural development among smallholder farmers in 
marginal rural areas in Tajikistan, this interdisciplinary research 
draws on development studies, sociology and ethnography to 
capture in particular the role of knowledge in this context.12 The 
approach of doing development oriented problem driven research, 
accepts different understandings of what the problem is (Ziai 2011). 
Therefore the protracted agro-economic development is analysed 
interdisciplinary; agricultural production is conceptualized as 
                                                          
12 This entails the understanding of interrelations relevant for development 
policies and to encourage the rapid integration of new scientific knowledge into 
practice. Development studies is a multidisciplinary branch of social science 
concerning the prospects for future developments mainly in poor southern 
countries. 
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intersection of knowledge and governance arrangements.13 The 
present research is using case evidence as the genuine domain of 
social sciences to produce narratives that explain the complexities 
of farmers’ knowledge practices. This approach creates interlacing 
narratives along case studies of certain knowledge assets as 
specialized expertise on potato or rice production. Other cases 
describe knowledge practices to claim access to land (bobogi claims) 
or to exercise power (ariza letters). Case studies are realized by a 
rigoros sociological research approach combined with qualitative 
anthropological field research. The geographic boundaries of the 
Zarafshan Valley constitute one part of the frame of this study. This 
includes to make `developmental factors´ explicit over time, as a 
string of concrete and interrelated events (Flyvbjerg 2011), which is 
particularly relevant in the context of frequent Tajik policy changes 
towards the reform efforts. Another frame of the study constitutes 
farmers considerations of relevant knowledge to safeguard 
livelihoods. Thus, the mixed sociological approach enables to 
combine specific strengths of case studies, in-depth narratives and 
context, to address the above indicated development issue of a 
protracted agro-economic performance in remote rural areas. 
  
                                                          
13 Flyvbjerg speaks of development-oriented research (2001, 2006).  
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The Zarafshan Valley as Place of Study 
 
Map 3  Topography of Tajikistan and the Zarafshan Valley. Sources: 
google/maps.com (accessed 01/2016) and 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/tajikistan_rel01.jpg 
(accessed 01/2016). Modified by the author. 
The research took place in rural communities along the Zarafshan 
River in the north of Tajikistan. Data for this thesis has been 
collected by extended field research mainly in upper and lower 
parts of the Zarafshan Valley, especially in Panjakent and Kŭhistoni 
Mastchoh districts. Research has been undertaken in four villages 
that were considered representative for the different agricultural 
production systems along the Zarafshan River. The Zarafshan Valley 
has been selected as it is rather remote from administrative, 
political and economic centres in Tajikistan. However, with regard 
to climate and natural resources, administrative set up, agricultural 
production systems, topography and access to markets it is easily 
comparable to other sub-regions in Tajikistan and Central Asia. At 
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the same time, the Zarafshan area is poorly researched. This study is 
based on data collected during eight months field research in 
Tajikistan in 2011 and 2012. The foremost way of gathering data 
was interviewing farmers in their home villages. The interaction 
with farmers followed an interdisciplinary methodology consisting 
of participant observation, semi-structured repeated interviews, 
and implementing a farm diary survey (FDS). Long term 
ethnographic field research allowed also for repeated semi-
structured interviews. The methodology combined specific 
strengths of case studies, in-depth narratives and context, on the 
one side, and complement the study with quantitative data of the 
farm diary survey (Tajik Farm Diary 2013). Figure 1 below outlines 
the general argumentation of this study.  
 
 
Figure 1  Post-Soviet transformation of the Tajik agricultural sector with its 
impact on epistemic cultures and agricultural expertise. Source: The 
author. 
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Structure of the Thesis: Outlook on Chapters 
The following chapter two recounts general theoretical terms and 
conclusions used in the research. The chapter provides the 
theoretical framework of the present research. Initially knowledge is 
discussed in the context of rural areas as being socially constructed, 
which concerns both, everyday knowledge as well as agricultural 
expertise. Taking into account the dynamics of knowledge, its 
emergence, use and loss, the perspective on epistemic cultures is 
introduced. The concept of epistemic cultures outlines the context 
to particular assets of knowledge and thereupon underlining the 
fact that knowledge comes into being co-produced together with 
power and governance. The chapter proceeds with a discussion of 
various governance concepts, while putting particular emphasis on 
governance in post-Soviet societies. It reveals that in Central Asia 
Western theoretical governance approaches not fully apply, instead 
the mid-range concept of meshwork governance is found more 
suitable. Meshwork governance combines structural and processual 
views on governance. In the remaining part of this chapter the 
specific characteristics of post-Soviet governance arrangements in 
Tajikistan and Central Asia are discussed. Chapter three relates on 
empirical data from field research. The background to Tajik farm 
restructuring processes is discussed together with the political 
economy that initiated and maintains these changes. The chapter 
highlights the various stakeholders involved in the transition from 
collective to individualized agriculture in Tajikistan. The chapter 
concludes with an overview on how agricultural information and 
advice are available in Tajikistan today. The specific research 
questions and methodology used to address matters are presented 
in chapter four. The chapter elaborates the assumed shift of rural 
epistemic cultures from agricultural expertise towards governance 
oriented knowledge practices. This research entails a particular 
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social science approach to address these questions and relate 
findings to the general rural development in Tajikistan. Chapter five 
details the environmental set up of Zarafshan Valley, the emergence 
of individualized agriculture and current livelihood provision. It 
provides empirical insights of farming in the Zarafshan Valley, 
especially on the complicated access arrangements to arable land. 
In the context of limited access orders these arrangements have 
settled unequal distributions.  
Chapter six to chapter eight resemble the empirical core of the 
study. Chapter six addresses the role of knowledge in the 
individualized Zarafshani agriculture. It reveals the crisis of 
agricultural expertise on local level, which farmers consider of 
disputable quality. Agricultural expertise from outside the 
community is simply not much requested. The chapter discusses 
three examples of how knowledge is approached in the Zarafshan. 
First, agricultural information and expertise, provided for instance 
by the media, NGO and external actors. Second, explicit agricultural 
expertise is discussed with regard to seed potatoes. Third, 
knowledge farmers consider relevant to manoeuver administrative 
issues, i.e. the case of establishing the individual dehqon farm. 
Chapters seven and eight discuss prevailing knowledge practices in 
the Zarafshan Valley. These refer to principal issues of local farmers 
that is safeguarding and increasing the households’ access to land. 
Chapter seven elaborates on local means to determine access to 
land by using the example of bobogi arrangements. It turns out that 
the state and its legal regulations are only selectively adhered in 
rural areas. Chapter eight displays another way of how knowledge is 
mobilized in the Zarafshan Valley. Ariza complaint letters are a 
frequent and ubiqous practice to potentially exercise power over 
others. In contrast to the crisis of specialized knowledge presented 
in chapter six, the local institutions bobogi and ariza are presented 
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as examples of localised modes of contesting knowledge in rural 
areas. Chapter nine discusses the findings of field research. The 
individualization of agriculture created in the Zarafshani agriculture 
large bloc of smallholder farmers with severe difficulties to maintain 
a livelihood and who are limited in their potentials of organizing 
agricultural production. Taking into account the high level of 
specialization during the collective Soviet agriculture, the research 
reveals shifts of epistemic cultures that are responsible for the crisis 
of agricultural expertise in current Zarafshani agricultural 
production. The findings show that the focus of local epistemic 
cultures lies on governance arrangements. Local farmers seek to 
participate in governance processes, which are characterized as 
notoriously uncertain meshwork arrangements. Thus, knowledge 
practices focus on access arrangements, limiting the options of 
competitors or safeguarding own property. Re-orientation of 
epistemic cultures is aligned with the failures of agrarian expertise 
in the Zarafshan Valley. Agricultural expertise is out of use as long as 
individual farmers are not equipped with contextual, everyday 
knowledge, for example strong neopatrimonial networks, which 
allow valuating knowledge and putting expertise into practice. At 
last, chapter ten draws conclusions of the findings and their 
meaning for the future development of the Tajik agriculture. 
Uncertain governance conditions are not favourable for farmers to 
implement new knowledge as farmers choose to invest in resilience 
strategies. Failures of governance create a vacuum that allows those 
more powerful local actors to use the uncertain governance 
arrangements in their interest, while those less connected and less 
powerful will have difficulties making use oft he vacuum in their 
interest. In this regard, knowledge practices remain predominant in 
rural epistemic cultures as long as no solution to uncertain 
governance arrangements is found. Agricultural expertise itself does 
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not ensure agricultural production and rural livelihood. Thus, at 
present time, local epistemic cultures in the Zarafshan Valley are 
caught in a negative co-production cycle of uncertain governance 
and knowledge practices. In order foster rural and agricultural 
development this negative cycle has to be overcome. The findings 
suggest that stabilizing governance arrangements, i.e. reducing 
meshwork governance and the impact of diverse normative 
systems, would be an incentive to farmers to consider agricultural 
expertise.  
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2  Knowledge and Governance in Rural 
Central Asia 
The following chapter explains the theoretical aspects of how 
knowledge and governance are interconnected in Central Asian 
rural communities. Initially, knowledge is discussed in the context of 
rural areas as being socially constructed, which concerns both, 
everyday knowledge as well as agricultural expertise. Taking into 
account the dynamics of the emergence of knowledge, its use and 
loss, the perspective on epistemic cultures is introduced. Epistemic 
cultures outline the context to particular assets of knowledge and 
thereupon underlining the fact that knowledge comes into being co-
produced together with power and governance. Establishing such 
co-productionist thinking underlines the presence of power and 
governance interventions in the process of the social construction 
of knowledge. Knowledge and governance are therefore 
conceptually considered inseparable.  
The chapter continuous with discussing the conceptualization of 
governance, with particular emphasis on research concepts that 
address governance processes in post-Soviet societies. In the 
Central Asian rural context, Western theoretical governance 
approaches not fully apply. I therefore develop the mid-range 
concept of meshwork governance in post-Soviet areas to avoid a 
binary perspective on governance as state rulings versus local 
governance. The notion of meshwork is meant to capture various 
processes that lead to governance and potentially to the emergence 
of order against the background of the simultaneous assemblage of 
institutions, processes and authorities. Meshwork governance 
combines structural and processual elements, which helps to 
explain the specific characteristics of post-Soviet governance 
arrangements in Central Asia. Meshwork governance conditions 
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exercise decisive influence regarding the co-production of rural 
epistemic cultures.  
Epistemic Cultures in Agriculture and Rural Areas 
Following a social constructivist approach to knowledge in 
agriculture and rural areas, this conceptual chapter aims to 
illuminate how members of society “come to know and 
simultaneously create what is real” (Giddens 2009: 273). In order to 
broaden the understanding of rural knowledge construction and 
comprehend sub-regional differences in Tajikistan, the notion of 
epistemic cultures is adapted to underline that knowledge is 
constructed in the context of individual affairs, external 
interventions, economic trends and local governance processes. 
This approach builds on insights from the sociology of knowledge 
and of science and technology studies (STS). Epistemic cultures 
highlight the particular context to knowledge assets, analysing 
practices and beliefs that constitute a culture’s attitude towards 
knowledge and its ways of justifying knowledge claims. Knorr-Cetina 
introduced the concept of epistemic cultures as “those amalgams of 
arrangements and mechanisms-bonded through affinity, necessity, 
and historical coincidence – which, in a given field, make up how we 
know what we know” (1999: 1). The field of epistemic cultures 
refers in this study to agriculture and rural communities. The 
ground-breaking study of Knorr-Cetina established epistemic 
cultures as central perspective in STS: “Epistemic cultures are 
cultures that create and warrant knowledge, and the premier 
knowledge institution throughout the world is, still, science” (1999: 
1). While this perspective provides interesting insights, the 
concentration on scientific knowledge in academic institutions was 
criticised for ignoring cultural aspects. “Culture has been defined 
rather narrowly as practice, in this case the various practices used to 
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establish and maintain machineries of knowledge production” 
(Evers 2000: 11). Successively, the perspective of STS broadened its 
approach to knowledge and epistemic cultures were studied also in 
other fields apart from science (Jasanoff 2004; Wynne 1989). Evers 
reclaims the perspective of epistemic cultures for sociology, as 
these are “not only found in the laboratories of natural science 
research” (Evers 2000: 11) but in other parts of society too. 
Epistemic cultures can be identified around local arrangements, 
such as agriculture, which is structuring rural societies in Tajikistan. 
In the present research, the concept of epistemic cultures entails 
the analytic view on particular knowledge assets [Wissensbestände] 
in society combined with the specific context of governance and 
power.  
Defining Knowledge  
From an individual perspective, knowledge is a means to make 
informed decisions, necessary to strategically manoeuvre everyday 
processes. This implies an understanding of knowledge as sustained 
continuum of information, capacities and practices that enable 
actors to act. Defining knowledge is a first-rate philosophical 
question with long tradition, dating back to the Greek antique. Plato 
considered knowledge in the book Theaetetus as “justified true 
belief” (In:  Gabriel 2013: 3). In Plato’s conception the individual in 
the centre of the epistemological process of substantiating 
knowledge. For knowledge, to come into being, there needs to be 
an ontological attachment to the individual cognition. Although, 
knowledge is bound to the actions of the single human, the 
epistemic findings need to meet within a truth-apt correlation 
[Wahrheitsbedingung des Wissensanspruchs] (Gabriel 2013: 5). A 
later definition by Duns Scotus in the 15th century takes the social 
aspect of knowledge into account: “Knowledge means explanation 
of the order of things" (Scotus 610: cap. IV, 6 et 7 concl.). Explaining 
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the order of things to others is bound to inter-subjective 
transmission. Being able to explain an action is an act of knowledge 
sharing. Scotus refers here to an important feature of knowledge: It 
is bound to society and shared with others. Thus, while knowledge 
is of central importance for individual action and attached to the 
individual, it is not a discovery of social constructivism that 
knowledge is dependent from society too. I will elaborate the social 
construction of knowledge further below. There is on the one hand 
the affirmative role of society to confirm truth claims of knowledge 
assets. On the other hand Scheler established already in his late 
works of 1928 the concept of knowledge as a basic condition of 
individual being (Seinsverhältnis). Rather than a static condition 
(commodity), he marked knowledge as “becoming” (werden) 
(Scheler 1976: 70). This processual aspect of knowledge, enabling 
the individual to act, has received much scholarly attention, also 
beyond the sociology of knowledge.14 Stehr and Grundman 
understand knowledge as capacity for social action 
(Handlungsvermögen), and referring to scientific knowledge as 
“capacity for action or capacities to intervene” (2005: 11). Putting 
competences as central feature of knowledge were outlined already 
earlier by Dewey and Bentley (1949), and result from individual 
potential to combine the known with the enacted knowing (In: 
Stehr 2004: 87). According to this strand of the sociology of 
knowledge, individual knowledge is learned from society, shared 
with society and required to interact with others. Knowledge is 
considered “more as a competence to do something than a compact 
good that one can transport and store” (Rammert 2004: 86f). 
Knowledge and individual action are closely interrelated, to the 
extent that actions represent a form of tacit knowledge (Knoblauch 
                                                          
14 The approach has been taken up for instance in the actor-network theory 
(ANT) by Bruno Latour.  
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2010: 163). While sharing the considerations for action, Stehr and 
Grundmann underline that the “realization of capacities of action 
and that of power, or better, control over some of the 
circumstances of action, are allies” (2005: 11). In this perception 
knowledge figures as instruction for action, while action is the 
evidence of knowledge. Similar to the consideration of Duns Scotus 
above, the connection of knowledge is an implicit reference to 
collective sharing. Flyvbjerg underlines that individual knowledge 
cannot be separated from society as it is learned and shared 
(Flyvbjerg 2001: 20f). In its more elaborated form, already the 
standard definition of knowledge involves today the understanding 
of an “Erkenntniszustand allgemeiner intersubjektiv-vermittelbarer 
Sicherheit bzgl. der Kenntnis einzelner Gegenstände oder 
prozessualer Vorgänge” (Neuser 1996: 574). 
Prioritizing Knowledge 
Knowledge assets in society are subject to selection and 
prioritization. Despite claims of eternal relevancy for certain 
physical laws or religious beliefs, knowledge is ontologically 
alternating. The interpretation of information or the accumulation 
of meaning are neither static, but follow temporal and spatial 
change processes. Referring to Foucault, contemporary post-
modern philosophers dismiss the concept of truth or universal 
knowledge [universals] (Clegg et al. 2014: 7f). These are somehow 
delicate considerations when being linked to societies with closed 
world views and ruling hegemonic perspectives, ideologies and 
dominant strands of knowledge. Historical research for instance on 
science and academic activities, literature or economy in modern 
totalitarian regimes such as Fascist-Germany or the Soviet Union 
revealed vast evidence for very strict policies regarding knowledge. 
Flyvbjerg remarks that potentially prevailing “norms cannot be 
given a universal grounding independent of those people and that 
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context” (2001: 100). Thus, context is decisive for what and how 
knowledge counts. In rural communities for example, certain bodies 
of knowledge are canonized, while other assets do not apply. I will 
address the issue further below with regard to the situatedness of 
knowledge and explain why societies construct the stock of 
knowledge differently. The process of selecting and prioritizing 
knowledge continues through mutual recognition or non-
recognition of different assets of knowledge. Accordingly, in 
everyday practice a short term accumulation of knowledge on 
particular issues takes place while other assets of knowledge are 
neglected or even abandoned, due to non-relevancy. In this regard, 
the factual loss of knowledge is taken as empirical evidence for the 
permanent structuring processes of knowledge assets (Evers and 
Wall 2006).  
The Co-production of Knowledge Assets and Epistemic 
Cultures 
Interdisciplinary scholars, such as Long, decline to engage in 
theorizing knowledge for emphasising its application and relevance: 
“I distance myself from general epistemological debates on the 
nature of knowledge and knowledge universals. Instead I aim to 
understand how knowledge impinges on the ordering and re-
ordering processes of everyday life” (2001: 171). Long’s approach 
focuses on the practical and tangible traces of knowledge in society. 
Scrutinizing particular bodies of knowledge in agriculture and rural 
areas, it appears appropriate to further adapt the framework of 
epistemic cultures in order to understand what and how things are 
known in the processes of ordering everyday life. While local 
epistemic cultures are potentially open-ended and un-disclosed, 
they however display how certain bodies of knowledge dominate in 
the community and other knowledge assets get lost. This research 
perspective is based on the idea that knowledge is socially 
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constructed in society, a system of inter-subjectively shared beliefs 
that guide how people make sense of their environment. Stocks and 
preferences of knowledge assets are locally diverse, because of 
differing value systems and construction practices. Due to its 
foundation in scientific communities, STS originally did not question 
social interests and previous believe in procedures of knowledge 
production, relating to concepts such as boundary work (Gieryn 
1983). This changed when STS scholars started scrutinizing the ‘co-
production of science and social order’ (Jasanoff 2004). By 
introducing what she calls the ‘idiom of co-production’ Jasanoff 
asks: “Does it any longer make sense to assume that scientific 
knowledge comes into being independent of political thought and 
action or that social institutions passively rearrange themselves to 
meet technology’s insistent demands?” (2004: 15). Applying a co-
productionist thinking of “natural and social orders as being 
produced together” (Jasanoff, 2004: 2) helps to focus on the drivers 
that structure epistemic cultures. As such, the STS perspective 
adopts a conception of an analytically inseparable relationship 
between governance, knowledge and power, glued together by a 
certain social order (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Jasanoff 2004) and 
thus converging to questions raised by the sociology of knowledge.  
The Social Construction of Knowledge in Everyday Life 
The sociology of knowledge, with conceptual inspirations from STS, 
allows addressing real world problems, such as knowledge in 
agriculture. This is conceptually and methodologically central for the 
present study, which seeks to identify knowledge assets that are 
actually requested and applied by smallholder farmers. The 
framework of epistemic cultures is adapted in order to understand 
how knowledge is created and warranted in different environments, 
how knowledge actually contributes to the agricultural 
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development in the Tajik Zarafshan Valley. This approach may deter 
inconsistencies of knowledge assets, it intendeds to display external 
and internal interferences with local epistemic cultures, displaying 
how knowledge is present, or absent, in certain fields or sub-
regions. With regard to Foucault, I perceive knowledge exposed and 
locked to power, normative programmes and governmental 
paradigms (1989). The conceptualization of epistemic cultures 
allows to integrate diverging processes and interests in an 
overarching framework. It underlines how the various forms of 
expertise, everyday knowledge and knowledge practices are 
interrelated with processes of governance and power.  
With reference to the post-Soviet and local-agrarian focus of the 
present research, I will look at knowledge in rural communities in 
everyday life. I use the term everyday knowledge not only when 
referring to any form of public knowledge, but also to pose this kind 
of knowledge analytically against the many forms of expertise that 
are relevant in agricultural production. In a general sense “everyday 
knowledge derives from practical reasoning about context-specific 
events”(Bevir 2007: 536) and is juxtaposed to scholarly knowledge 
based in scientific training. Berger and Luckmann undertake in their 
influential book The Social Construction of Reality (1984 [1966]) 
systematic steps towards a sociology of knowledge that addresses 
the ordinary stocks of knowledge in society. According to Berger 
and Luckmann “the sociology of knowledge must concern itself with 
whatever passes for 'knowledge' in a society, regardless of the 
ultimate validity or invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such 
'knowledge'” (Berger and Luckmann 1984: 15). Thus, all knowledge 
that is publicly negotiated is relevant. Everyday knowledge is 
socially constructed and, despite being influenced through power 
resources and governance processes, it also forms the local reality. 
Berger and Luckmann address this complexity, because “all human 
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'knowledge' is developed, transmitted and maintained in social 
situations” (Berger and Luckmann 1984: 15) and subsequently 
derive a research programme: “[T]he sociology of knowledge must 
seek to understand the processes by which [..] a taken-for-granted 
'reality' congeals for the man in the street. In other words, […] the 
sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social 
construction of reality” (Berger and Luckmann 1984: 15). 
Consequently Berger and Luckmann insist that it is “common-sense 
'knowledge' rather than 'ideas' [which] must be the central focus for 
the sociology of knowledge. It is precisely this 'knowledge' that 
constitutes the fabric of meanings without which no society could 
exist” (1984: 27). Everyday, common-sense knowledge establishes 
reality in society and provides sense to everyday life. The 
experience of common-sense understanding is contributing to the 
formulation of identities, values and moralities as shown in the 
elaborated cases of Central Asian societies (Driscoll 2015; Harris 
2004; Schoeberlein-Engel 1994).  
Principally, the social constructivist approach is built on the 
assumption of various realities that communities create and 
experience. “Among the multiple realities there is one that presents 
itself as the reality par excellence. This is the reality of everyday life” 
(Berger and Luckmann 1984: 35). According to Berger and 
Luckmann, all knowledge, also the taken-for-granted common sense 
knowledge of everyday reality is derived from and maintained by 
social interactions. Within social constructivism, reality exists only 
through actors and action, through interaction, people’s knowledge 
becomes reinforced (Knoblauch 2010: 157).15 With emphasize on 
rural societies, the flexibility and openness of everyday knowledge 
in society is recognized by Arce and Long (1992) who perceive 
                                                          
15 The attention to empirically traceable action links to the roots of social 
constructionism in the phenomenology of Husserl and Schütz. 
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knowledge as “constructive in the sense that it is the result of a 
great number of decisions and selective incorporations of previous 
ideas, beliefs and images, but at the same time destructive of other 
conceptualizations, understandings. Thus it is not an accumulation 
of facts but involves ways of construing the world” (1992: 213). 
While on one side knowledge is created and shared, other parts of 
knowledge lose their common-sense acceptance and are 
abandoned.  
Constructivism, Power and Hegemonies 
There are some important insights by STS that complement the 
social constructivist approach to knowledge. Firstly, local value and 
significance of knowledge equate with the differentiation and 
hierarchy of lay knowledge versus scientific knowledge (Wynne 
1989). This means that on local level the different assets of 
knowledge are considered coequal. Secondly, STS research outlined 
that knowledge assets contain a localized and positioned 
component. But despite knowledge is situated in local context, this 
does not reduce legitimate truth claims. Third, building on 
approaches of the sociology of knowledge and Foucault, STS studies 
recognize the combination of knowledge, power and governance, 
up to the point that these are considered as inseparable entities. A 
significant branch of late STS concerns how knowledge practices 
come into being, with power interventions and governance 
arrangements as part of the process (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; 
Jasanoff and Long-Martello 2004; Jasanoff 2005; Wynne 1989). Also 
allegedly value-free institutions maintain social elements as 
distinctive structures, commitments, practices, and discourses that 
vary across cultures and change over time. Each society is 
constructing knowledge autonomously and values it differently. 
Processes that shape reality, the inter-subjectively shared common 
sense, are certainly political as the selection of inputs added to the 
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commonly agreed knowledge is not arbitrary. Every knowledge 
asset potentially has a political dimension, as politics is often seen 
as grounded in the idea of ‘pure’ factual knowledge - which is biased 
by interests, values and worldviews too (Knorr-Cetina 1981). 
Knowledge, per se is far from being value-free, purely objective or 
non-judgmental [wertneutral]. The status of knowledge applied in 
society is eminently political because answering the question “Who 
decides what are the facts?” depends on power structures and the 
underlining state regime. It was mainly Foucaults work on the 
relation of power and knowledge as in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1989 [1968]) that broadened the understanding of the 
inevitable interference of power on knowledge processes. Foucault 
identified discursive practices as structures, e.g. scientific 
disciplines, which are in themselves institutionally grounded bodies 
of discourse that constitute what can become objects of knowledge 
and who has authority to speak about them.16 This approach was 
taken on by Flyvbjerg and others, who outlined that in the absence 
of truth universals, it is impossible to build an objective standpoint 
e.g. for scientific knowledge (1998: 227). Knorr-Cetina showed that 
constructivist patterns are equally found in the so called factual, 
scientific knowledge and that discovering `real things´ is always 
problematic, despite objectivists’ believes that “the world is 
composed of facts and the goal of knowledge is to provide a literal 
account of what that world is like” (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 1). She 
argues that facts are the result of social constructions, because 
“constructivity [prevails] in terms of the decision-laden character of 
knowledge production” (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 152). It may count as 
                                                          
16 “The term refers to a historically and culturally specific set of rules for 
organizing and producing different forms of knowledge. It is not a matter of 
external determinations being imposed on people's thought, rather it is a 
matter of rules which, a bit like the grammar of a language, allow certain 
statements to be made”. Quote from: http://www.michel-
foucault.com/concepts/  accessed 10/2017.  
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central achievement of constructivism to question hitherto totalized 
terms. “[W]hat may be deemed possible at one time may not be 
held to be so at another. A form of knowledge represents what is 
held to be thinkable, to be possible, at some moment in time” 
(Hacking 1999: 170). An ethnographic analysis must therefore name 
and accept the constructing forces that are at work.  
Situated Knowledge and Alternative Modernities  
The problem of the situatedness of knowledge has also been 
addressed from the angle of post-colonial studies (Tlostanova 
2015). Mignolo’s statement “I am where I think” radicalizes the 
thought of the situatedness of knowledge (Mignolo 2011b: 169), 
referring to the fact that those who produce or claim knowledge are 
themselves positioned within a particular epistemic culture. This 
aspect of knowledge is insofar important as it underlines the 
developmental imperative [Anspruch] of advisory interventions. 
Mignolo critics Western knowledge to which he refers to as the 
“Western code” (Mignolo 2011a), a ruling paradigm that serves 
primarily elites in North America and Western Europe. The 
“Western code” is in itself a persistent resource of power and 
political domination. Nevertheless, Mignolo identifies “processes of 
decoloniality breaking the Western code are already underway 
building global futures” (2011a: xiii). Mignolo may be taken as 
representative of the spectrum of post-colonial studies who show 
that alternative knowledge claims in science and elsewhere exist 
that deserve to be recognized. Such shifts in the status of 
knowledge reflect underlying changes in the relation of Western 
and non-Western societies. The era of modernity was characterised 
socially by industrialisation, the societal division of labour and 
philosophically by "the loss of certainty, and the realization that 
certainty can never be established, once and for all" (Delanty 2007: 
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3069).17 While this definition applies particularly to the Western 
world, processes of modernisation may have unfolded in non-
Western societies completely different.18 “However, while European 
modernity should be admired for its many virtues, its imperial bent 
to `save the world´ by making of the world an extended Euro-
America is unacceptable” (Mignolo 2011a: xiv). Such biases and 
path-dependencies of the global-Western academic 
conceptualisation of modernity is something contemporary area 
studies seeks to address (Mielke and Hornidge 2014). Informed by 
post-colonial and de-colonial studies (Fanon 1967; Mignolo 2011a; 
Tlostanova 2012), their central point is to consider the cultural 
relativity of how the natural and social world are perceived. 
Therefore, out of considerations of economic globalization, 
development studies and post-colonial perspectives, the term 
modernity is eventually thought as a ‘plural condition’ (Eisenstadt 
2003). This has provoked discussions of alternative modernities 
juxtaposed to Western conceptions of modernity, displayed in 
deviant models of stateness, strands of knowledge, governance and 
conceptions about development. The new post-Soviet Central Asian 
nations make a striking case for such considerations. In the frame of 
this study, I enlarge the perspective of the original sociology of 
knowledge with components of STS (Jasanoff and Long-Martello 
2004) and critical suggestions from post-colonial studies. 
Considering the situatedness of knowledge concerns not only 
development studies but eventually agricultural economics too.19 In 
this regard, difficulties arise when seeking common ground between 
                                                          
17 In this direction points also Zygmut Baumans concept of `liquid modernity´ as 
characteristic of Western societies.  
18 Delanty states: "Modernity is not Westernization, and its key processes and 
dynamics can be found in all societies" (2007: 3069). 
19 Jasanoff and Long-Martello note that “local knowledge is not merely `place-
based´ but is also situated; that is, it is constituted within particular 
communities, histories, institutional settings, and expert cultures” (2004: viii).  
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local agricultural knowledge systems (Aenis 1997; Lemma 2007) and 
global expertise (Leeuwis 2004) in regional extension efforts and 
development interventions.  
Local Knowledge, Knowledge Practices and 
Agricultural Expertise 
The focus of the present analysis is on knowledge dynamics related 
to local agricultural matters. Such knowledge domains are usually 
discussed along categories as: Local knowledge, public expertise, 
indigenous knowledge, traditional knowledge, rural or horticultural 
knowledge, tacit knowledge and others (Carolan 2006; El-Berr 2009; 
Hornidge 2012, 2013; Taylor and Loë 2012: 1208f). The various 
approaches to local knowledge reveal that despite the narrow focus 
on the diverging qualities of knowledge20, these categories broadly 
overlap and are analytically hard to differentiate. Consequently, 
with regard to the plurality of possible perspectives El-Berr states: 
„Eine einheitliche Definition, was unter lokalem Wissen zu 
verstehen ist, gibt es nicht“ (2009: 29). Conceptualizations of 
localized knowledge are often used in development research, 
agrarian studies, ethnography, anthropology etc. in form of specific 
mid-range concepts (Hornidge 2017; Taylor and Loë 2012: 1208f).21 
Dealing in the context of development discourses and practices with 
forms of local knowledge is no easy task as there is broad 
agreement about the “crucial role of indigenous, traditional and 
local tacit knowledge for the development of communities 
[however, A.M.], basically standing in opposition to the ‘expert 
knowledge’ focused development paradigm” (Hornidge 2012: 29). 
                                                          
20 The perspective on local knowledge runs the risks of providing narrowly 
focussed and occasionally individual results (El-Berr, 2009: 18; FN 43f). 
21 Local knowledge is defined as “the mundane, yet expert understanding of and 
practical reasoning about local conditions derived from lived experience. In this 
sense, it is often juxtaposed with `expert´ knowledge” (Bevir 2007: 535). 
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This paradigm determines that agrarian expertise is normally not 
understood a part of local knowledge (Hoffmann et al. 2009; Lemma 
2007) but deriving from academic training. Such non-expertise is 
attributed with the qualities of local knowledge such as “practice-
based, context specific, interactively derived, lived experience–
based, and tacit and involves practical reasoning” (Bevir 2007: 536). 
Acknowledging the insightful ethnographic perspectives on local 
knowledge, this research maintains analytically a distinction of 
everyday knowledge practices and agricultural expertise.  
Everyday knowledge denotes the social reality as described above 
by Berger and Luckmann (1984). Everyday knowledge may 
concretize to particular knowledge practices, which may be 
expertise and experience in implementation and use. Agricultural 
expertise is science or longstanding local experience. Knowledge 
practices can be strategies or solutions to general issues, 
procedures of dealing with tasks or responses to recurrent everyday 
obligations. In this regard, knowledge practices are non theoretical 
knowledge, sometimes not even verbalized knowledge assets that is 
used to maintain everyday life.  
Opposed to knowledge practices is the concept of expertise. While 
any knowledge about farming may be taken as agricultural 
expertise, there are normative structures that separate for instance 
general, everyday knowledge from expertise. From an outside etic 
perspective expert knowledge “is what qualified individuals know as 
a result of their technical practices, training, and experience [..]. 
Experts are usually identified on the basis of qualifications, training, 
experience, professional memberships, and peer recognition” 
(McBride and Burgman 2012: 13). Extension professionals, Western 
academia, training institutions, but also academic structures in non-
Western countries (Amsler 2007) build and maintain such categories 
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(Collins and Evans 2002).22 With reference to Foucault above, 
institutions maintain hierarchies and hegemonic paradigms of what 
counts as expertise, which yields into normative framings of local 
agricultural knowledge “conceptualized as locally situated 
knowledge, held by a specific group of people, about agriculture-
related ideas, resources and practices, composed of ‘traditional’ as 
well as ‘scientific’ elements” (Frey 2016: 94).  
However, agricultural expertise from the emic perspective of local 
farmers look differently, as it is embedded in local values. In the 
case of Tajikistan, local experts are often elderly farmers who have 
gained experience through praxis. There is no sharp differentiation 
between local agro-expertise and everyday knowledge in rural 
areas, as both knowledge assets are available for everyone. Carolan 
seeks to place agricultural expert knowledge at the interface of 
science and local everyday knowledge. He suggests agricultural 
expertise is co-produced by local and other experts’ knowledge 
(2006), as through this hybrid character meaningful local 
adaptability is ensured. Agricultural expertise is therefore an 
inclusive term that displays the intersection of scientific research, 
academic training and local forms of everyday knowledge and 
practice. The “localization of ‘expert’ knowledge” (Hornidge 2012: 
34) results from its socially constructed character, situated within a 
particular epistemic culture that comprises interferences of 
knowledge cultures, paradigms of modernity and power interests.   
Co-production of Epistemic Cultures  
It is one of the premises of this study that epistemic cultures, which 
make up “how we know what we know” (Knorr-Cetina 1999: 1) are 
                                                          
22 As a form of compromise appear Collins and Evans who delineate three forms 
of expertise with regard to agricultural production: I) No expertise II) 
Interactional expertise III) Contributory expertise (2002: 254).  
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neither fix nor static. Taking the perspective of epistemic cultures 
allows analysing change processes with regard to knowledge, 
especially its use, validity and social distribution. Building on Knorr-
Cetina, I am following later specifications of STS (Jasanoff 2004) and 
sociology (Evers 2000; Leeuwis 2004), who enlarged and applied the 
concept of epistemic cultures in other areas than science. Leeuwis, 
for instance, adopts a perspective of different epistemic cultures 
being parallel at work in rural areas, i.e. on one side scientists’ 
agricultural expertise and on the other side farmers’ practical 
experience (2004: 105, 113). Negotiating a balance of this 
dichotomist processes is then the central task of agricultural 
extension efforts. With reference to specific challenges of rural 
areas and agricultural production in Central Asia, the present 
research seeks to understand factors and drivers that shape and 
condition the local construction of knowledge. Knowledge is related 
to the social context, structured by power, governance 
arrangements or the conditions of communication means. Knorr-
Cetina started to reflect from a sociological and philosophical 
position on the infrastructures of knowledge production, as well as 
the culturally embedded  production of these infrastructures (Van 
Assche et al. 2016: 32). Culture, in her understanding, refers to a 
delimitated environment. Knorr-Cetina’s concept of epistemic 
cultures came to “include small environments of knowledge 
production, the environment of these environments, the elements, 
and the preconditions” (Van Assche et al. 2016: 32). On a superior 
level, knowledge cultures make the environment to epistemic 
cultures. “Knowledge cultures, a complementary concept in Knorr-
Cetina’s frame (2007), can be understood best, as a wider concept, 
as the culture nurturing or hindering the working of epistemic 
cultures” (Van Assche et al. 2013: 4). The actual construction and 
development of epistemic cultures is determined by underlying and 
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potentially far-reaching mechanisms that couple power and 
governance with the procedures of knowledge production and 
dissemination. Knowledge cultures make the frame to epistemic 
cultures as they provide a “sort of scaffolding for epistemic 
cultures” (Knorr-Cetina 2007: 66). While the epistemic cultures in 
the realm of Soviet agriculture developed along clear networks of 
state organizations, research institutions and governance incentives, 
the emerging knowledge assets certainly did not leave the 
intellectual frame laid out by the communist knowledge culture. 
The result were e.g. “engineering-oriented” (Van Assche et al. 2016: 
38) epistemic cultures in Soviet rural areas.  
Against this background Knorr-Cetina’s framework of epistemic and 
knowledge cultures allows to analyse and relate local and national 
arrangements with regard to knowledge. Epistemic cultures 
incorporate the context to assets of knowledge, while knowledge 
cultures focus on national and global conceptions. The latter is 
considered as hegemonic narratives or ideologies. On the contrary 
to Van Assche et al. (2016) I do conceive epistemic cultures in rural 
areas also independently of state structures, as for instance linked 
to social, economic and religious structures. Knowledge assets are 
at first socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1984), epistemic 
cultures display the context of how knowledge assets arrange to 
power structures and to the local social order. Essentially, the 
perspective on epistemic cultures displays the context which 
determines how knowledge is constructed, disseminated, used and 
lost (Long and Long 1992). In this regard, epistemic cultures indicate 
which knowledge is considered relevant, how it is valued and 
applied by farmers. Change processes are subject to negotiations of 
power that follow social and political incentives, which may be 
central economic policies or constraints by limited access orders. 
Epistemic cultures appear thus as heterogeneous and potentially 
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unfinished processes because they are subject to permanent 
change. These processes are open to manifold interference from 
third parts, such as powerful elites, interest groups, or state 
authorities. Interferences may not only determine the construction 
and use of knowledge but also its distribution. Leaning on the 
insight of Schütz that “knowledge is socially distributed” (1964: 
121), this translates into certain social structures, which recognize 
some strands of knowledge that are inter-subjectively transmissed 
and constitute local reality, while at the same time other knowledge 
is neglected. Schütz frames these mechanisms within “typifications 
of common-sense thinking [that determines] the social distribution 
of knowledge and its relativity and relevance to the concrete social 
environment of a concrete group in a concrete historical situation” 
(In: Berger and Luckmann 1984: 28). According to Scheler, it is the 
task of the sociology of knowledge to analyse how knowledge is 
distributed in society (Knoblauch 2010). A major selection of 
knowledge, for instance, occurs along gender roles (Nuijten 2003, 
2005) or, with reference to rural areas and agriculture, the 
differentiation of farmers and experts (El-Berr 2009). Adapting 
Scheler’s thoughts to the concept of epistemic cultures implies to 
ask which knowledge is possibly generated by whom, who is able to 
make use of it. Subsequently the task is to identify how power 
structures interact with epistemic cultures.  
It is evident that epistemic cultures are differently conducive to 
different assets of knowledge. Referring to knowledge in the 
individualized agriculture in post-Soviet Tajikistan, sub-regionally 
different knowledge practices and epistemic cultures emerged. 
Concretizing the STS approach of analysing co-produced and 
reciprocal knowledge and social structures allows to learn about 
sub-regionally diverging dynamics. Jasanoff points to the question 
of intrinsic power mechanisms by asking how epistemic cultures are 
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established, stabilized and perpetuated (2004: 39). She continuous, 
with implicit linkage to Schütz and Scheler, to re-address the 
principal questions of the early sociology of knowledge on the social 
distribution of knowledge: “How knowledge is taken up in societies, 
how it affects people’s collective and individual identities, 
permitting some to be experts others to be research subjects and 
others to be resisters or revolutionaries [..]?” (Jasanoff 2004: 42). 
The study of inherent power relations in local epistemic cultures 
appears relevant, because access to knowledge in society is not 
arbitrarily. It is in this regard that the construction of epistemic 
cultures is not arbitrarily but reflects power relations. Long outlines 
how the encounter of power with epistemic cultures potentially 
unfolds. He underlines the linkage of the distribution of knowledge 
to the political agenda of elites. Long points to the daily struggle for 
power and dominance that is founded in different interests, 
“multiple realities” of local actors with “potentially conflicting social 
and normative interests, and diverse and discontinuous 
configurations of knowledge” (2001: 26f). Building on Long, then the 
frame of epistemic cultures  
“must look closely at the issue of whose interpretations or 
models [..] prevail over those of other actors and under what 
conditions. Knowledge processes are embedded in social 
processes that imply aspects of power, authority and 
legitimation; and they are just as likely to reflect and 
contribute to the conflict between social groups as they are 
lead to the establishment of common perceptions and 
interests” (Long 2001: 26f).   
Thus, single knowledge assets and entire epistemic cultures may be 
subject to power interference. By framing the distribution of 
knowledge in society, epistemic cultures help to stabilize political 
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regimes, maintain the dominance of local elites or sustain the local 
social order.23  
Power and Power Resources  
Power is ever present in daily life, it is a crosscutting “net of 
omnipresent relations, and not only as being localized in ‘centers’ 
and institutions, or as an entity one can ‘possess’” (Flyvbjerg 2004: 
405). Empirically power is localized in and related to certain 
resources and actors, however it cannot be possessed (Uphoff 1989: 
320). Material or immaterial resources may become resources of 
power, e.g. “economic resources, social status, information, physical 
force, legitimacy and authority” (Ilchman and Uphoff 1969: 173). 
While resources do not contain power as such, they may generate 
power in relation to social or individual action or political support. 
Thus power is generated by individuals, organizations and 
institutions that are capable to access and provide a meaning to the 
resources at hand. Power is often attributed to authorities, such as 
state administration, sub-regional warlords or local strongmen who 
exercise power over others. However, at the same time power is a 
designing factor, “productive and positive, and not only [..] 
restrictive and negative” (Flyvbjerg 2004: 405). The particular access 
or use of resources allows to mobilize power. Thus, being timely and 
spatially fluid, attached to different kinds of resources and actors, 
power shall therefore be seen as a relational concept linked to 
interaction with its context (Uphoff 1989, 2003). Flyvbjerg follows 
this perspective depicting it “as ultradynamic; power is not merely 
something one appropriates, it is also something one 
reappropriates and exercises in a constant back-and-forth 
                                                          
23 The focus on co-produced epistemic cultures allows to understand how 
everyday life and livelihoods are differently ordered by stocks of knowledge, 
governance arrangements and power interventions in a certain locality or sub-
region. 
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movement within the relationships of strength, tactics and 
strategies inside of which one exists” (Flyvbjerg 2004: 406). Tracing 
power relations in society in order to understand ongoing 
governance processes is no simple task and not the centre issue. 
Foucault introduced the perspective that the “central question is 
how power is exercised, and not merely who has power, and why 
they have it; the focus is on process in addition to structure” 
(Foucault 1982: 217). According to Foucault, power is studied with a 
“point of departure in small questions, ‘flat and empirical’, not only, 
nor even primarily, with a point of departure in ‘big questions’” 
(Foucault 1982: 217). This intends to ask how power is structurally 
imposed on knowledge, on resources, etc. however, this is no linear 
process. Flyvbjerg points to some analytic difficulties related to 
power: “Knowledge and power, truth and power, rationality 
and power are analytically inseparable from each other; 
power produces knowledge, and knowledge produces power” 
(2004: 406). Powerful actors not only shape governance 
processes, but also enable or avert the enforcement of 
decisions. Power-knowledge relations and consequences are 
everyday phenomenon at the centre of social research, insolubly 
entangled with everyday life.  
The Co-production of Epistemic Cultures in Rural 
Areas 
Linking to the above, it is evident that rural epistemic cultures are 
closely related to local governance processes. The above introduced 
‘idiom of co-production’ (Jasanoff 2004) refers to the processes of 
how knowledge comes into being together with political thought 
and action. Considering not only what we know, such as particular 
assets of agricultural knowledge and expertise, but also how we 
know it, requires taking into consideration the social and political 
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environment to knowledge assets. Knowledge “does not exist as 
such, but is produced, filtered, and disseminated by certain 
organizations/ networks, institutions and procedures” (Hornidge et 
al. 2016: 14) with exactly these processes being shaped by political 
processes. Also in rural areas and the realm of agriculture, some 
assets of knowledge are highly political. Accordingly, the outlined 
particularities of governance in post-Soviet societies indicate 
limitations of what and how knowledge is known. It is in this regard 
that the focus on epistemic cultures combines the analytic view on 
knowledge in society with the specific context of governance and 
power. This constellation is one representation of the nexus of 
governance and knowledge, or power and knowledge respectively 
as discussed above. I consider Jasanoff’s argumentation that co-
productionist accounts reveal “unsuspected dimensions of ethics, 
values, lawfulness and power within the epistemic, material and 
social formations” (2004: 4) with epistemic cultures effectively 
stabilizing thereof conditions, as one representation of this nexus. 
Knowledge practices result within the structural frame of social 
order. Exploiting the ‘idiom of co-production’ reveals underlying 
ruling paradigms, values, and state ideologies that effectively build 
and frame epistemic cultures. With reference to co-productionist 
thinking knowledge, governance and power are inseparable within 
the framework of epistemic cultures as they emerge and act 
together. “Co-production can therefore be seen as a critique of the 
realist ideology that persistently separates the domains of nature, 
facts, objectivity, reason and policy from those of culture, values, 
subjectivity, emotion and politics” (Jasanoff 2004: 3).24 Co-produced 
knowledge, and co-produced epistemic cultures as Knorr-Cetina 
                                                          
24 Jasanoff restricts the `idiom of co-production´ to a mid-range concept. 
“However, co-production, in the view of contributors to this volume, should not 
be advanced as a fully fledged theory, claiming lawlike consistency 
and predictive power”(2004: 3). 
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gives the example of science, is thus inseparable and open to 
interference from outside domains (1999). The focus on epistemic 
cultures in the Tajik agriculture is exactly to analyse how the 
underlining interrelations between knowledge assets, governance 
processes and power evolve together. Epistemic cultures are 
socially constructed; they come into being co-produced with 
political thought and action. “To sociologists and social theorists, 
the co-production framework presents more varied and dynamic 
ways of conceptualizing social structures and categories, stressing 
the interconnections between the macro and the micro, between 
emergence and stabilization, and between knowledge and practice” 
(Jasanoff 2004: 4). In practice, the idiom of co-production highlights 
the constant and mutual interferences that shape epistemic 
cultures. However, co-productionist thinking means at the same 
time that epistemic cultures have a share in the conclusion of 
governance arrangements, steering of knowledge or the execution 
of power.  
With reference to the questions of this study, rural epistemic 
cultures are analysed with regard to agricultural production. Thus, 
pointing out that under the conditions of post-Soviet Central Asia, 
agricultural expertise is interconnected to local governance 
arrangements. Knowledge assets are considered power resources 
that are potentially mobilized to interfere with governance 
arrangements. Local epistemic cultures identify and develop along 
potential power resources. In the context of Tajikistan, these may 
be connections to powerful persons, Islamic education or state 
administration. Thus, with regard to competitive negotiations within 
local governance processes, various claims are made on the basis of 
intersubjectively shared knowledge. Such claims may convince 
through consent with the social order in place or claims correspond 
to the interests of local elites. Negotiating local governance results 
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in “ongoing struggles over meaning and the control of strategic 
relationships and resources” (Long 1992: 27). Emerging governance 
arrangements relate on knowledge as central resource of power, 
mobilized through interpretations, meanings, hegemonic narratives. 
This implies to settle local disputes on applicable norms to a given 
conflict. “Knowledge encounters involve the struggle between 
actors who aim to enrol others in their projects, getting them to 
accept particular frames of meaning [..]. If they succeed then other 
parties delegate power to them” (Long 1992: 27). Respectively, 
knowledge assets are potentially always able to interfere and 
manipulate governance arrangements.  
Framing Epistemic Cultures: Hegemonic Narratives  
Influencing governance arrangements happens not only through 
processes of hierarchical steering but also through attempts to 
promote specific knowledge assets. In the specific context of post-
Soviet Central Asia, some narratives and interpretations may 
become hegemonic due to the fact that questioning them is 
sanctioned either by state authorities or by society. Hegemonic 
narratives support the position of powerful actors. In praxis such 
narratives are instructed from the government in order to make the 
citizens undersign one political worldview, state ideology, LAO or 
buying into the promoted national identity. Lemon elaborates the 
example of a so-called counter-terrorist attacks in Tajikistan. 
Information and statements around the attacks are reframed until it 
fits into the “government’s narrative in reproducing its hegemony” 
(2014: 249). Under the conditions of the neopatrimonial state, such 
rulings can hardly be challenged. As a consequence, references to 
hegemonic narrations are also made from below. Citizens in 
peripheral areas refer to such narratives and arguments on national 
and local level to support own claims with some official approval. 
Popular narratives outline the strong and just rule of the president 
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or the uniqueness of agricultural production and quality. 
Contributing to such narratives is not an easy task, because one has 
to identify hierarchies, power resources of the relevant institutions 
and individuals. Hegemonic narratives are making “sense of the 
past” (Umetbaeva 2015: 297), however, from the perspective of the 
presence. Narratives not only refer to the president or to the state, 
rather to the increasing references are made to the values of Islam 
(Harris 2004; Stephan 2010). Such processes have a strong impact 
on the development of epistemic cultures and the specific approach 
towards certain knowledge assets. Epistemic cultures are co-
produced by authoritative narratives, but also contribute to the 
steering of certain knowledge assets and therewith the mobilisation 
of power. Some assets of knowledge are dominant over others, 
evident in the sub-regionally diverse knowledge production, 
distribution, uptake and loss. Differentiation and local selection of 
knowledge assets is primarily a question of communal request. 
However, significant steering regarding knowledge assets is 
prescribed by the frames imposed by knowledge cultures which 
form ruling paradigms, ideologies and hegemonic perspectives. 
Hence, the co-production of epistemic cultures in neopatrimonial 
authoritarian states is influenced by dominant narratives that 
emanate from the president, the state administration, local elites 
and their respective clients. In particular the post-Soviet Central 
Asian republics maintain knowledge cultures that preserve manifold 
links to communist ideology and values, which have an important 
role in framing public opinion and everyday life. I will discuss further 
below the specific features of the post-Soviet public sphere. The 
context of ramified hierarchies along neopatrimonial networks 
creates a situation where particular knowledge assets conflict with 
national knowledge cultures and politics that maintain the LAO’s. As 
I will elaborate in the case studies below, contradictions of 
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knowledge cultures and local practice create opportunities for 
skilled individuals to make a living.  
Conceptualizing Governance  
Governance has become a central issue in social science in the 
recent decades (Bevir 2007; Bora 2012). The amount of research on 
governance is closely linked to the experience of limits and failures 
of state-centred governance concepts, especially in the context of 
severe state crisis as for instance the collapse of the communist 
eastern bloc states (Suny 1993). Equalling governance with the 
actions of the government and state administration turned out 
dubious taking into account that states which experienced long war 
periods such as Afghanistan still have rules and conceptions of order 
(Schetter 2007). Attention shifted from governments to alternative 
forms of governance, which are not or only loosely attached to the 
state (Bevir 2013; Bora 2012: 345f). The role of governments as 
authoritative actors that decide and implement decisions has been 
increasingly questioned, as such causalities are empirically not 
detectable in many parts of the world (Bevir 2007: 364; Malito 
2015). Less authoritative definitions of governance build on insights 
of often ethnographical research that showed regionally diverse 
governance arrangements, as strong differentiations of global-
Western and other regions of the world such as Africa, the Americas 
and also post-Soviet Central Asia (Bierschenk and Sardan 2003; 
Skinner et al. 2001). Parting from a perception of governance as 
„institutionalisierte Modi der sozialen Handlungskoordination, 
durch die kollektiv verbindliche Regelungen (policies) verabschiedet 
und implementiert werden“ (Börzel 2006: 2), I conceptualize 
governance as decision making and the implantation of decision 
(Mielke 2012). I consider governance arrangements as situated a 
specific regional context and argue for conceptual amendments for 
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how governance unfolds in the post-Soviet republics in Central Asia. 
In the following I will briefly discuss different conceptions of 
governance, from authoritative views to less hierarchically 
structured forms of governance through networks. This allows me 
to develop a mid-range perspective on governance suitable to the 
research region that I call meshwork governance, which builds on 
different authorities and diverse normative systems that compete in 
decision making and implementation. Out of the rich theoretical 
work on governance I pursue a mixed perspective. To capture the 
particularities of local governance in rural communities in post-
Soviet Central Asia and Tajikistan I am using a mid-range concept of 
meshwork governance that combines structural and processual 
governance concepts. The term mid-range concept describes 
temporal, spatial  and conceptual limitations of a theory (Hornidge 
2017; Mielke 2017). This mid-range concept fits to the example of 
meshwork governance further below. Despite close conceptual 
overlapping, governance is distinguished from politics as a more ad 
hoc and potentially less organized form of making and 
implementing decisions. Governance is perceived as flexible and 
solution oriented, while politics appear linked to solid structures, 
following long-term management intentions.  
Governance as Exercising Authority 
Until a few decades ago, governance was almost exclusively 
discussed in terms of state authority and the hierarchic execution of 
power in a specific arena. An earlier World Bank definition referred 
to governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's economic and social resources for 
development” (The World Bank 1991: 1). However, measures of the 
governance and state measures were and continue to be equated, 
because “the concepts of governance and stateness remain vague 
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and narrowly interpreted” (Malito 2015: 21).25 After political 
upheaval in eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
state-inclined perception of governance as authoritarian rule 
increasingly came under suspicion (North 1998). Recent definitions 
circulated by the World Bank do not anymore equal the state with 
the government, perceiving the latter “as the set of traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (World 
Bank, 2006: 2). However, still the dominant and exclusive role of the 
state is outlined, which selects, monitor and replaces governments. 
Accordingly, governance is often linked to what the state does. This 
normative perspective appears to various degrees still in charge at 
development practitioners such as the World Bank, USAID, IMF or 
DFID (Grindle 2007). Central in these approaches is the perception 
of the state in charge of decision making and political steering, using 
administrative and other resources to impose its rule on the 
population. In this view, stateness is measured as the capacity of 
the government to effectively formulate and implement policies 
through a set of output indicators (Malito 2015; Umbach 2009). The 
government’s authority and capability to govern is expressed by 
providing binding decisions and ensuring the implementation of 
decisions. As for the authoritative view, Fukuyama sees 
“governance as a government's ability to make and enforce rules, 
and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is 
democratic or not” (Fukuyama 2013: 3). Virtually, governments 
derive authority from the undisputed command over power 
resources such as the army, legislation and jurisdiction, dominance 
of information, etc. In such a scenario, respect and sub-ordination 
                                                          
25 Malito states: “The term ‘stateness’ refers to ‘the institutional centrality of the 
state’ (Evans 1997), i.e. to the two basic conditions: the organizational capacity 
to formulate independent policies (Nettl 1968), and a coherent institutional 
framework indispensable to promote social cohesion (Jessop 1990). The latter 
two conditions presuppose the classical attribute of the state: Decisive control 
over the application of authorized force within the territory” (2015: 7). 
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of citizens under the state and its organizations and institutions is 
pre-assumed. However, this perspective is inadequate for many 
states especially in non-Western contexts. While in Western context 
the state remains the dominant authority in many fields, recent 
concepts of governance convey a “more diverse view of authority 
and its exercise” (Bevir 2007: 380). However, the so far dominant 
view of considering the state and the government almost as equal, 
i.e. strong and authoritative, has come under pressure and is 
substantially enlarged by post-colonial thinking and the renewed 
interest for local perspectives.  
Less Normative Conceptualizations of Governance 
Somewhat in opposition to the authoritative views on governance, 
slightly idealized and normative approaches developed that avoided 
explicit reference to power and authority. With reference to the 
concrete localization, i.e. in European usage, this view on 
governance refers to methods or mechanisms that deal “with a 
broad range of problems/conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at 
mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating and 
deliberating with each other and cooperating in the implementation 
of these decisions” (Schmitter 2001: 8). Accordingly, the normative 
and idealized aspects of this conceptualization hardly match outside 
Western-European context (European Union 2001).26  
Less normative conceptions accept that not necessarily the 
government is required to establish orderly structures and 
arrangements, instead governance takes place through “rules and 
institutions for the authoritative organization of collective life” 
(Donahue 2002: 1). Moderate conceptualizations seek for a more 
                                                          
26 The European Commissions position on governance reads: “‘Governance’ 
means rules, processes, and behavior that affect the way in which powers are 
exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness, and coherence” (European Union 2001).  
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neutral and balanced stand of what represents governance. Chibba 
captures governance as two dimensional:  
“The first [dimension] refers to all aspects of the way a 
nation is governed, including its institutions, policies, laws, 
regulations, processes and oversight mechanisms. The 
second dimension is its cultural and ideological setting, for 
governance is perceived and shaped by values, culture, 
traditions and ideology” (Chibba 2009: 79).  
While the above definitions display somewhat global-north or euro-
centrist conceptualisations to understand and analyse governance 
arrangements, this indicates already the dependency of the 
concepts on different levels of generality and theoretical contexts. 
Therefore, complementary to the above discussed state-related 
perspectives, in the following I will focus on “processes (governance 
as a tool) and structures (governance as a form)” (Malito 2015: 3), 
leaving aside potential other categories, as the focus of this 
research lies on local governance. Literature provides two main 
strands to conceptualize governance, either as structure or process 
(Pierre and Peter 2000; Umbach 2007). 
Governance as Process  
Following the process-oriented perspective, governance is 
understood “as the continuous political process of setting explicit 
goals for society and intervening in it in order to achieve these 
goals” (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004: 99). Governance takes 
place as a process of political steering, what implies the conceptual 
construction of the social environment through political institutions 
and procedures. Institutions, famously described by North  as “rules 
of the game” (1990: 3), framing not only political processes, but 
enable or constrain social life and activities. However, a not less 
ideal-typical consideration of governance as political steering is 
provided by Mayntz who requests the „Fähigkeit zur konzeptionell 
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orientierten Gestaltung der gesellschaftlichen Umwelt durch 
politische Instanzen“ (In: Börzel 2005: 617). Thus, the process of 
political steering requires strategically acting subjects 
(Steuerungssubjekte) and objects that are governed 
(Steuerungsobjekte) (Börzel 2005: 617). Strategically acting subjects 
in this regard may be representatives of the state, but also local 
elites. It is central in the conceptualization of this thesis that the 
specific goals of the governance process are properly identified, i.e. 
to name the concrete intended achievements. Governance is thus a 
process of “hierarchical coordination, non-hierarchical co-ordination 
between public and private actors, regulated self-steering and 
societal self–steering” (Umbach 2009: 40). Analysing governance as 
a process hypothesizes the existence of clearly defined aims behind 
actions and decision making. The processes towards these goals 
may be started either through hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
steering. This can be governmental decrees, orders, the respective 
legislation or in the latter case majority voting. Hierarchies indicate 
the presence of power and exercise significant influence on steering 
processes. However, hierarchies are neither stable in the perception 
of governance goals, nor firm in the assertiveness and capacity to 
mobilize power resources. In favour of more flexible and reflexive 
perspectives on governance argue Manuel-Navarrete et al. 
underlining the “`living´ process through which social goals and 
objectives are achieved. It is not a given, but a changing set of 
procedures and processes” (2009: 15). The perspective on 
governance as process contains different challenges. Firstly, it is 
based on the agreement of common goals and aims among the 
strategically acting subjects. Secondly, steering procedures and 
processes need to be identified to arrive at these aims. This works 
as long as hierarchies are strong, unquestioned and the goals of the 
steering efforts are not questioned. Although, as hierarchical orders 
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diverge, the respective governance aims may diverse and 
potentially fall in competition.  
Governance as Structure  
In contrast to the previous, governance is also conceptualized as a 
structure. Structure-oriented perspectives subsume that 
governance “includes different mechanisms of co-ordination and 
patterns of interaction of interdependent political and societal 
actors, institutionalised steering systems, collective action within 
institutions, strategic coalition-building and the implementation of 
decisions taken by networks, tripartite negotiation systems, public-
private partnerships, and/or interest groups” (Umbach 2009: 40f). 
According to this approach “governance encompasses the structural 
dimension of policy-making” (Malito 2015: 4) as a new “form of 
social order“ (Börzel 2005: 617). The reference to social order 
means detectable structures, such as institutions, partnerships, 
networks, hierarchies or processes of interaction. It is the social 
order that forms the overarching framework for institutional 
arrangements (Mielke et al. 2011) and these structures provide the 
grounds for everyday decisions (Börzel 2005: 618). Thus, decisions 
that result of governance processes are at the same time a 
statement by the community, i.e. a normative programme, on how 
social order is shaped, referring to the underlying socially 
constructed reality. The relations of governance, power and the 
social order in place are mutually reflexive, however, social order is 
structured by power relations (Mielke 2012: 51f). The reference to 
power indicates why the structural perspective links to the 
traditionally institutionalized governance that leans explicitly on 
authority as indicated in the statement of the World Bank above 
(2006: 2). Structural governance relies on coordinated activities, 
resource allocation leads to the further development of these 
networks. In this regard researchers started to “develop typologies 
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of such governing structures—most commonly bureaucracies, 
markets, and networks—and they identify the characteristics 
associated with each structure” (Bevir 2007: 367). The significance 
of the social order for local governance arrangements is also 
recognized by Mielke et al. who perceive social order as “the 
structuring and structured processes of social reality [..] constantly 
generated by the interplay of worldviews and institutions” (2011: 1). 
This structure has been relevant even in times of the complete 
absence of the state (Schetter 2009). 
Assemblages and Post-Soviet Meshwork Governance  
The reference to the role of social order facilitating governance 
emphasizes already that decision making and implementation of 
decisions take place within a multitude or meshwork of processual 
and structural governance arrangements in a form of assemblage 
and which are not always separable. This involves different scales, 
governance arrangements may refer to local, national, international 
or transnational levels (Bora 2012: 346). Decision making and 
implementation of decisions is realized through flexible and hybrid 
forms of selectively structural and processual arrangements. With 
regard to the interleaving of the two conceptual strands, Börzel 
talks of „Verschachtelung oder Einbettung von 
Regelungsstrukturen“ (2006: 9). Especially with focus on rural areas, 
it becomes evident that one-dimensional and uni-linear 
conceptualizations of governance are hardly detectable, instead 
parallel, network oriented, reflexive and recursive approaches 
prevail (Bora 2012: 345). In order to develop a conceptual view that 
applies to rural areas in Tajikistan, I aim to synthesize structural and 
processual governance conceptualizations into the mid-range 
concept of meshwork governance. The concept of meshwork 
governance is used to describe the hybrid and volatile character of 
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local governance arrangements often found in Central Asia. I 
develop meshwork governance as mid-range concept to avoid a 
binary perspective on governance as state rulings versus local 
governance processes. The notion of meshwork is meant to capture 
the processes that lead to governance and the emergence of order 
in front of the simultaneous assemblage of institutions, processes 
and authorities. These processes are thought open and unfold with 
unpredictable outcomes. Ingold underlines “the importance of 
distinguishing the network as a set of interconnected points from 
the meshwork as an interweaving of lines” (2011: 64). The 
conceptual openness of the meshwork is linked to the analytical 
considerations of assemblance theory, which seeks to elaborate on 
the configuration of parts and wholes; the ordering of 
heterogeneous entities and how they interact for a certain time 
(Müller 2015: 28). “Across time and space, territory, authority, and 
rights have been assembled into distinct formations within which 
they have had variable levels of performance” (Sassen 2008: 5). 
Assemblage thinking goes back to Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 
2003) who used the approach as provisional analytical tool for social 
and urban planning questions, building on the premise of no 
predefined hierarchies, no single organizing principle behind 
assemblages. The framework prescribes that every assemblage is 
territorial, taking into consideration the micro and macro relations 
of spaces and places (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 2003: 503f).  
With regard to post-Soviet areas, governance is characterized by the 
parallelism of structural and processual modes of governance 
(Kropp and Schuhmann 2014). While governance of state 
authorities relates on hierarchical steering, on local level horizontal 
structures negotiate decisions and implementations.27 In post-
                                                          
27 This implies to perceive social order as horizontal structure. „Zum einen 
handelt es sich um Regelungsstrukturen (governance structures), sie sich auf 
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Soviet Central Asia such modes of governance are interlaced and 
simultaneous, it is appears adequate to speak of a meshwork of 
governance arrangements, indicating that various procedures, 
institutions and organizations overlapping each other. The approach 
resembles what has been described as hybrid (Koehler and Zürcher 
2004; Meagher 2012) or meshwork governance (Delanda 1995). It 
points to a diffuse distribution of power and authority, putting in 
the centre the coincidence of various modes of governance of one 
and the same matter. The notion meshwork governance refers 
explicitly to various hierarchies involved in governance 
arrangements by focussing on how communities “articulate 
heterogeneous components as such, without homogenizing [along 
hierarchies, A.M.]” (Delanda 1995: 1). Employing the term 
meshwork appears adequate in the present research as it refers 
primarily to local governance arrangements, underlining the 
alternating, parallel and overlapping presence of processes and 
structures that unfold together (Ingold 2011). In the post-Soviet 
context governance unfolds against the highly ambiguous presence 
of neopatrimonial state authorities. Powerful actors, institutions or 
organizations not only shape governance processes, but also enable 
or avert the enforcement of decisions. Similarly, Foucaults analysis 
of the broad meaning of power and government in European early 
modern times designates “the way in which the conduct of 
individuals or of groups might be directed” (1982: 790). To govern, 
in this sense, “is to structure the possible field of action of others” 
(Foucault 1982: 790). In the case of Tajik LAO, the president and 
state authorities rule sector-wide through strong executives and 
neopatrimonial co-optation of elites, exercising tight control for 
instance over the public sphere, media and religious belief. 
                                                                                                                           
die Institutionen und Akteurskonstellationen beziehen. Zum anderen geht es 
um Koordinations- oder Interaktionsprozesse, die auf (wechselseitige) 
Verhaltensänderungen der beteiligten Akteure abzielen“ (Börzel 2006: 2). 
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However, on local level state governance processes struggle with 
significant voids and are only selectively able to implement their 
agenda. Decisions and demands formulated by the central 
government may, however, be limited by diverse interests of local 
elites. The term social order encompasses a mainly horizontal 
constellation of institutions, processes and actors that can be found 
in one locality in a certain moment of time (Mielke et al. 2011). The 
social order displays a normative programme that structures 
governance processes and arrangements, inevitable to all members 
of the community. However, individual actors find ways to 
manipulate or sideline institutions promoted by the social order, i.e. 
by submitting to patronage networks.28 Despite additional 
transactional costs, the flexibility of how institutions are appealed 
and mobilized, indicates strength and assertiveness of powerful 
actors who exercise influence over governance processes (Lauth 
and Liebert 1999).29 Under meshwork conditions elites outreach 
expands usually on more than one institution.  
In order to sharpen the perspective on governance I will further 
focus on governance in rural areas of Central Asia, especially in 
Tajikistan. The specific view on local governance constitutes a 
particular situation of interference between representatives of the 
state and local institutions, organizations and processes. 
Governance on local level is subsidiary, linked to state authorities 
and non-state institutions, organizations and processes alike. Post-
Soviet rural areas rely on various governance processes linked with 
diverse normative systems, which compete and complement with 
                                                          
28 „Zum einen handelt es sich um Regelungsstrukturen (governance structures), 
sie sich auf die Institutionen und Akteurskonstellationen beziehen. Zum 
anderen geht es um Koordinations- oder Interaktionsprozesse, die auf 
(wechselseitige) Verhaltensänderungen der beteiligten Akteure abzielen“ 
(Börzel 2006: 2).   
29
 Whereas actors often hide the logic of their operations and relying instead on 
the efficiency of other institutional or personal arrangements. 
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each other, often in accordance to the sectorial strong or absent 
state (Kropp and Schuhmann 2014: 66). In this regard, local 
governance processes are hybrid in a dual sense: Firstly, they unfold 
with or without the patronage of the state. Secondly, there is an 
overlapping of structural and processual governance elements. 
Structural forms of governance build in parts on the local social 
order in place, something Rosenau and Czempiel understand as 
“rule without formal government” (1992: 5).30 This means a set of 
regulatory mechanisms implements decisions without the tools of 
state regulation (Malito 2015), but through local structures and 
processes. Local governance processes are in this regard meshwork 
arrangements of state interventions and local processes in form of 
overlapping institutions, mechanisms and procedures, through 
which actors formulate their interests, settle conflicts or comply 
with rights and duties (Mielke et al. 2011; Poos 2011). This kind of 
parallel existence of processual and structural forms of governance 
in local communities is perceived as transition away from 
hierarchical steering towards new forms of governance (Bora 2012: 
345f). Theorizing local governance as hybrid or meshwork 
arrangement allows therefore a better understanding of the 
complexity of everyday processes in post-Soviet rural settings.  
“Viewing governance in a more processual way enables us 
to invest the concept with reflexivity, and to better represent 
the conditional and changing ways in which individuals 
respond to others [..] built upon the idea that there exists a 
sphere of power characterized by competition, collaboration 
and power disputes, and populated by hierarchically 
organized factions” (Manuel-Navarrete et al. 2009: 15). 
                                                          
30 „Rosenau (1992) versteht Governance als ein System von Regeln und die 
Governanceforschung als eine nicht mehr auf das „Machen“, sondern auf eine 
komplexe, netzwerkförmige Regelungsstruktur ausgerichtete Form der 
Beobachtung“ (Bora 2012: 346f). 
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The flexible understanding of governance as interplay of different 
actors, local processes and national authorities, with the sub-
regional government as one actor among others describes a 
situation of assembled structures and processes. This approach 
appears adequate to capture governance processes in notoriously 
opaque institutional environments that determine agriculture and 
everyday rural life. Competitive processes seek to bend at decision 
making or implementation. With regard to Tajikistan, Driscoll 
underlines neopatrimonial dependances and warlord competition 
(2015). In this sense, governance is the implementation of decisions 
that follow “the outcome of factions competing for power” 
(Manuel-Navarrete et al. 2009: 3) which may sound simplistic from 
the perspective of the Western democracies. In an environment 
where the institutional distribution of power is not always clear, as 
post-Soviet Central Asia, the reference to the ever-implicit power 
competition is illustrative. 
“Central to this framework is a diffuse notion of authority. 
Diffuse in the sense that authority is not a monopoly of the 
State, but an asset shared amongst competing 
organizations, including corporate actors and public 
institutions both local and distant” (Manuel-Navarrete et al. 
2009: 3).  
The diffuse notion of authority applies to the situation in the rural 
hinterland of the neopatrimonial post-Soviet republics. Local 
governance processes unfold as meshwork of state and non-state 
actors who compete over the decisions to be made. Power plays 
naturally a decisive role and is mobilized through patron-client 
relations, references to resources, networks or values and 
moralities (Mielke 2012: 32, 36f).31 While post-Soviet governments 
                                                          
31 Mielke substitutes the term ‘worldview’, as it insufficiently captures the 
everyday practice dimension of social order, with the term ‘moralities’.  
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put much efforts to maintain the linear processual model of 
governing through hierarchical steering, in praxis this is only 
achieved selectively (Roche and Heathershaw 2010).  
Local governance in the post-Soviet context is thus characterized 
less by state structures, but to a large extend by phenomenon’s as 
forum shopping, institutional bricolage and legal pluralism along 
different normative systems (Benda-Beckmann 1981; Cleaver 2002; 
Sehring 2009). The subsequent effect is meshwork and competition 
of decision making in form of various institutions, processes, 
authoritative rulings and implementations. Literature indicates that 
even for rural dwellers it is no simple task to determine which 
boards, institutions or processes settle decisions (Bliss 2012; 
Herbers 2006; Trevisani 2011).32 Hodgson provides evidence that 
despite being intrinsically interlinked, status and significance of 
institutions vary (2006). In rural areas, also thanks to the diffuse 
distribution of power, legal regulations, local traditions or religious 
institutions operate potentially coequally. Besides this structural 
competition (Börzel 2006: 3), also functional overlapping of 
different institutions and processes occurs, so called institutional 
bricolage, according to the diverse interests involved in the decision 
making process (Cleaver 2002; Sehring 2006).  Meshwork 
arrangements remain volatile and intransparent because they refer 
to various normative systems as the state, religious norms, science 
or local traditions. Shifting between different institutions, 
organizations and processes is a common practice in rural 
communities because favourable decisions potentially depend on 
the respective forum. Benda-Beckmann described the selective and 
flexible approach to governing bodies among the Minangkabau in 
                                                          
32 Neighbouring rural societies in Afghanistan are an intersting comparison to 
post-Soviet Central Asia. Mielke shows that resouce governance remote rural 
areas works on the basis of a more distinct social order with little interference 
of the central state (Mielke 2012).  
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Indonesia as forum shopping (Benda-Beckmann 1981). Accordingly, 
governance processes not necessarily remain with particular boards 
or institutions that are legally in charge, alternatively there are 
other forums and norms to appeal to. Thus, a general flexibility and 
ambiguity prevails about which forum is adequate to respond to the 
respective request. A forum is defined in analogy to Benda-
Beckmann as institutions that potentially settle disputes (1981: 
117). There are different kinds of forums operative within the local 
social order, for instance state or non-state, on local or national 
level, religious or secular forums. Local actors employ this flexibility 
by traveling with their requests from one forum to another, seeking 
the ‘right’ institutional setting to receive a positive response 
(Benda-Beckmann and Pirie 2008).33 Forum shopping, as form of 
legal pluralism is something possibly avoided within European 
governance. Normative pluralism on the other hand builds on 
legitimacy deriving from non-state authorities, i.e. values and 
moralities. In rural communities in Central Asian, values and 
moralities refer to large extend on local understandings of Islam, 
Muslim culture and local traditions (Harris 1998; Mielke 2012; 
Roche 2013). However, moralities and mind sets are intrinsically 
nurtured from the values and ethics of the Soviet society 
(Markowitz 2012; Tlostanova 2012).  
Communication and Framing of the Public Sphere in 
Tajikistan 
Although meshwork governance arrangements display conceptual 
openness, this does not mean rulings in Central Asia are arbitrarily 
or weak (Heathershaw 2014). State regimes maintain a tight grip on 
policies down to the local level (Markowitz 2013). In the case of 
                                                          
33 In a revised discussion, the concept of forum shopping is contextualized with 
the dichotomy order – disorder to underline its close relation to local 
institutions (Benda-Beckmann and Pirie 2008). 
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Tajikistan, the massive personalization of the state in the figure of 
the president is a major resource of power. Personalization of the 
state emerges together with the marginalization of formally 
democratic institutions that ought to ensure checks and balances of 
state powers. These structures fail to provide meaningful results in 
post-Soviet Central Asia (Driscoll 2015; Nourzhanov and Bleuer 
2013). The Tajik civic-public space [öffentliche Raum] of media, 
political parties, associations or religious institutions is thoroughly 
dominated and co-opted by state authorities and their clients, who 
create detriments to the political opposition and the Islamic clergy 
alike (Lemon 2015). Democratic institutions and organizations are 
subordinated to personality of the President. The state maintains a 
strict observation of the political opposition and the media 
(Bensmann 2007; Loersch and Grigorian 2000). In this context, 
Western ideal-type public discourses following Habermas’ discourse 
ethics (1990) are not applying to post-Soviet Central Asian societies. 
Instead, “bilden hier stark regulierte symbolische Interaktionen in 
Form von Ritualen, Mythen und Zeremoniellen die Grundlage einer 
offiziellen Sphäre von Öffentlichkeit, der eine informelle Sphäre 
gegenübersteht“ (Ursprung 2008: 154). The public sphere in post-
Soviet Central Asia systems is normative and regulated thanks to 
the surveillance and intervention of authorities and co-opted social 
structures. In consequence, the public sphere is mainly apolitical, 
with social and political issues being neglected or discussed 
informally, i.e. explicitly hidden from the public. Taking the example 
of Tajikistan; communicative spaces, where society is able to debate 
the range of own affairs are severely limited.34 This is essentially a 
case of path-dependency, because previous  
                                                          
34 Habermas discourse ethics see ideally citizens form the public and the 
audience for discourses. Habermas’s was widely criticized for his attempt to 
formulate a normative discourse theory and its consequences for politics and 
jurisprudence (Flybjerg 2001: 48). The consequence, for Habermas, is that 
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“sozialistische Regimes einen sehr restriktiven Umgang mit 
Informationen pflegten und diese vielfach nur in 
verklausulierter, kryptischer Form weitergaben, begünstigte 
dies die Entstehung einer informellen Öffentlichkeit. Aus 
bruchstückhaften Informationen mussten sinnstiftende 
Erzählungen geschaffen werden“ (Ursprung 2008: 154).  
Thus, the state in the post-Soviet space does not provide the full 
picture what encourages people to distil meaningful narratives 
themselves. This spurs demand and competition for information. 
Elite competition is part of the governance process, whereas 
specific information and knowledge serve to topple opponents 
while elites function at the same time as gatekeeper of exactly this 
information (Heathershaw 2009: 152).35   
The reference to the “informal public” (Ursprung 2008: 154) is 
certainly an important characteristic of post-Soviet societies; in the 
sense that there are significant assets of knowledge and information 
that people do not want to share publicly. Dividing social 
arrangements in public or informal (Helmke and Levitsky 2004) is 
part of everyday knowledge, thus completely internalized by the 
population (Hayoz 2015; Lebedeva 2006).36 The consistency of the 
informal public is a legacy of the Soviet everyday culture and 
corresponds with the very restrictive information policy of the USSR 
(Oswald and Voronkov 2004). In Central Asia, in part due to the 
                                                                                                                           
human beings are defined as ontologically democratic beings, as homo	
democraticus (Flybjerg 2001: 90f).  
35 The approach to knowledge and information is in this regard opaque as it is 
considered a power resource. “The ethic of `authority´ demands that 
information and law are used and abused to maintain control, rather than being 
in themselves regulative of social control. [...] Where official information 
becomes a hidden weapon of ‘authority’ it is unsurprising that its public 
transcript is reduced to the provision of bland statistics, or is completely 
withheld.” (Heathershaw 2009: 112). 
36 Some arrangements are deliberately established informally, e.g. the practice 
of blat, a structured system of favours, that was in place all over the USSR but is 
still being used (Lebedeva 2006).   
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above mentioned democratic limitations as the absence of political 
competition, some hegemonic narratives and ideological topoi 
prevail, putting caps on political or economic topics. Accordingly, 
these topics do not enter the media and are not accepted in public 
debates. The public sphere prevails as `Präsenzöffentlichkeit´, which 
means that peoples statements only count when physically present. 
Conditions as the `Präsenzöffentlichkeit´ help to manipulate for 
instance governance processes as they impose symbolic, pre-
structured, formal political rituals that constitute authority. Large 
parts of the official public sphere are characterized by ritualized 
forms of communication, which clearly depict hegemonic narratives, 
as particularly obvious in the celebration of canonized holidays and 
television broadcasts (Lemon 2014; Lewis 2016; Umetbaeva 2015).37 
Post-Soviet leaders and authorities in Central Asia subscribed to 
previous governance practices, as they were able to build on the 
persisting mind-set (Driscoll 2015: 125f), while embarking on new 
national symbols and subsequent hegemonic narratives (Roy 2007).  
                                                          
37 Exactly such arrangements connect to the constitution of politics in former 
Soviet societies where semi-deliberate performative actions, “freiwillige 
rituelle Mitgestaltung symbolischer Inszenierungen” (Ursprung 2008: 155) 
were a regular procedure. Everyday life in the USSR required exactly this kind 
of participation at “Massenveranstaltungen und die regelmäßig geforderte 
aktive Zustimmung zum Regime“ (ibid.:155). As a totalitarian state, the entire 
social system in the USSR was based on complicated mechanisms that required 
from each individual „immer wieder in ritualisierten Kontexten eine Äußerung 
für oder gegen das Regime“ (ibid.: 155). Such symbolic performances display 
and effectively strengthen the hegemonic narrative of the regime. Eventually, 
through consistent and active „Bejahung zur Herrschaft, die weder mit rein 
passiver Unterwerfung unter Zwang noch mit freiwilliger Beteiligung 
gleichgesetzt werden kann, ließ sich über die konkrete Ritualsituation hinaus 
eine soziale Ordnung konstituieren – Herrschaft eben“ (ibid.: 155f.). 
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Summary: Meshwork Governance and Epistemic 
Cultures  
Conceptually the present research makes use of meshwork 
governance to understand political processes in the specific 
research region in rural Tajikistan. Meshwork governance 
arrangements build on different authorities and diverse normative 
systems that compete in decision making and implementation. 
Governance arrangements are inseparable from the presence and 
distribution of knowledge in society, i.e. knowledge and governance 
are considered coming into existence co-produced. Conceptually, 
the interlinkage of knowledge and governace is accomplished in the 
concept of epistemic cultures. Epistemic cultures determine “how 
we know what we know” (Knorr-Cetina 1999: 1); they help to 
stabilize political regimes, maintain the dominance of local elites 
and sustain the local social order. 
The focus on co-produced epistemic cultures is used in the present 
research to understand how everyday life and livelihoods are 
ordered by various stocks of knowledge, governance arrangements 
and power interventions in different localities and sub-regions. 
Hence, the perspective of epistemic cultures allows analysing how 
knowledge assets such as agricultural expertise and knowledge 
practices evolve, are taken up and modified in rural societies. 
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3  Farm Restructuring and Transformation 
of Agricultural Knowledge  
While the post-Soviet Republic of Tajikistan underwent severe 
political upheavals since independency in 1991, rural livelihoods and 
agricultural production experienced dynamic transformation 
processes, but economic stagnation too. This chapter outlines how 
post-Soviet land reforms and farm restructuration processes led to 
the individualization of agriculture. The chapter further looks into 
details of agricultural policy implementations. It illustrates how farm 
restructuration and individualization processes evolved according to 
the interests of national and local elites. These power structures 
determine today’s setup of agricultural production and are different 
from authoritarian modernisation projects in neighbouring Central 
Asian states. The last part of the chapter describes how 
transformation processes have effect on epistemic cultures in rural 
Tajikistan, referring in particular on agricultural knowledge and 
information.  
Privatisation, individualization or de-collectivization are key terms 
used to describe the efforts of agricultural restructuring throughout 
the post-Soviet states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, containing 
implicitly a development paradigm, namely the consent to establish 
capitalist, market-oriented, self-reliant rural farm entrepreneurs in a 
democratic political order. The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
related communist states in the late 1980’s started a global 
transformation process of socialist inspired collective economies as 
Russia, Mongolia, Cuba, and China, assumingly towards the Western 
type market economies of the EU or the USA. However, in the 
Central Asian post-Soviet republics, despite the transition to 
capitalist market conditions the state continues to have significant 
economic leverage in rural areas, with the assumed development 
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aim ever more vague. Agriculture is in all Central Asian states of 
major concern for both, economy and society. About two thirds of 
the population live in rural areas and is occupied in agricultural 
economies, whereas on average “this sector makes up 
approximately 30% of state revenue” (Markowitz 2016: 519). 
Despite comparable starting points after the collapse of the USSR, 
post-Soviet nation-states embarked on different paths to 
restructure their agricultural sector(Spoor 2004).38 The new Central 
Asian nation-states presented themselves committed to economic 
reforms to implement market economy in agricultural areas (Rozelle 
and Swinnen 2004; Spoor 2004).39 Initially, Western analysts saw 
these policies as a logic outcome to compensate previous collective 
agriculture. “The Chinese and Vietnamese experiences led to the 
expectation that the new institutional rules introduced in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union would lead rural residents to 
defect en masse from inefficient collectivized farm organizations to 
more efficient, individually operated farms” (Hierman and 
Nekbakhtshoev 2017: 1). Underlying development assumptions of 
these reform processes refer to the strength of the capitalist market 
economy that attracts rural households to establish private farm 
enterprises which will eventually enhance productivity and 
production, thus ensure a livelihood from agricultural production.40 
                                                          
38 Farm restructuring implies “new forms of association, namely cooperatives, 
joint stock companies, partnerships, associations of peasant farms, private 
farmers and peasants” (Spoor 2004: 11). 
39 See strategic government papers as the Kazakhstan 2030 Government 
Development Programme.  
40 Dehqon farm is the term for a privatized farm enterprise. There are three 
different types: the individual, family	or collective	dehqon farm. The collective 
dehqon farm is usually the successor of former Kolkhoz/ Sovkhoz enterprise. At 
times of field research and at least until 2016, collective	dehqon farms prevailed 
in the Zarafshan Valley. The individual	dehqon farm denotes that the farm is 
bound to one single household. The family	dehqon farm consists of a number of 
households who pool together their land and share spending and profits. The 
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In this view, economic development is founded in private property. 
Robinson et al. wrap up the paradigm that “strong user rights and 
liberalization are positively related to agricultural labour 
productivity in post-Soviet economies” (2008: 172) and provide in 
their Tajik case studies partial evidence for this view (Robinson et al. 
2008: 200). The positive relation of individual property to business is 
widely accepted not only among scientists (Rizov 2004) but also 
NGO practitioners (Verdery 2004) and international donors as the 
World Bank or the European Union. Scholars as Lerman (2000, et al. 
2002), Spoor (2004) and others lined out that agricultural 
restructuring in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and economic 
performance are directly related.  
“These authors argue that Central Asian countries are 
amongst the worst performers and they link poor 
agricultural output to a high persistence of collective 
structures in which privatization has consisted simply of 
changing the sign on the door” (Robinson et al. 2008: 172).  
Thus, while there is wide agreement among Western scholars and 
policy makers that the development paradigm of privatizing, de-
collectivizing or individualizing former collective agricultural 
structures is having favourable effects on agricultural economy; on 
local level these processes unfold protracted and ambiguous. Post-
Soviet dismantling of previous kolkhoz and sovkhoz structures and 
the successive distribution of land happened in all former Soviet 
republics (Lerman 2004). However implementation is diverse; post-
Soviet Central Asian states bought differently into this development 
paradigm (Spoor 2007) with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
(Veldwisch and Bock 2011) as most cautiously, and Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan (Petrick and Pomfret 2016). Still, it is important to note 
                                                                                                                           
large-scale production cooperative as new form of the collective dehqon farm 
could not be retrieved in the Zarafshan Valley. 
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that also within the countries the implementation of land reforms 
has developed sub-regionally differently. Despite central reform 
legislation within the country, implementation and outcome of 
agricultural restructuration efforts have been in Tajikistan for 
example, sub-regionally highly diverse (Hierman and Nekbakhtshoev 
2017; Robinson et al. 2008). While some structures were surely 
decollectivized, in the sense of “breaking up large cooperative and 
state farms into individual, autonomous farms” (Hierman and 
Nekbakhtshoev 2017: 1), others had changed only by name. The 
term decollectivization suggests the structured dismantling of 
collective farm structures, which was often not the case (ICG 2005; 
Tuychi 2014). Understanding post-Soviet change processes as form 
of privatization is equally problematic as only a very few of the 
emerging farm households were ready to enter a yet to emerge 
market economy. All land tenure remains with the state, allocated 
land use rights do not provide rural households with the same 
security as private property. Claiming the privatization of Central 
Asian rural economies is only punctually applicable and thus 
misleading as in large parts one cannot speak of a functioning 
market economy. For these reasons I denote the transformation 
process in rural Central Asia as agricultural individualization, which 
describes firstly an economic process, however includes a social, 
livelihood and knowledge dimension. The term agricultural 
individualization provides an open perspective and, as I will show 
throughout this book, adds a social dimension to the initially 
economic transformation process. The individualization of 
agriculture refers not just to economic rearrangements from 
collective to the household level, it includes also the social-
administrative dimension that was fulfilled by kolkhoz structures, 
and importantly for this research, a cognitive-intellectual dimension 
of communal arrangement (Mielke and Schetter 2007).  
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The Individualization of the Tajik Agriculture 
After the collapse of the USSR and the declaration of national 
independence in 1991, Tajikistan introduced a series of land reforms 
and agricultural support policies with the aim of transferring the 
collective farming system of kolkhozes and sovkhozes41 to individual 
agricultural production. While farmers started to defect from 
collective farms in Tajikistan already in the early 1990’s without 
direct involvement of the state on local level (Roy 1999, 2007), only 
later the Tajik state attempted to steer the process with a series of 
agrarian reforms. Namely the 1992 Law of the Republic of Tajikistan 
On Land Reforms “aimed at the creation of equal rights for 
development of different forms of enterprises and at the rational 
use and protection of land in agricultural production” (Tuychi 2014: 
129). Subsequently several laws regarding access to land and the 
restructuration of farm enterprises have come into existence since 
then with the intention to dissolute collective farm structure and 
individualize agricultural production (Nekbakhtshoev 2016; Sehring 
2009; Tuychi 2014). However, implementation and outcome of land 
reform legislation in Tajikistan are sub-regionally highly diverse. 
Significant differences occurred between cotton and non-cotton 
areas or high and low land areas (Hierman and Nekbakhtshoev 
2017; Robinson et al. 2008). Taking the dismantling of collective 
farms as indicator for the progress of individualization confirms vast 
differences throughout the Tajik sub-regions (Hofman and Visser 
2014). In contrast, rather little research has been available about 
how land reform efforts actually unfolded in remote mountainous 
areas of Tajikistan (Bliss 2011, 2012; Kraudzun 2016; Kreutzmann 
2002; Kreutzmann and Watanabe 2016; Mandler 2013, 2016).  
                                                          
41 Kolkhoz and sovkhoz were the main types of farm enterprises in the former 
USSR. The names stand for the two main forms of state controlled collective 
farming.  
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Land Access Regulations 
Until 1992 and beyond all relevant arable areas in Tajikistan were 
managed by Soviet collective farm structures (Giese 1970; Roy 
1999), thanks to the 1992’s law on land reform each employee [i.e. 
kolkhoznik or sovkhoznik] had a share of these collective farm assets 
(Porteous 2005).42 Kolkhoz and sovkhoz structures ceased out and 
every member of the collective structures was entitled to a quota of 
land use rights (Republic of Tajikistan 1996).43 This quota of land 
consisted usually of a set of land use rights, i.e. shares of irrigated 
land, unirrigated land, garden land and other kinds of land. 
Nevertheless, the “certificate listed only the names of the 
shareholders and the boundaries of the farm as a whole, and did 
not specify the location or the size of the shareholders’ land shares” 
(Nekbakhtshoev 2016: 56).44 The granted usage rights of land 
parcels made at the same time the farmer a stakeholder in the 
newly formed collective dehqon farm45 enterprise (Robinson et al. 
2008; Rowe 2010). Land use titles guarantee life-long inheritable 
tenure to individuals for household plots and dehqon farms (Duncan 
                                                          
42 Hierman and Nekbakhtshoev are defining a collective farm as any farm 
“where the majority of shareholders have only paper shares” (2017: 5). 
43 Due to the specific division of labour which organized kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes, this entailed that many of the farmers today were not farmers during 
Soviet times, but rather administrative employees, mechanics, drivers etc. 
Farmers were organized in collectives [brigade] specialized on certain 
agricultural tasks. 
44 Interestingly, in non-cotton areas of Tajikistan as the Zarafshan Valley, 
farmers had a very clear idea where these titles are located, and actually 
already used this land as their private property. As Nekbakhtshoev remarks, 
this was not everywhere in Tajikistan the case (2016: 51). Chapter seven shows 
that farmers in remote and marginal agricultural areas, despite being member 
in the collective dehqon farm, delimitated precisely their land plots and 
individually worked their land. 
45 In the course of these early reforms many kolkhoz and sovkhoz structures 
split up along brigades and formed communal collective dehqon farms where 
previous command structures largely remained intact (Nekbakhtshoev 2016: 
56). In cotton areas, working teams [brigada] were often maintained for a long 
time afterwards. 
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2000: 15f). These titles may be passed on to others but cannot be 
sold. Farmers are not allowed to trade land tenures what entails the 
nonexistence of a regular land market (Kandiyoti 2007; Van Atta 
2008). The land code reads: “Land in the Republic of Tajikistan 
belongs to the exclusive ownership of the state”.46 This principle is 
founded in the Tajik constitution, which makes explicit that land is 
the endowment of the people and cannot be a marketable 
commodity.47 Land use titels may be transferred to others 
(Caccavale 2005; Duncan 2000: 16f), are in itself not fully stable 
arrangements. Firstly, they may not determine a specific delimitated 
piece of land. Secondly, it is comparably easy for authorities and 
rural elites to circumvent or neglect these rights. Empirical findings 
discussed below show that the various access arrangements to land 
are not stable. Land plots may be requested by other farmers, but 
also misappropriated by authorities (Mandler 2013: 15f). These 
scenarios are a permanent source of discontent for farmers, who 
take measures to safeguard present access arrangements.  
Following the above `privatization’ mind-set, since 2006 the Tajik 
government launched a sequence of reform laws (Tuychi 2014)48 
and initiatives to promote farm households to defect from the 
communal collective deqhon farm, encouraging them to set-up so 
called individual or family dehqon farms. Individualized farm 
enterprises were displayed by the government as favourable to 
private entrepreneurship because they provide increased financial 
sustainability, release individual entrepreneurship, enhance the use 
                                                          
46 Article 2, The Land Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, 1996. Retrieved 
04/2014 available at: http://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=2150   
47 This principle is formulated in article 13 of the Tajik constitution. Ideally, it is 
understood as care-taking of Tajik authorities of the non alienable properties of 
the people (private conversation with Zvi Lerman 2016). 
48 Tuchy provides a concise overview over the Tajik state reform efforts (2014: 
129-36) 
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of agro-technology and stabilize the farm business. 49 Further, it 
enables farm households to secure existing land tenures through 
land certificates that may be used as collateral for bank loans.  Once 
the district land committee has issued land use certificates, previous 
requests and laws may not be applied to the land plot any more 
(Caccavale 2005). On the basis of land certificates, individual or 
family dehqon farm can be established. Exactly these processes of 
farm restructuring unfolded differently throughout the Tajik sub-
regions. Thus, Hierman and Nekbakhtshoev state that despite “the 
uniform standard by which local authorities were to implement 
centralized law, [..] rates of decollectivization were uneven across 
Tajikistan’s districts” (2017: 5). With the perspective on cotton-
producing enterprises, the authors maintain that the “spatial 
variation in decollectivization patterns [is due to the] de facto 
devolution of decision making authority to local elites” (2017: 6), 
namely managers of the collective dehqon farms, who pursue their 
own agenda. In Tajik cotton areas, Nekbakhtshoev identifies 
decentralized land reform and land allocation processes (2016: 49) 
which are resisted by “Soviet rural elites-turned-managers” (2016: 
18, 54, 62, 236f). Personal interests of local elites as farm managers 
surely helped to maintain collective farm structures also in remote 
and marginal agricultural areas, however I will argue in chapter six 
that for a long period it was also in the interest of smallholder 
farmers to remain within collective farm structures (Mandler 
2016).50 Albeit in non-cotton regions of Tajikistan the situation may 
be different. In the aftermath of the long history of Soviet collective 
farming in Tajikistan, relations between individual households and 
                                                          
49 Nekbakhtshoev quotes the then governor of the Tajik Sughd province 
Qoodiiri (2016: 55). 
50 As I will be shown below at the example of the Zarafshan Valley, farmers 
produce individually on their own land plots, however remained members of 
the collective dehqon farms. This situation prevailed in the Zarafshan area until 
2014 and beyond.   
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the collective farm included complex ties of economic, 
administrative, social and occasional character (Hann 2003).51 
Deprived of substantial agricultural resources, the remaining 
communal collective dehqon farms were not able to continue the 
previous role of the former kolkhoz or sovkhozes (Herbers 2006; Roy 
1999; Spoor 2007). But even in its’ reduced form, the collective 
farms still had a central role in the community’s daily affairs as a few 
structures and institutions as meetings, councils, health care or 
transport continued to exist for a certain period. Eventually, related 
to economic individualization processes emerged the reorganization 
of agricultural knowledge and its potential role in smallholder 
agricultural development. This development complies with land 
reform efforts in neighbouring post-Soviet countries. Only very few 
collective farms resisted the general trend of agricultural 
individualization and continued to work collectively in a meaningful 
way, i.e. working profitably and providing services for the 
community, as examples in Kazakhstan (Babadjanov 2014) and 
partially in Uzbekistan (Kandiyoti 2003; Trevisani 2011) show. 
Kirgizstan and Georgia instead followed an economically more 
liberal approach where collective farms were more quickly 
abandoned (Frey 2016; Lerman and Sedik 2009b).  
Due to sub-regional differences of farm individualization processes, 
it is still very difficult to give a coherent picture of farm structures 
throughout Tajikistan. The continued existence of collective dehqon 
farms underlines sub-regional varieties. Against this background the 
individualization of agricultural farm structures appears as 
economic paradigm somewhat incomplete. On the one hand side 
individualization happened only partially. On the other side it 
resulted in unclear, ambiguous property and production conditions. 
                                                          
51 This corresponds with the conception of the kolkhoz as total social system in 
the late Soviet Union (Hann 2003, Trevisani 2010).   
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Arrangements of agricultural individualization turn out particularly 
ambivalent as these processes are strongly influenced by the state 
policies of limited access orders, which exacerbate the competition 
for arable land. Thus, the term individualization does not describe a 
somewhat linear capitalist transition from collective farms to 
private household farming (Lerman and Sedik 2009c). Instead, it 
actually describes waves of agricultural policy conditions that 
allowed or coerced farmer to enlarge individual production. In 
remote areas individualization denotes mostly unsystematic farm 
restructuring, where farmers defected sporadically from collective 
enterprises by organizing access to agricultural resources without 
accordance to legal frameworks and pursuing individual livelihoods.   
Meshwork Governance and Competition of Local 
Stakeholders 
Local elites in Tajik rural areas are not a homogenous group. There 
are at least three different types of elites in rural Tajikistan, whicht 
overlap as well: Economic elites that focus on production and 
commercialization, political elites that build on exclusive access to 
powerful networks and, religious elites such as mullahs or rural 
dwellers with a particular pious lifestyle. Elites draw authority and 
reputation from their capacity to mobilize or intimidate co-villagers. 
Political elites dispose of privileged links to the state administration 
and ‘power organs´ [Machtorgane].52 Such capacities enable these 
rural dwellers to establish a form of coerced-solidarity 
[Zwangssolidarität] of they rural community with the state, using 
real or symbolic mobilization of power and wealth to stigmatize, 
intimidate and to marginalize potential dissenters. Through 
                                                          
52 The so called ‘power organs’ [Russ. organy vlasti] or power authorities are in 
common Tajik understanding the army, the secret service GKNB and the police. 
The Tajik State Committee for National Security (GKNB), the successor agency 
of the Soviet KGB, is still commonly referred to simply as KGB. 
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ritualized narratives and references to the president and the 
founding myths of the state, local elites claim loyalty with the state 
system; presenting themselves as guardians of peace, political 
stability and justice in rural areas. Several authors note, the status 
quo (Boboyorov 2013a: 14) or the legitimate order (Heathershaw 
2009: 68, 73) is determined through a terminology of value 
conceptions for instance as “tinji [well, peaceful, stable, calm] and 
notinji [unstable, political tension]” (Roche 2013: 27) that discredits 
any criticism as opposition to the local way of living and to the state. 
Ritualized reference to values and certain national narratives 
promoted by elites have taken characteristics of an ideology that 
monopolizes social identities and impedes alternative 
conceptualisations of reality, be it religiously or politically (Harris 
1998, 2012; Stephan 2010). Critic to cases of injustice, inequality or 
corruption is quickly denounced as disturbing the peace within the 
village. References to stability and tinji are therefore no value free 
statements (Heathershaw 2009: 73).53 The example of tinji shows 
how elites denote full political affirmation and seek to disperse 
discontent among villagers or regarding authorities (Epkenhans 
2012; Heathershaw 2009: 72f). Boboyorov explains convincingly 
how the repeated reference to an assumed common identity and 
local customs is mobilized by local elites to subvert smallholder 
villagers (2013a: 134ff). 
The above paragraphs have shown some general lines how post-
Soviet individualization of agriculture unfolded in Tajikistan. The 
                                                          
53 Stability is an often used term in Tajik media, development discourses and on 
local level (Boboyorov 2013:14); the topos belongs in fact to the rhetoric of the 
government. Stability, as also reflected in the concept of peace [tinji], means 
cementing inequality, corruption etc. Stability and tinji are therefore hardly 
value free terminology. Such references to local identity and common order 
eventually serve to sideline and intimidate any critic of the existing conditions. 
Thus, the reference to such topoi is a governance mechanism (Lemon 2016a). I 
will further elaborate on such practices in the empirical chapters below.  
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following sub-chapter refers to paradigms of Tajik and Central Asian 
governance processes grasped as political economy, which 
Dudoigon described tellingly hovering from “ambiguity to 
ambivalence” (2004). Dudoigon’s formulation summarizes the 
conduct of political actors in Tajik rural areas, i.e. how political 
forces affect the choice of economic policies. Governance in Central 
Asia’s rural areas appears largely non-democratic decision making 
and neopatrimonial authoritarian policy implementation (Sehring 
2009: 85f). The broad view on the political economy of agricultural 
policies in post-Soviet states aims to describe motivations, modus 
and impact of actors towards law, custom, and government that 
frame the logic and paradigms of agricultural restructuration 
(Petrick and Pomfret 2016). Despite a quarter century of national 
independence, leadership in the five Central Asian republics follows 
a post-Soviet design (Van Assche et al. 2014), which is different to 
neighbouring Islamic states such as Pakistan or Afghanistan (Mielke 
2012; Schetter 2007). On local level, governance parallels between 
the Islamic republics and post-Soviet states become increasingly 
visible, i.e. through references to shari’ah or the expulsion of 
females of the public sphere (Schetter 2009, 2013a, 2013b). 
However, policies in Central Asian republics, i.e. agricultural policies, 
are still dominated by social and political paradigms that prevail 
within the institutional and behavioural patterns of Soviet societies:  
“[P]ost-Soviet states share important similarities. One 
similarity is very strong executives. [P]ost-Soviet leaders 
inherited populations with restricted choice sets and all the 
national symbols of state authority, including a time-tested 
party system to manage the aspirations of talented elites, 
uniforms and statue-lined streets for parades, museums and 
archives, a school system for the education of children, a 
national television network, and much more. Across most of 
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post-Soviet Eurasia, self-reinforcing processes of single-party 
hegemonic stability were unleashed once the chaos of the 
transition subsided and the electricity was turned back on. 
Rural votes could be traded for access to scarce public 
goods. [Neutralizing] the risk of insurgency from the internal 
hinterlands [..] with ritual elections, occasional violence, and 
constant surveillance. Potemkin institution-building in the 
capitals was paired with a return to Soviet vote-farming in 
rural areas. Strong presidents, in this account, emerged via a 
path-dependent logic to take the place of Party Secretaries” 
(Driscoll 2015: 125f)   
Driscoll outlines major features of post-Soviet republics in Central 
Asia, pointing for instance at very strong executives under strong 
national presidents. With exception of Kirgizstan, presidents in 
Central Asian states have assumed de facto extra-legal positions, 
employing national founding mythologies that link to particular 
periods in pre-Soviet history. In analogy to communist cult of 
personality, authoritarian rulers are displayed as enlightened 
patriarchs, labelled by simulated democratic institutions as “father 
of the nation” (Soest and Grauvogel 2015: 19). Soest and Grauvogel 
(2015) present a set of six dimensions of legitimacy claims that are 
employed by post-Soviet authoritarian regimes.54 Despite different 
degrees of authoritarianism in the Central Asian republics, the 
personal figure of the president is a pre-condition that steadily gains 
weight in determining national policies. Besides Kirgizstan, the 
presidents of the Central Asian republics have virtually unlimited 
terms and are hardly accountable to democratic checks and 
                                                          
54 Soest and Grauvogel (2015: 6f) identify six dimensions of how states claim 
legitimacy: (1) ideology, (2) foundational myth, (3) personalism, (4) 
international engagement, (5) procedural mechanisms, and (6) performance 
(i.e. claims to success in producing desirable political, social, or economic 
outcomes). 
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balances from parliaments or other institutions of the state 
(Markowitz 2013; Reeves et al. 2014). Strong leaders preside over 
weak state institutions, so that de facto the figure of the president 
symbolically and physically overlays the government and the state. 
This phenomenon has long been discussed in the context of the 
question if Central Asian republics are strong or weak states 
(Heathershaw 2014; Heathershaw and Schatz 2017; Meagher 2012). 
Former Soviet republics were perceived as hybrid states, where the 
government is not adequately present in certain policy sectors, nor 
in rural areas (Koehler and Zürcher 2004; Zürcher 2005). Highly 
centralized post-Soviet state structures are strong in security and 
economic sectors, while absent in others, such as guaranteeing civil 
rights, jurisdiction, economic policies or providing basic services e.g. 
health, infrastructure or education. Selective stateness is 
particularly evident in rural areas (Trevisani 2011). Laruelle speaks 
of multiple and regular contradictory logics that “signal the core 
instability of these regimes and their hybridity” (2012: 321). Despite 
strong leaders, Central Asian states have difficulties to implement 
agricultural policies in the periphery or guarantee civil rights 
(Reeves 2014). It is this “intrinsic ambiguity of (Central Asian) post-
colonial state formation which produces paradoxes such as 'strong-
weak' states” (Heathershaw 2009: 142). In selected areas as 
security, internal politics or parts of the economy the state is 
through its agencies (‘power actors’ and the administration) and 
external allies (international partners) a strong player. However, in 
some central sectors, governmental competences migrated to other 
agencies and actors, what has been perceived as “state 
fragmentation” (McGlinchey 2014), “state failure” (ICG 2009, 2011) 
or “state erosion” (Markowitz 2013). Nevertheless, over the course 
of the past 25 years, Central Asian states and their leadership have 
proved very resilient against crisis.  Within this setting, democratic 
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processes in a Western sense are the exception. People have very 
little possibilities to participate in political processes.55 This is much 
criticized from a Western perspective which continues to identify 
“democratic deficits” (Soest and Grauvogel 2015: 5) of increasingly 
authoritarian `regimes´ (ICG 2011; Lemon 2016b).56 In contrast to 
Western democracies, post-Soviet states in the European periphery 
present themselves as alternative democracies, for instance in 
analogy to the Russian “sovereign democracy” (Brusis 2016)57 i.e. 
idealized as advanced version of presidential democracy. Schematic 
and value-laden comparisons with Western democracies appear of 
little conceptual use as they develop insufficient explanatory power. 
I argue that governance processes in the post-Soviet realm of 
eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia are not a deviation from 
Western models but conceptually different.58 Significant differences 
result from the authoritarian leadership of the president and his 
allies, interlinked with the profound ambiguity between strong and 
weak, i.e. selective, governance, which is a key characteristic of 
governance in post-Soviet areas. The situation results from either 
retreat or incapacity to govern major political fields. Many 
governmental competences are delegated to other agencies and 
actors. For the cases of Georgia and Tajikistan, Driscoll explains why 
                                                          
55 Democratic processes are manipulated by rigged elections, outlawing of 
political opposition and the complicated, if any, transition of power between 
political competitors.  
56 Indicators of authoritarian regimes are the selective absence of public sphere, 
simulated democratic representations, the lack of reals checks of the political 
system, the repression of opposition politics. Compare with chapter four.  
57 The term `sovereign democracy’ is opposed to the idea of `liberal democracy’, 
intending to distance one-self to the transatlantic-European model of 
democracy is, in analogy to Russia, reason of state (Staatsräson) in some of the 
post-Soviet states (Brusis 2016).  
58 There is not one Western governance model as there is no Eastern 
governance deficit. The intention here is to show that against Western 
dominated perspectives on governance, there are general features and practices 
that differ between east and west.  
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large parts of state domains are ruled in form of power sharing in 
order to keep the president at its position (2015). Effectively, such 
virtual power arrangements between warlords and other political 
actors enforce the authoritative organization of everyday life 
(Donahue 2002: 1), although at the cost of civic participation in 
state affairs. State authority is shared almost at every level, not 
necessarily with institutions, but with powerful actors, who follow 
their own agenda (Driscoll 2015; Wiegmann 2009). Manipulating or 
co-opting single actors allows the government and namely the 
president to rule at the centre of the state, determining state 
politics. State authority is intrinsically tied to the personality of the 
president (Driscoll 2015: 125, 129f). Critics or political opposition to 
the president means in this context going against the state. Despite 
the façade of democratic parliamentarian institutions and pledges 
of leaders for enhancing democracy, governance at state level and 
down to sub-districts is deeply authoritarian.59 This particular 
phenomenon is prevalent in all post-Soviet Central Asian states – 
with the modest exception of Kyrgyzstan. In the public sphere, the 
president substitutes the state, indicating that those areas which 
are not close to the president are somewhat without the state. 
State governance processes in the post-Soviet republics typically 
rely on tight control of the public sphere and communication 
through the state administration. Driscoll quotes Kotkin’s bon mot 
that the “various post-Soviet nations emerged deeply Soviet” (In: 
Driscoll 2015: 125). Especially in rural areas, governance 
arrangements of everyday life are characterized by uncertainty and 
poor rule of law, occasionally interrupted by abrupt and powerful 
interventions of local elites or authorities (Kropp and Schuhmann 
2014: 63f).  
                                                          
59 Heathershaw speaks with regard to Tajkistan of the “simulation of 
'democratisation', 'opposition' and 'multiparty politics'” (2009: 94).  
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Neopatrimonial Authoritarian Leadership: The Role 
of the President 
As a consequence, most post-Soviet states in Central Asia are 
characterized as neopatrimonial as all important decisions require 
the consent of the president (Ishiyama 2004: 43f; Laruelle 2012; 
Paiziev 2014). Departing from Weber’s considerations regarding 
patrimonialism and legal-rational bureaucracy (1978 [1968], 1980), 
Erdman and Engel define neopatrimonialism as a “type of political 
domination which is characterised by insecurity about the 
behaviour and role of state institutions (and agents). This insecurity 
structures the reproduction of the system” (2006: 19). While 
Erdman and Engel build their concept on findings from Sub-Saharan 
countries in Africa, this holds true for post-Soviet states in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus too. Laruelle describes the specific forms of 
neopatrionialsm in Central Asia as patronal presidentialism that is 
built on far-reaching patronage systems, designing, moderating and 
manipulating the various power-fractions within the country (2012: 
316). The notion of the neopatrimonial state indicates authoritarian 
leadership in rural areas presenting itself as force of stability in a 
context of insecurity. Markowitz elaborates on the case of 
Uzbekistan how “neopatrimonial relationships within the state’s 
territorial administration support the rise and institutionalization of 
authoritarian rule” (2012: 1) and argues that in consequence this 
“halts political and economic reform, undermines the rule of law, 
and diminishes social welfare provision to the public” (2012: 1). 
Patronage networks link local elites with the central government, a 
relation which ideally constitutes mutual authority. On local level 
patronage networks provide security, trust and predictability, 
collective identities are the outer layer of these patterns of 
institutionalized order, as argues Boboyorov (2012, 2013a). They are 
possibly reaching from very high up in state structures down to 
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small villages. Such vertical relations entail that unsolved political 
issues at national level, for instance regarding agricultural sector 
development, the relation of the state to Islam, or the definition of 
national security have an immediate impact on local affairs. 
Authoritarian rulers in rural areas potentially conflict with the state 
building efforts of the central state, as they consider rural areas as 
personal fiefdom that is governed and exploited with little 
limitations or control (Heathershaw 2009; Wiegmann 2009).60 
Driscoll elaborates on the example of Georgia and Tajikistan how 
national leaders rule through a semi-orderly high-risk “coalition 
game” (2015: 30f), where the presidents carefully manoeuver 
between the various power fraction in the country and distribute 
available assets to remain in charge. Authoritarian leadership in 
Tajikistan is a case in point for the post-Soviet neopatrimonial 
regime. The state is highly centralized under the authoritarian 
leadership of President Emomali Rahmon,61 who is displayed as 
“Founder of Peace and Harmony: Leader of the Nation” and 
together with his family absolved from possible application of 
national legislation (RFE/RL Tajik Service 2015), in order to rebuild 
the Tajik nation as renewal of the Samanid emirate (Soest and 
Grauvogel 2015: 18). However, despite the historical mission of the 
president to link with mythological ancestors, everyday politics 
show the selective capacities of the state to rule over provinces or 
to address pressing political issues as the economy, rule of law, 
education and health care. The cases of apparent administrative 
incapacity are used by the government to underline the need of 
                                                          
60 Schetter notes in Taliban dominated regions of Afghanistan the re-
strengthening of local powers: “Wiederkehr lokaler Herrschaftsansprüche, 
lokale Kommandeure, Verteidigung des Lokalen” (2007: 236f.)  
61 De	facto the Tajik president commands significant resources of power as the 
general state apparatus (Heathershaw 2009: 145). The president exercises 
power in particular through the control of the power organs [Russ. organy	
vlasti]: Army, secret service and the police. 
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authoritarian competences to extent the state power over the 
country and thus secure development efforts. The narrative of 
‘catching up’ allowed, for instance, Tajikistan for a long time to 
“maintain the appearance of being 'on the road to democracy'” 
(Heathershaw 2009: 113) and attract the assistance of foreign 
donors, which again is a resource of power exclusive to the 
president (Driscoll 2015; Heathershaw 2009; Zürcher 2005). Thus, 
the president is not only symbolically in the centre of the state, but 
a guarantor for the political and economic existence of the state. 
The patronizing figure of the president carefully employs a strategy 
to rule (Herrschaftsstrategie) based on the narrative of being 
saviour of the nation,62 while actually limiting and discrediting 
democratic processes (Heathershaw 2009: 93, 171). In fact, the 
“political process is closed to all who might challenge [President] 
Rahmon” (ICG 2016: 2,13). For Heathershaw, this belongs to a 
process of state building based on “emergent, legitimate and post-
conflict order” which is in fact “authority” (2009: 109). Thus, 
authoritarian policy making legitimates itself on the basis of its 
emendation from the leader. Consequently, the president and the 
Tajik government have stepped up in recent years their tendency to 
authoritarian decision making and the use of violence to silence 
secular and religious opponents (Lemon 2016a).63  
                                                          
62 The president presents himself in public as peace-maker of the Tajik civil war 
from 1992 – 1997, which he brokered as one of the leaders of the winning 
military coalition (Driscoll 2015).  
63 In recent years several severe violent clashes between government forces and 
renegades from the regime happened, e.g. 2010 in the Kamarob Gorge, 2012 
and 2014 in Khorog, 2015 in Dushanbe and the Romit Gorge.   
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Agricultural Information, Advice and Expertise in Rural 
Tajikistan 
Currently available agricultural information and specific expertise 
developed in parallel to the rural transformation processes in post-
Soviet Tajikistan. Previous Soviet structures that produced and 
disseminated agricultural expertise were well developed in 
Tajikistan, with outreach also to remote collective farms (Dudoignon 
and Noack 2014; Herbers 2006). Since Tajik national independence, 
many of the institutional networks between local experts, research 
organizations, administration and policy makers have ceased to 
exist (Shtaltovna and Mandler 2012). Other networks crossing the 
boundaries of agricultural production have come into place. Despite 
the protracted individualization of agricultural structures, 
production was in fact since long time an individual task and so the 
approach to agriculturally relevant knowledge (Hornidge et al. 
2016). Thus, with regard to agricultural knowledge, new sources and 
networks have developed which may not be as efficient as the 
former centralized structures, however work under the conditions 
of a fragile private market system. Referring to the post-Soviet 
states, Van Den Ban stated a “consequence is that agricultural 
extension and other forms of adult education have a more 
important role to play in […former communist] countries than 
elsewhere in the world” (1999: 121). Agricultural production is a 
knowledge intense activity. According to Roeling, farmers rely on an 
agricultural knowledge system (1994) through which rural actors 
commune in order to solve problems or release innovations 
(Leeuwis 2004). There is widespread evidence for the delicacy of 
agricultural production regarding limitations of the agricultural 
knowledge system (Foss 2007; Lemma 2007; Wall 2006). In return, it 
is commonly agreed that production is stimulated by incentives for 
education and knowledge exchange (Evers et al. 2006; Evers 2008; 
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Roeling 1994; Roeling and Wagemakers 1998). Agricultural 
extension or advisory services are understood as “promoting 
agricultural productivity, increasing food security, improving rural 
livelihoods, and promoting agriculture as an engine of pro-poor 
economic growth” (IFPRI 2016). This means, particular assets of 
knowledge are believed to positively influence agricultural 
production, such as scientific expertise, so called best practices or 
economic advice. Research and advice are perceived as potential 
boost to the agricultural production, especially in the former Soviet 
republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus where it is assumed to 
trigger economic development (CACAARI 2009; IMF 2009; Wason 
2002).  
Agricultural Expertise and Advice in Post-Soviet 
Agriculture 
The former Soviet republics in Central Asia have a collective history 
of rural centralized agricultural advisory services, which were 
hierarchically structured throughout the entire Soviet Union. 
Specific agricultural expertise was channelled to kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes through local and regional departments of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA). Every kolkhoz or sovkhoz had a set of trained 
experts available, consisting of engineers, agronomists, accountants 
who regularly attended courses to update their knowledge. 
Furthermore, the chief of the collective farm [raísi hodshagi 
dehqonon] was closely integrated in Soviet power structures, e.g. 
through sub-regional party and government structures (Frey 2016; 
Shtaltovna 2016). The elaborated and extensive knowledge system 
of the former collective farming systems however deteriorated 
almost immediately with the end of the Soviet Union (Morgounov 
and Zuidema 2001), especially those institutions which were funded 
directly by Moscow (Van Assche 2016: 35). The centralized 
exchange of agricultural expertise ended gradually with the collapse 
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of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz farming system in early 1990s, although 
with different speed in the various sub-regions. The USSR-wide 
established networks of education and research dissolved rather 
early after the political independence of the former Soviet 
republics, as the newly independent states faced the challenge to 
provide subsidies to these entities (Beniwal et al. 2010). Eventually, 
during the following individualization processes large parts of the 
Soviet collective agricultural infrastructure and knowledge system 
became out of use. Agricultural expert knowledge that was 
integrated in Soviet research structures, is either lost or became 
outdated (Evers and Wall 2006; Morgounov and Zuidema 2001), 
with research activity drastically shortened (Beniwal et al. 2010). In 
absence of new intellectual input, the remains of the Soviet 
knowledge system, such as routines and staff mentality form in 
some areas the basis of current cultivation praxis that often has not 
changed much. This applies especially to cotton regions, as this is 
the sector where states still exercise most control (ICG 2005; Van 
Atta 2008; Wall 2006). In cotton areas, farmers were bound, and 
partially still are, to crop quotas, particular production techniques, 
predefined input supplies and marketing mechanisms (Bliss 2008; 
Boboyorov 2016; Van Atta 2008). The Tajik cotton areas are only 
one example where the Soviet paradigm of dealing centrally, 
collective and very hierarchically with agricultural knowledge still 
prevails. This continuity in the way how agricultural knowledge is 
available is sensible in many other areas of the Tajik agricultural 
sector due to institutional path dependencies as pseudo-
individualized farms and the persistence of leadership structures 
that link with authoritarian state structures. Still, the Tajik state 
maintains important research structures, as the Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences in Dushanbe or agricultural departments at 
provincial and district level [so called agroprom]. However, these 
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organizations are usually underfunded and lack expertise as a result 
of elite job-sales, so that they are hardly fit for the task to advise 
individualized farmers. Nevertheless, the Tajik government 
maintains its approach to enlarge and strengthen the role of 
agricultural advice as part of its long term agricultural reform 
commitments.64 These programmes and institutions are often 
invisible in rural areas (Engel and Simonetti-Techert 2015: 4). While 
the MoA in Dushanbe is considered to have a two staff extension 
department (Van Atta 2014), this situation repeats on provincial and 
district administrative levels. District heads of agroprom do not 
foster the systematic dissemination of specialized agricultural 
advice (Mandler 2016), but follow a Soviet style “top-down 
approach, try to impose their views and objectives on local actors 
and are mainly interested in just controlling and reporting” (De 
Danieli and Shtaltovna 2016: 163). This attitude is the continuation 
of the Soviet knowledge paradigm, apparently disengaged with 
parallel individualization processes in the Tajik agriculture. Still, it is 
appropriate to state that there is currently no overriding national 
organization that provides agricultural advice to farmers (Shtaltovna 
2016: 37). Shtaltovna and Danieli identify from the side of the Tajik 
government “little interest in a general development strategy for 
rural areas or in some form of reinvention of the agricultural 
expertise system” (2016: 167). Agricultural expertise in Tajikistan is 
currently not hierarchically pooled in central organizations on 
national or provincial level. Instead, central sources of knowledge 
are locally attached to individuals or minor structures with little 
                                                          
64 Some central statements of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of 
Tajikistan (MoA): MoA and the Tajik Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
Agricultural	Reform	Program	in	Tajikistan	for	2010-2020, Dushanbe 2010; 
Consolidated	Document	Agriculture	Reform	Programme	of	Republic	of	Tajikistan, 
Dushanbe 2011; Programme	for	reforming	the	Agriculture	Sector	of	the	Republic	
of	Tajikistan	for	2012-2020, Dushanbe 2012; Land	Code	Of	The	Republic	Of	
Tajikistan, Dushanbe 2012. 
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coordination and exchange among each other. These can be 
individuals, local farmer associations, external NGO, and state 
organizations as the district agricultural department agroprom. As a 
consequence of the above situation, each farming household is 
constrained to develop its own approach to access the required 
agricultural expertise (Mandler 2013). Against the background of 
deteriorated state support for agricultural research and advice, as 
well as massive social change in rural areas, the respective expertise 
comes with difficulties to local farmers. The existing gap in accessing 
agricultural advice cannot be easily substituted by external parties 
as NGOs, because “the farmer as a funnel for Western expertise, or 
as a central learning point for the modification and later 
implementation of such expertise, in general does not yet exist in 
Tajikistan” (Shtaltovna 2016: 30; Van Assche et al. 2013). Discussing 
agriculturally relevant knowledge in Tajik rural areas simply in terms 
of extension or agricultural advisory services would therefore be 
short-sighted. Especially under the conditions of LAO, smallholder 
farming decisions need to take the broader economic and political 
context into account. Unlike in previous collective structures, the 
head of household is in charge of farming decisions and has to fulfil 
complex tasks that developed gradually with the post-Soviet 
economic and political transition towards a capitalist market 
economy: “To be a farmer in Tajikistan today, one needs to be a 
multifunctional entrepreneur with specific agricultural knowledge as 
well as financial and legal skills, marketing skills and the ability to 
source all the required inputs and machinery” (Shtaltovna 2016: 30). 
Such challenges impact even more on the many female headed 
households.  
Individualized Approaches to Expertise and Advice  
In fact, the transformation towards new domains of knowledge 
accelerated in response to the change of the production system 
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(Kandiyoti 2003). With poor state advisory systems in place, there is 
a plurality of sub-regional different providers of agricultural advice. 
Although De Danieli and Shtaltovna see “farmers’ main sources of 
knowledge are state agronomists from Agroprom [agroprom] or 
former kolkhoz specialists” (2016: 163), I  emphasize local forms of 
knowledge exchange and mutual consultation, thus specific 
knowledge structures and practices that developed on village level 
around local resource persons. Such persons may be former kolkhoz 
specialists; however as I will outline in the empirical chapters below, 
often these persons are experienced farmers of advanced years and 
maturity and are usually the first contact person for agricultural 
advice. Namely agricultural expertise is not alone the domain of 
centralized, professional experts, but has always been the 
prerogative of local farmers themselves (El-Berr 2009). One prime 
effect of the collapse of the collective farming system is therefore 
the reinforced concentration on expertise and advice available on 
local level. Farmers reverse themselves to experts and experienced 
farmers within their community who are subject-matter specialists 
despite being often without formal education. With regard to the 
high-mountainous parts of Tajikistan Bliss talks of a revival of local 
expertise in the process of de-collectivisation (2006). Similar 
consequences of agricultural individualization processes are also 
traceable elsewhere in the region of Uzbekistan as Kandiyoti 
outlines (2003: 251). These examples make evident that sub-
regional different cultures of agricultural knowledge are being 
established that lack the link to central expertise. Agricultural 
restructuration processes have established a plurality of sources for 
agricultural information and advice that are from the perspective of 
individual farmers coequal; farmers opt for the various sources 
individually and case wise. With regard to the previous collectivized 
system, this appears as new paradigm regarding agricultural 
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knowledge. Despite the diverging local conditions throughout 
Tajikistan, farmers potentially can refer to a few main strands to 
gain agricultural information and advice from beyond village level. 
Firstly, rudimentary state advisory structures exist attached to 
provincial, district [hukumat] and sometimes sub-district [jamoat] 
level. The already mentioned district agricultural departments 
[agroprom] dispose very few personnel and financial resources. 
Therefore these offices do “not deliver proper advisory services to 
farmers. The main reason for that is their expertise is outdated and 
does not always meet present-day farmers’ needs” (De Danieli and 
Shtaltovna 2016: 163). Officers provide unpaid advice, but often 
sporadically and on individual basis (Bliss 2012; Mandler 2016: 342). 
However, despite the poor endowment, these offices are for many 
farmers a fixed point of reference. Higher structures as the MoA, 
the Tajik Academy of Agricultural Science or universities only 
sporadically fulfil their role of providing technical expertise. To make 
matters worse, since the end of the Soviet Union, these institutions 
have not adjusted to a mentality that serves the interests and needs 
of agricultural experts and farmers.   
Thus, from the side of the government of Tajikistan no priority is 
scheduled to specialized information or economic assistance for 
farmers. International consulting and agricultural extension services 
through NGOs and international organizations partially fill this gap. 
They are significant sources for agricultural advice and services in 
Tajikistan. NGO advisory services are usually provided through long 
and short term development projects (De Danieli and Shtaltovna 
2016: 164f). In many cases these efforts are implemented together 
with local Tajik NGOs (WFP 2005). The discontinuity of assistance 
programmes and projects in this realm creates not only short-
sighted results, but raises also little expectations on the site of the 
clients. Mismatch of services and requests explains why agricultural 
 133 
advisory services work with little effect, at times disdained by 
farmers (MEDA 2006). Surveys among farmer reveal that the quality 
of the provided services is an issue (Bakozoda et al. 2011; 
Welthungerhilfe 2006). Farmers request timely answers to specific 
questions, which may not be provided by the extension services 
available (Engel and Simonetti-Techert 2015: 5; Shtaltovna 2016). 
Mobile internet is increasingly available through telephones but it 
too lacks relevant services and information packages tailored for 
smallholder farmers. Especially in remote areas, missing links to 
markets as potential service and knowledge providers is a central 
issue (Giuliani et al. 2011).  
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Intersection: Media in Rural Tajikistan 
 The significant deterioration of the general infrastructure since 
1991 was a major blow to the inter-regional information flow in 
Tajikistan. Media, as cornerstone of public communication, is poorly 
present in rural areas (Bensmann 2007; Wason 2002). Apart from 
infrastructural and economic limitations, media in rural Tajikistan 
faces harsh political restrictions. Due to potential intimidation and 
lack of resources media outlets are only sporadic capable to cover 
agricultural issues (Loersch and Grigorian 2000; NANSMIT 2009). 
Media outlets are under tight control of the government and used as 
centralized domains to exercise power. Driscoll gives an account 
how “centralized radio and television network, broadcasting a single 
narrative from the titular capitals” are crucial “compliance-
generating technologies” (Driscoll 2015: 125) effectively employed 
in rural areas to corroborate and transmit state power.  
“A mass reception of the same narratives in the same 
language at the same time – watching the same television 
serials as they air, hearing the president speaking on the 
radio, or downloading the same “Internet memes” – is a 
modern national ritual [..]. In social science jargon, one 
could say that public and synchronized mass communication 
technologies lower the cost for political leaders to create 
`common knowledge’[..]. I recall being in the rural village of 
Kalikhum when the lights were turned on for the first time in 
months, in concordance with the springtime Navruz holiday. 
The national television channel played songs of peace, and 
Rakhmonov’s face was plastered on the screen. I knew that 
if it were not for that man, the lights would still be off, and I 
knew that my host family understood this in the same way” 
(Driscoll 2015: 125). 
While the media has a clear function for the state, it is weak with 
regard to agricultural or rural matters, it do not serve as a source for 
information: “There are different newspapers and journals for 
farmers as Kishovarsi [agriculture], Xaeti dehot [rural live], Gasetta 
agroinform [agrarian information newspaper], Journal kishovars 
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[agricultural journal], Kishlok xodshalegi [rural agricultural 
economy], but they hardly operate” (Dushanbe 25.07.2011). The 
funding of such publications comes from the ministry of agriculture 
(MoA) or the provincial government, however they are published 
sporadically. In fact, these publications were untraceable either in 
the cities or in villages of the Zarafshan Valley, and couldn’t even be 
found elsewhere in Tajikistan. Nevertheless, a few issues of the 
newspaper Zarafshon that dedicates three pages of information to 
agriculture were found in Panjakent. According to the district 
agricultural department [agroprom] in Panjakent, farmers of this 
district are informed with the weekly journal Riskofarin about 
agriculture in the region (Panjakent 08.08.2011). Yet, during field 
research, this weekly newspaper has never been seen outside the 
agroprom’s office and was unknown in other visited offices and 
among farmers. Despite the scarce availability, newspapers are 
sources of information for farming technologies and provide, also 
by omitting information, general information on agricultural 
policies. Farmers were invited to read newspapers at the head 
office of the collective dehqon farm. Collective dehqon farms are 
usually advised by authorities to hold subscriptions of the 
governmental newspapers Cumhuriat or Minbari Xalk (Dushanbe 
19.07.2011). On enquiry, farmers repeatedly complained that the 
quality of reporting on agricultural politics and technical issues in 
the available newspapers is very poor. Education of journalists is 
low; there are very few who have the capacity to cover agricultural 
issues. Radio and TV are said to produce even worse broadcasts in 
this regard. Still, “freedom of the media today is much better than 
some years ago” says the expert of the NGO NANSMIT.  
“But media coverage of agriculture is low. Journalists are 
badly trained, not specialized for agricultural issues and 
have no funds to travel out of the city. They hardly go into 
detail and also do not bother some big guys, who defend 
their monopoly of something. Journalists do not ask 
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further [investigative, A.M.] questions, they simply repeat 
general topics and strategies provided by the ministry of 
agriculture. Therefore their articles and information have 
official character” (Dushanbe 19.11.2011).  
Some of the better off farmers who were regularly buying and 
sharing newspapers reported the limited access to print media. They 
are obliged to content themselves with the press available in rural 
areas, which are usually newspapers close to the government. 
“Newspapers are generally too expensive. The newspaper 
AsiaPlus costs here about 2,5 Somoni [0,39 €]. I have to buy 
it in the city; but the issue is at least one day delayed. 
General newspapers do write about agriculture but not 
detailed enough. Take the example of potatoes in Tavildara 
district: Prices, diseases, cultivation techniques were not 
mentioned. There is no precision in reporting such topics” 
(Garibak 15.07.2011).  
Considering the affirmative reporting, without critical cross-checking 
of statements or independent displaying of data, it appears that the 
state is heavily involved in agriculture and the display of agriculture 
in public. Farmers, however, are cut off from climatic information, 
ongoing political or economic developments. This results in limited 
public debate about agricultural production and its future 
development. It has thus negative impacts as agricultural expertise 
further outdates and potential investments are stalled.  
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Summary: Obstacles to Individualized Expertise 
Tajik individual farmers face a complex scenario of potential sources 
for agricultural knowledge, information and advice. From a Western 
perspective, the assumed positive economic nexus between 
knowledge and innovation is challenged by the complex Tajik 
political economy. Difficulties for individual farmers derive from 
neopatrimonial authoritarian governance and policy making that 
corresponds with established limited access orders LAO. Unlike 
Western extension systems, which assume the ideal case of 
farmers’ free choice regarding their farm practices (Röling 1994), 
farming innovations may easily become problematic in rural 
Tajikistan. State organizations and powerful local actors, both, 
monitor farmers closely economically and politically. For example, 
in Tajik cotton areas this led to forms of knowledge governance, 
with decidedly negative incentives for innovation (Wall 2006, 
Herbers 2006a, ICG 2005).65 In fact, agricultural expertise is 
competing with other knowledge and third party interference, 
which creates manifold obstacles for extension measures, 
diminishes its effectiveness up to complete failure. These challenges 
source in the general political economy with e.g. interferences in 
the public sphere and domains of knowledge production alike 
(Amsler 2007: 2, 148). Similarly argues Van Assche who underlines 
that in the post-Soviet states of Central Asia and the Caucasus 
specific agricultural knowledge cannot be separated from general 
dispositions of power and is unthinkable independent from 
governance (2016). This prescribes the frameing of rural epistemic 
cultures as authorities continue to declare certain areas suitable to 
                                                          
65 It has been touched upon several times before that the conditions for 
agriculture change significantly between cotton and non-cotton areas. Outside 
cotton areas extension services have a bigger role to play as the influence of 
local governance on cropping and marketing patterns is lower (Boboyorov 
2015; Wiegmann 2009).   
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particular crops, i.e. cotton or potatoes, thus considering alternative 
production systems is implicitly and explicitly prevented. LAO 
conditions create a situation that determines the exchange of 
knowledge and information and therewith schedules the 
implementation of innovations. Incentives for Tajik farmers to 
approach information and advisory services are therefore limited, as 
they experience the obstacles in making use of new knowledge, up 
to the point of deliberately abandoning market-oriented production 
(De Danieli and Shtaltovna 2016: 172). In consequence, farmers 
develop a critical and selective approach to information and 
knowledge, starting with the differentiation between local or 
external expertise.  
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4  Research Questions, Hypothesis and 
Methodology 
Following up the conceptual considerations that frame Tajikistan a 
neopatrimonial authoritarian state and its agricultural sector 
structured by limited access orders LAO, the present study departs 
from a perspective on the nexus of co-produced knowledge and 
governance arrangements to scrutinize the role of expertise in the 
Tajik agricultural sector. The research evolves along three sets of 
questions that guide the analysis. The first question examines the 
individualization of agriculture as process of social fragmentation. 
Agricultural transformation in Tajikistan, e.g. farm restructuration 
and market economy, had significant impact on agricultural 
production, livelihoods and the cohabitation in rural communities 
alike. Previously powerful local institutions, state authorities, 
organizations and processes that determined policy-making 
(Politikgestaltung) on local level gave way to other normative 
systems designed by new elites, an emerging post-Soviet state 
ideology and the public understanding of Islam. These parameters 
significantly deliminate the room for manoeuver of farmers by 
imposing new practices and rules as for instance through LAO. The 
research therefore asks: To what extent do farmers approach 
agriculture individually and how do they act together? How can 
farmers participate in political processes on local and sub-regional 
level? 
The second question asks why despite precarious livelihood 
situations in rural areas the individualization of the Tajik agriculture 
did not release a surge of innovation and productivity. The present 
situation of stagnating smallholder agriculture perpetuates rural 
poverty and fails to stimulate economic potentials. Limited natural 
resources combined with little political representation created 
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obstacles that reduce the potential of agricultural development. In 
this context, individualized smallholder farmers were expected to 
turn to agricultural information and advice as incentive for 
establishing intensified production. The research fathoms thus the 
role of agricultural expertise especially among smallholder farmers 
in remote rural areas: How is the development of the agricultural 
sector related to the availability of information and expertise? 
What kind of agricultural expertise and knowledge is considered 
by farmers and how is it obtained?  
Thirdly, to understand the dynamics are released by agricultural 
individualization, the present thesis adopts a perspective on 
epistemic cultures that subsumes all assets of knowledge which 
farmers link to agriculture. Epistemic cultures describe how 
knowledge assets are situated in society, i.e. how they are created 
and warranted. The perspective on epistemic cultures provides 
insights about the value and significance that the community draws 
to particular assets of knowledge. Taking the case of smallholder 
agriculture in the Zarafshan Valley, the present research analyses 
the role of agricultural expertise within the epistemic cultures of 
remote rural communities. Since previous agricultural advisory 
structures appear defunct, the emergence and mobilization of 
expertise is determined by other factors. Against this background 
the research asks: How does the context of agricultural 
individualization in Tajikistan, as limited access orders LAO, 
structure the way farmers organize knowledge and expertise?  
Research Approach 
To deal with the research questions the present thesis pursues an 
interdisciplinary social science perspective. Addressing the initial 
problem statement of depressed agricultural development among 
smallholder farmers in marginal rural areas in Tajikistan, the present 
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research draws on development studies, sociology and ethnography 
to capture the role of knowledge in this context. Involving different 
disciplines allows to analyse crosscutting issues as represented by 
epistemic cultures in Tajik rural communities. With the claim of 
doing problem driven research the present analysis follows 
Flyvbjerg’s request for genuine deliveries of social sciences: “Good 
social science is problem driven and not methodology driven in the 
sense that it employs those methods that for a given problematic, 
best help answer the research questions at hand” (2006: 242). Thus, 
this approach to agricultural development in its broadest sense is 
conceptualized as interdisciplinary research with focus on the social 
and livelihood dimension of agricultural production. Agricultural 
production is exposed to governance steering and power 
interferences on various levels, in particular in the context of LAO. 
The following parts of the chapter will explain how the questions 
are operationalized by principal sociological research approach and 
qualitative anthropological field research methodologies. 
Social Science Approach to Knowledge and 
Governance in Agriculture 
Agricultural restructuration not only contains political and economic 
processes, but impacts on the entire rural cohabitation and 
livelihoods. With reference to the processes of individualization of 
the agricultural sector under the conditions of the LAO, change 
processes are highly political affairs, with many different 
stakeholders and assets at stake. I choose a mainly sociological and 
ethnographic approach to grasp the complexity of agricultural 
individualization processes, addressing the challenges and 
motivations of smallholder farmers. Using case evidence is the 
genuine domain of social sciences that allows producing narratives 
to explain the complexities of transforming local epistemic cultures. 
Post-Soviet farm restructuration combines economic and social 
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processes, structured by intransparent political and power 
interventions with severe impact on livelihoods and production. 
Providing in such a context qualitative research results is the specific 
achievement and productivity of social sciences. It is the particular 
domain of the social sciences to clarify about power and power 
resources, providing “concrete examples and detailed narratives of 
the ways in which power and values work in social organizations 
and with what consequences” (Flyvbjerg 2008: 106). Yet, according 
to Flyvbjerg, social science case studies concerns also underlying 
development issues, suggesting “how power and values could be 
changed to work with other consequences” (Flyvbjerg 2008: 106). 
Thus, the advantage of the mixed sociological approach lies in the 
depth and richness of the interdisciplinary perspective on my 
central development issue of low agricultural performance among 
smallholders in remote rural areas in Tajikistan, with knowledge as 
determining variable. Interdisciplinary and methodological set up of 
the study at hand is framed to analyse the Tajik smallholder 
agriculture in remote rural areas, in particular with regard to the 
three main issues, addressed in the research questions and 
hypothesis. 
Making Sociology Matter 
It is a central concern of Flyvbjerg to underline the particular 
scientific competences and achievements of the social sciences 
against the conceptually ever more dominant natural sciences.66 To 
corroborate the unique position of the social sciences, Flyvbjerg 
elaborates a specific approach to make sociological research 
relevant to present day problems. He calls this approach phronetic 
social science. “Phronesis concerns the analysis of values - `things 
                                                          
66 Flyvbjerg categorically defends the social sciences against belittling from 
natural sciences (2011).  
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that are good or bad for man´ - as a point of departure for managed 
action” (Flyvbjerg 2008: 83). This approach elaborates on Aristoteles 
who places in the Nicomachean Ethics phronesis between techné 
and episteme (Flyvbjerg 2008: 79). The three intellectual virtues 
have different characteristics and are used to achieve different 
objectives (Flyvbjerg 2008: 82). Flyvbjerg sees the role of the social 
sciences and particularly sociology to assist in making judgements. It 
is in this regard that phronetic social science puts an emphasis on 
values and power (Flyvbjerg 2008: 78), i.e. the values upon which 
people base their decisions. “Phronetic sociology explores current 
practices and historic circumstances to find avenues to praxis. The 
task of phronetic sociology is to clarify and deliberate about the 
problems, possibilities and risks that different social organizations 
face, and to outline how things could be done differently” (Flyvbjerg 
2008: 106)67, therewith clarifying values, interests and power 
relations. The phronetic social science approach focuses on how 
values and power form the basis of social practices. As analytical 
program phronetic social science abstains largely from theory 
building, instead solution-oriented and based on interdisciplinary 
work.68 The concept is deliberately kept open to take 
developmental trajectories into account. “Phronetic sociology is 
also not about, nor does it try to develop, theory or universal 
method. Thus, phronetic sociology is an analytical project, but not a 
theoretical or methodological one” (Flyvbjerg 2008: 105). The 
openness of phronetic research approach allows the flexible use of 
mid-range concepts such as meshwork governance to identify 
                                                          
67 The quote continuous “all in full knowledge that we cannot find ultimate 
answers to these questions or even to a single version of what the questions 
are” (Flyvbjerg 2008: 106). 
68 Both, phronetic social sciences and grounded theory basically resign from 
creating a comprehensive theoretical framework. Despite methodologically 
very close, phronetic social sciences differ from the later approach in its 
orientation on development with explicit focus on values and power relations.   
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avenues to praxis, i.e. the mobilization of expertise and knowledge 
practices in the context of everyday rural livelihood provision. The 
conceptual flexibility of the phronetic research approach has been 
criticized as liberal normative programme (Clegg et al. 2014; Schram 
2004), however it enables the analytical framing of evolutions as the 
post-Soviet agricultural restructuration under the conditions of 
neopatrimonial authoritarian LAO. For this kind of research 
perspective, case studies are particularly suitable, as they 
emphasize on knowledge and power. 
Framing the Case Studies 
Case studies are central to the social sciences, deriving most and 
genuine insights by producing narratives that order complexities in 
the sense of Geertz (1973).69 Ideally it sets out to draw a concrete 
plan of action, providing a set of “concrete examples and detailed 
narratives” of the kind and means in which “power and values 
work” (Flyvbjerg 2008: 106) in societies.  This perspective includes 
the analysis of thereof consequences and indicates potential change 
processes (Flyvbjerg 2008). Good case studies combine a mixture of 
methods to display the complexity of the phenomena. Case studies, 
according to Flyvbjerg, are problem driven research (2011: 313) and 
deliver depth, richness, completeness, and within-case-variances. 
Burawoy elaborates the extended case method that deploys 
participant observation to locate everyday life in its foreign and 
historical contexts (1998: 4). His concept of case studies based on 
participant observation that enables to overcome the 
“discrepancies between normative prescriptions and everyday 
practices“ (Burawoy 1998: 5). Successful case studies employ a 
methodical mix as outlined with regard to phronetic science above. 
                                                          
69 Geertz points to the genuine role and capacity of social sciences: “Seek 
complexity and order it” (1973: 34). 
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Case studies may consist of sub narratives or sub-units. Individual 
units within the case may be studied in a number of ways, for 
instance qualitatively or quantitatively, analytically or 
hermeneutically, or by mixed methods (Flyvbjerg 2011).70 Important 
for the study at hand is the capacity of case studies to provide 
comparable and generalizable findings of complex contexts.71 Case 
studies stress `developmental factors´, as the case typically evolves 
over time, often as a string of concrete and interrelated events 
which occur “at such a time, in such a place” and that constitutes 
the case when seen as a whole (Flyvbjerg 2011: 301).  
The thesis at hand is taking agricultural knowledge in the Zarafshan 
Valley as case for the transformation of epistemic cultures during 
the post-Soviet period after Tajik independence. Whereas, the 
geographic boundaries of the Zarafshan Valley constitute one part 
of the frame of this study, thematically it is knowledge in 
agriculture. “The drawing of boundaries for the individual unit of 
study decides what gets to count as case and what becomes context 
to the case” (Flyvbjerg 2011: 301). Later examples will show how 
case and context continuously interact, for instance with regard to 
Tajik national policies or the role of religion in society. The case 
study underlines the value of concrete, practical, i.e. context-
dependent knowledge what enables it to display complexity and in-
depth insights. There is no contradiction in the single case study and 
the generalization of its results, as just as scientific experiments, the 
case study is a starting point and corroboration of theories. Case 
study research is equally prone to failures as other research 
methodologies, e.g. being too specific or giving in the tendency to 
confirm the researcher’s preconceived assumptions (Flyvbjerg 2006: 
                                                          
70 The following refers to Flyvbjerg’s methodological discussion of case studies 
(2006).  
71 This includes the freedom of the researcher who has the choice of what is to 
be studied. 
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309). To this end, a well done case study research is complementary 
to other methodologies and approaches. Therefore the present 
research complements case studies, in-depth narratives and 
context, with quantitative data of the farm diary survey (Tajik Farm 
Diary 2013).  
Field Research Methodologies 
The above elaborated approach manifests itself in a specific field 
research design to address farmers’ motivations, interests and 
strategies, governance processes and underlying power relations. 
Methodologically this thesis is based on long term ethnographic 
field research that allowed for a series of repeated semi-structured 
interviews and participatory observations. In total eight months of 
field research were conducted between 2011 and 2012. The 
methodology was informed by the extended case study approach 
that collects accounts of “what `natives´ actually were doing, with 
accounts of real events, struggles, and dramas that took place over 
space and time” (Burawoy 1998: 5). In particular I have employed 
the following research methods: participant observation, semi-
structured interviews, and farm diary survey (Tajik Farm Diary 
2013).  
Participant Observation 
Participant observation as research method requires long time or 
repeated presence of the researcher in the community to create 
rapport and trust (Mack et al. 2005). At the same time it creates the 
basis for applying different field research methods (Bernard 2006) 
which enable the collection of various types of data: Sociological, 
demographic and economic figures, e.g. the farm diary survey (FDS 
2013), NGO profiles, local publications, expert statements, 
administrative data and oral history. Being able to conduct field 
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research often alone, being culturally and language-wise prepared, 
eventually allowed creating trustful relations with local people. 
Interviews were carried out with the help of female research 
assistants, to close language gaps and compensate the fact that 
many households in rural areas are headed by women farmers. This 
constellation enabled to contact a wide variety of local actors 
(Bernard 2006). Such contact and acquaintance allows then for 
participant observation, this means participation in village life, i.e. 
local fests [tui] and rituals [maraka], talks on the fields or communal 
gatherings [majlisi]. Participation in this regard means, being 
involved in everyday talks and actions, and being able to ask 
questions. Participating in everyday life of three particular 
communities in the Zarafshan Valley allowed me to observe and 
document social networks, decision making processes and 
important other procedures. Main disadvantages of participant 
observation are its time-consuming procedure and the related 
difficulty to document the data. This means also being clear about 
the emic or etic perspective of collecting and documenting the data. 
The data collected allowed me to reconstruct the emic perspective 
of local farmers on their daily matters (Kottak 2006: 47). The 
technique of participant observation is an inherently subjective 
exercise (Mack et al. 2005). This requires taking a broad perspective, 
being clear about the own presence and positionality. The 
researcher is in several ways part of the situation and has a practical 
impact on the situation that is under research, which implies also 
ethical concerns (Bernard 2006: 439f). Also with reference to the 
Flyvbjergs phronetic social science approach, I openly admitted my 
research interest and related objectives. Field research was 
designed as open as possible, categorically following an 
interdisciplinary approach in data collection as proposed by 
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development studies or Galtung’s approach to peace studies (1984: 
8). 
Semi-structured Interviews  
Most parts of the information used in this study stem from 156 
semi-structured interviews72 as well as a farm diary survey (FDS). As 
a result of the methodology, the interviews had varying character; 
from spontaneous ad hoc conditions allowed talking with an 
interesting informant to pre-arranged interviews. At the same time 
interviews were planned and often repeated in order to gain 
knowledge about the general context and specific correlations. 
These interviews were semi-structured and background oriented 
along guidelines (Bernard 2006: 210f). The latter type of interviews 
was carried out recognizing systematically the social layers of the 
rural society as discussed in the previous chapter (see chapter 05). 
Furthermore, interview partners were selected as representatives 
from the various groups of actors, such as heads or representatives 
of collective or individual dehqon farms, male and female heads of 
households, local elites and village poor (Bernard 2006; Rubin and 
Rubin 1995). Occasionally also representatives of the state were 
interviewed. Talks with interesting resource persons were 
conducted, whenever possible, several times. This allowed for a 
critical continuation of the interview and if necessary further 
enquiry, triangulation and contradiction (Neuman 2014: 166). As a 
rule, I quote from interview partners anonymously, providing the 
place and date of the interview. Whenever possible, I seek to give a 
brief background to the informant and situation of encounter. 
However, as social and state control is considerable in the villages, 
much information was exchanged on the basis of mutual 
                                                          
72 The specific research approach and methodology of doing participant 
observation led to the high number of single interviews, whereas interview 
partners were often consulted several times.  
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confidence. Informants gave their consent to be interviewed on the 
condition to treat the data responsibly, e.g. confidently from 
authorities, other villagers and local elites. Regularly my knowledge 
was requested in exchange for farmers’ knowledge.   
The Farm Diary Survey (FDS) 
The intention of implementing the farm diary survey (FDS) was to 
gather data that complements to participant observation and 
interviews. For this objective a specific methodology was 
developed. In particular, the survey was set up to capture the full 
agricultural cycle of farming households, while producing 
comparable, chronological data on farming activities and practices 
(Mandler et al. 2017).73 Smallholder households documented their 
farming activities on a weekly basis for the period of one year. 
Particular focus lay on the thorough documentation of weekly 
farming activities, its underlying reasons and motivations, including 
potential challenges. By asking about interactions with other 
farmers, authorities and clients it became also possible to learn 
about the required stocks and sources of knowledge. The farm 
survey was implemented in two villages in Tajikistan, one in 
southern Shartus district, the other in the Zarafshan Valley, 
Panjakent district. In every village eight households were selected 
based on gender of the household head, farm size and location, and 
economic situation of the household.74 With the help of skilled field 
research assistants, the selected households compiled the four-page 
questionnaire on their weekly agricultural activities for the period of 
                                                          
73 On a side aspect, the farm diary survey experiments with and develops 
further qualitative data collection methods, especially in a non-Western 
agricultural context: The farm diary was designed involving farmers’ 
formulations.  
74 Selected households were preliminary interviewed to get an idea about the 
participants, i.e. the size of their land, education level and agricultural 
productivity.  
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one year except for the winter break between November 2012 and 
February 2013. Analysis of the data set was then undertaken 
individually by the involved researchers. I used the computer 
programme AtlasTi to analyse and display parts of the data set.  
Challenges to Data Collection 
Data collected from authorities and official documents often 
transmits numbers and information that represent or imitate the 
government view. While it appears very difficult in the first view to 
obtain data from district level authorities, the available data 
provided by authorities needs critic revision. Figures and framework 
of the datasets are in many cases not easily comprehensible. In 
Tajikistan, as in many post-Soviet states, public data is in many ways 
treaded as state secret, which needs to be hidden from public or 
stripped of significant content as much as possible (Lebedeva 2006). 
This approach results from the Soviet state doctrine and is under 
conditions of the limited access order continuously re-enforced. 
Authorities’ restrictiveness regarding public data meets with social 
structures in the Tajik society. The population of Tajikistan is 
predominantly Muslim and maintains strict rules of social 
interaction (Harris 2004, 2012; Stephan 2010). Such rules are 
potentially tightened in rural communities. Doing research in rural 
communities is thus per se dubious to local dwellers.  
“Due to mentality of the locales, any `stranger´, who is 
wandering around and `collecting words for nothing’, is not 
a `trustworthy person´. He may `collect words´ for the 
security office about suspicious local men. Or he may invoke 
suspicion of the local government about his suspicious work. 
An anthropological research is not a part of the Soviet-born 
mentality of `suspicion´ and an anthropologist remains 
`stranger´ to it” (Boboyorov 2013a: 42).  
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Data collection in rural communities is thus a cautious process. 
Abstract political constraints and power interests potentially cause 
difficulties on local level, where powerful elites use general political 
directives, i.e. regarding religion or security, to intimidate villagers 
and strangers alike and treat basically any information as secret 
(Boboyorov 2013a: 104). Thus, interviewing farmers was not 
necessarily welcomed and occasionally even hindered. Authorities 
possess plenty of means to exercise close control over farmers in 
rural areas. As an outcome, many farmers react with self-censorship 
and minimalizing their collaboration with the researcher. The 
selection of methodologies for this study has taken into 
consideration these circumstances. Interviews were carefully 
arranged and when possible consecutively continued in order to 
establish trustful relationships. However, even with well-known 
respondents it was not possible to record interviews; instead all 
interviews were noted down manually. Recording statements 
appeared a threat, as the interview partners associated recorded 
statements with practices of the police and secret services. My 
research methodology was sensibly modified to avoid potential 
interference from authorities. It is evident from the specific 
methodology that the present field research tried whenever 
possible to go beyond pure data positivism. Provided availability, 
data was triangulated by different sources. Data from different 
sources was openly discussed with informants or the respective 
discussions were observed and documented. Triangulation of data 
was a crucial exercise for the researcher in order to trace and 
understand power relations. However, such an approach requires at 
the same time transparency about the positionality of the 
researcher himself. This means in the present research, being 
outspoken about the own ethical standpoint, i.e. positionality 
especially with regard to religious matters, but also to comment the 
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political situation. This links closely with Flyvbjergs’ phronetic social 
science approach, which explicitly requests from the researcher to 
clarify values, interests, and power relations as the basis for praxis. 
A contemporary reading of phronesis must not only pose questions 
about power and outcomes, it is also requested to provide answers 
to value questions. Flyvbjerg positions the phronetic researcher as 
being able and assist to develop “situational ethics” (2001: 130) 
which help people to make judgements and decisions, because 
focusing “on values, the phronetic researcher is forced to face the 
question of foundationalism versus relativism, that is, the view that 
central values exist that can be rationally and universally grounded, 
versus the view that one set of values is just as good as another” 
(2001: 130). Thus, the researcher is required to give a feedback on 
value-rational questions themselves, clearing the own positionality 
regarding the encountered values, knowledge and power. In order 
to limit the challenges of being a stranger to the villages, I put a lot 
of efforts to arrive in the community with the recommendation of 
external community members. Often the visited communities were 
selected on the basis of existing links. The help of my research 
assistants was in this regard invaluable. On various occasions we 
visited extended family members of the research assistants which 
allowed to build trust with the respondents and overcome more 
quickly the gap of being stranger. Through such arrangements and 
the possibility of extended presence in the community I was able to 
collect detailed ethnographic data.   
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5  Livelihood Provision in the Zarafshan 
Valley 
The Zarafshan Valley is a remote and mainly mountainous sub-
region that extends along east to west latitude in northern 
Tajikistan. Its physical surface is characterized as a long glacial 
valley, formed by the Zarafshan glacier. Steep tributary valleys 
contribute to the much eroded river channel. Settlements and 
arable land plots are usually not at river level, situated on elevated 
alluvial fans that stem from narrow tributary valleys. 
 
Map 4  Topography of the Zarafshan Valley. Source: google/maps.com  
(accessed 01/2016). 
The map shows the topography of the Zarafshan Valley with the 
eponymous river extending from east to west. The valley divides 
horizontally central and northern Tajikistan; it extends straight from 
the Kyrgyz in the east to the Uzbek border in the west. While 
mountains block the border to Kyrgyzstan, the national border to 
Uzbekistan between Panjakent and Samarkand has been closed 
since 2010.75 The landscape is characterized as sparse dry steppe 
vegetation, with warm summer, semi-arid continental climate. 
                                                          
75 Regarding the closed border between Panjakent and Uzbekistan see a 
detailed account at: http://www.tethys.caoss.org/penjikent-pandschakent-
pendschikent/ (accessed 01/2016). 
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Precipitation follows an annual pattern with peaks in late spring and 
autumn.76 Due to the significant difference in altitude between the 
upper and lower parts of the valley, climatic conditions are diverse. 
The tables below provide insight in the changing micro-climate 
between the elevated Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district, which is 
determined by high mountain environment exceeding 5000m, and 
the lower parts of the valley in Panjakent district at about 1000m 
above sea level (m.a.s.l.). The two communities mark the extension 
of my research area, completed by two other communities in the 
mid Zarafshan, and upper Zarafshan respectively. Case locations 
have been selected due to its distribution within the several districts 
in the Zarafshan Valley and for representing the main agricultural 
production systems: Rice, fruits, potatoes and livestock.  
 
Photograph 1 Irrigated land plots in the upper Zarafshan Valley near 
Revomutk village. Source: The author. 
 
                                                          
76 The GEF precipitation model for the Pamir-Alai mountains indicates a higher 
precipitation of the upper Zarafshan Valley between 700 and 1100mm/annum 
than the data collected form the Kŭhistoni Mastchoh meteorological office 
documents. See: www.bonn-dialogues.com  (accessed 01/2016). 
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Figure 2  Temperatures and precipitation in Madrushkat village in the 
upper Zarafshan Valley. Source: Meteorological office in Madrushkat 
village, modifications by the author. 
Up in the higher parts of the Zarafshan Valley annual precipitation is 
significantly higher compared to the lower parts of the valley. 
Available data for 2011 for the Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district shows an 
annual total precipitation of 244mm, while generic data for the city 
of Panjakent displays a total of 159mm per annum.77 These figures 
corroborate the utter importance of irrigation for agricultural 
cultivation as precipitation during the vegetation period from May 
till August is not sufficient for rain fed cultivation especially in lower 
parts of the valley. Irrigation is organized through a complicated 
system of micro channels that provides water from tributary rivers 
                                                          
77 Data retrieved from worldweatheronline.org  (accessed 10/2017).  
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over many kilometres to the single plots. Farmers did not engage in 
water harvesting or water storage, either individually or collectively.   
 
 
Figure 3  Temperatures and precipitation in the city of Panjakent in the 
lower Zarafshan Valley. Source: 
http://www.worldweatheronline.com/panjakent-weather-
averages/sughd/tj.aspx  (accessed 01/2016). 
Temperatures in the upper Zarafshan Valley are significantly lower 
and precipitation distributed over the year as compared to the 
Panjakent district, which explains deviating agricultural patterns 
that will be described in the subsequent sections of this chapter.   
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Photograph 2  Dry mountain vegetation near Soosun village. Source: The 
author. 
Administrative Division of the Zarafshan Valley 
Administratively, the Zarafshan Valley is situated in the Sughd 
province [viloyati Sughd] of Tajikistan and is divided into three sub-
provincial districts [nohiya] that cover the Zarafshan River from 
Panjakent district in the west, Ayni district in the middle parts, to 
Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district in the east. The three districts 
Panjakent, Ayni and Kŭhistoni Mastchoh summarize to 24 
municipalities [jamoats] that are situated along the Zarafshan River. 
Each district is governed by the district administration hukumat 
which is led by the head of district, the raísi nohiya.78 The hukumat 
administrates the district, directing local ‘power organs’, i.e. power 
authorities [Russ. organy vlasti] as the district deployments of the 
army, the secret service and the police. The hukumat entails various 
administrative branches that concern rural areas and agriculture. 
That is first of all the agricultural department, locally called 
agroprom, but also the land or cadastre committee that issues 
important land certificates.  
 
                                                          
78 Often simply called hokim, i.e. governor.  
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While the hukumat is based usually in the main community of the 
district, rural areas are governed by the sub-district administration, 
the so called jamoat. The jamoat is the lowest state organization on 
municipal level and in charge of settling local conflicts. It has various 
branches, in the Zarafshan Valley these were not standardized 
throughout the different jamoats. In most jamoats a representative 
of the hukumat’s tax office is available. The chief of the jamoat is 
the raísi jamoat, who is appointed by the head of district for an 
unlimited term and who was usually very visible in its sub-district. 
Due to the neopatrimonial character of policy-making prevailing 
also in the Zarafshan Valley, the hukumat and its related branches 
tend to be limited to nearby communities as they usually lack the 
means to travel to remote areas. However, many issues on local 
level involve the hukumat’s land committee, the agricultural 
department [agroprom], the ecology department or the tax 
department and therefore cannot easily be solved on municipal 
level. Such disputes tend to become very complicated because they 
entangle local institutions and administrative units at municipal 
[jamoat] or district [hukumat] level. As the cases further below will 
show, the hukumat usually has little incentives to interfere in local 
affairs and refrain from settling conflicts on local level. Table 2 
below presents some of the principal organizations to which 
Zarafshani farmers refer to settle agricultural matters. These 
organizations display for now only one side of the governance 
process, i.e. the part of the state administration. Local governance 
processes are complemented by local institutions that are the first 
instances to settle conflicts. I will elaborate a few example cases of 
governance processes with regard to the negotiation of access to 
arable land in detail in chapter seven.  
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Livelihood Provision and Demographic Development in 
the Zarafshan Valley 
Field research has been undertaken in four villages that were 
selected as representative for the different agricultural production 
systems in the three different administrative districts along the 
Zarafshan River. A closer look at livelihood provision in the 
Zarafshan Valley reveals that the rural population consists of mainly 
smallholder households. Farmers’ productive and economic actions 
are limited by the lack of access to arable land. Table 2 below 
provides an account of some parameters of the locations visited in 
the Zarafshan Valley, based on own data collection and 
calculations.79 The table indicates size and type of the prevailing 
agricultural production systems. The data illustrates the low average 
access per household to natural resources in the Zarafshan Valley.  
Photograph 3  Apricot trees in the central Zarafshan Valley near Ayni. 
Source: The author. 
 
                                                          
79 Figures are indicative, detailed data regarding arable land plots and the local 
distribution of arable land are normally not available or not easy to obtain, 
often incorrect and misleading. Figures publicly displayed in Revomutk village 
stated the existence of about 101 ha of irrigated fields in 2011. However, an 
earlier report in 2006, based on data of the municipal [jamoat] statistical office, 
informed that Revomutk village has 27 ha of irrigated land at disposal.  
 1
6
2
 
 
Tab
le
 2
  A
cce
ss to
 n
atu
ral re
so
u
rce
s an
d
 live
lih
o
o
d
 strate
gie
s. So
u
rce
: O
w
n
 
calcu
latio
n
s b
ase
d
 o
n
 W
e
lth
u
n
ge
rh
ilfe
, D
FID
 e
t al. (2
0
0
8
), in
te
rvie
w
s an
d
 
th
e
 ja
m
o
a
t statistic o
ffice
. 
 163 
Agriculture is the central livelihood and economic pillar in all four 
case locations. Rural households’ kitchen gardens are very 
important land plots for vegetable production which is a mainstay 
of the rural livelihood (Rowe 2009). Fruit gardens and livestock 
rearing are usually market-oriented activities. However, Table 1 
illustrates already the general small dimensions of local farming 
households, outlining sub-regional differences between the three 
Zarafshani districts. Panjakent and Kŭhistoni Mastchoh districts are 
suitable for stable crops, i.e. rice and potatoes, while Ayni district in 
the mid Zarafshan is dominant in fruit production, i.e. apricots. 
Livestock rearing is a complementary livelihood strategy, pursued by 
most households, limited by the capacity to provide fodder or 
access to pastures. Nevertheless, field research has shown that only 
very few households in the visited villages manage to gain sufficient 
income through farming. Local agricultural production is dominated 
by smallholder farmers, who neither provides sufficiently for the 
livelihood of average rural households, nor sufficient supply for 
agricultural markets. Further, Table 4 indicates already the shortage 
of irrigated arable land as central obstacle to local agricultural 
livelihoods. To make a living, the majority of rural dwellers need to 
combine subsistence farming with non-agricultural income from 
service provisions in urban areas as hairdresser, taxi driver, 
craftsmen or construction worker. Against this background it 
becomes apparent that the individualization of agriculture in the 
Zarafshan Valley has posed severe challenges to smallholder 
livelihoods. In particular, attention is required to safeguard and 
potentially increase the households’ access to arable land. The 
following paragraphs illustrate the environmental, administrative 
and demographic context to agricultural production. Eventually, 
beside economic obstacles that limit livelihood provision in remote 
rural areas, also social arrangements complicate farming in the 
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Zarafshan Valley. The challenges for female-headed farm 
households’ display exemplary complications of smallholder 
farmers. 
Agricultural Production Systems 
Although the mountainous conditions of the area provide abundant 
precipitation in winter months, arable land needs irrigation for 
cultivation. Intensive rain fed cultivation used to be common in the 
lower areas around Panjakent, but crops failed in recent years. 
Small rain fed plots for fodder (lucerne, barley) or wheat on 
northern mountain slopes provide very low results and often fail 
completely. According to local farmers, rain fed agriculture became 
almost impossible in recent years. It is hardly practiced in elevated 
regions. Instead minor cultivation of cereals on irrigated plots is 
pursued in tributary villages. Climatic conditions in the upper 
Zarafshan allow cultivation from April to October. In the lower 
region two harvests are possible; however this is not always 
practiced at the moment. The lack of working power, financial and 
economic constraints prevent farmers to intensive cultivation with 
massive use of fertilizer and pesticides. Due to land shortage and 
meagre production per hectare, extensive land use strategies are no 
option for farmers.   
Horticulture80 in Central Asia is traditionally practiced on the 
irrigated plots around the house, kitchen gardens called obshikori 
(Rowe 2009). Such kitchen gardens produce onions, carrots, 
tomatoes and potatoes, together with fruits such as cherry or apple 
trees. In case of abundance, products are marketed, although very 
                                                          
80 Horticulture primarily differs from agriculture in two ways. First, it generally 
encompasses a smaller scale of cultivation, using small plots of mixed crops 
rather than large fields of single crops. Furthermore, horticultural cultivations 
generally include a wide variety of crops, even including fruit trees with ground 
crops, whereas agricultural cultivation generally focus on one primary crop.  
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high transaction costs especially in Kŭhistoni Mastchoh reduce 
economic profits. 
Photograph 4  The kitchen garden of Osunmurod in Garibak village. Source: 
The author. 
Horticulture is prevalent in the upper Zarafshan Valley, as well as 
small- and medium scale potato and wheat cultivation. Onions and 
lucerne have become increasingly popular in recent years, both for 
consumption and livestock fodder. Bigger fruit garden plots [bogh] 
with up to several dozen of trees (apricot, mulberry, apples) are 
situated on nearby slopes. Such gardens also provide important 
fodder for livestock. Especially the elevated regions of Kŭhistoni 
Mastchoh district are particularly suitable for potato growing and 
partially vegetable production. Potatoes provide the most 
important cash crop in the upper parts of the Zarafshan Valley 
(Welthungerhilfe et al. 2008: 139). Beside potatoes, livestock 
rearing is an important business in the upper Zarafshan area. 
Households in this area rely considerably less on off-farm work and 
remittances from labour migrants. In the central section of the 
Zarafshan Valley natural conditions do not allow for extensive 
agriculture due to the lack of arable area and high population 
density. Areas in the middle parts of the valley around Ayni district 
specialized e.g. on fruit production. In lower areas of the Zarafshan 
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more arable land is available, however population density is high. In 
Panjakent district, beside fruit production, cultivation of grain and 
rice is predominant. 
 
Photograph 5  Cattle pasture on rice fields in the lower Zarafshan area near 
Panjakent. Source: The author. 
Livestock production and pastoralism has been dominant during the 
Soviet period in the elevated Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district, which is 
due to shortage of fodder not maintained at the same level today. 
“In Soviet times the kolkhozes in the district were specialized on 
animals. Today there are more people living here than before. The 
kolkhoz had about 1500 units of livestock” (Revomutk 16.06.2011). 
Livestock production, e.g. mostly sheep and goats, is an important 
component of agriculture in the entire Zarafshan valley – often 
managed in labour division with stockbreeders from lower 
settlements (transhumance) – however limited by the limited access 
to pastures, high price of fodder production and the and lack of 
winter buildings for livestock. Farmers largely invest savings in 
animals, trying to balance out their business between plant 
production and animal husbandry.   
Throughout the entire Zarafshan Valley agriculturally suitable land is 
very limited; as Tables 4 and 5 display, individual plots are very 
small and fragmented. A high concentration of inhabitants 
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particularly in middle and lower parts of the Zarafshan Valley leads 
to lesser amounts of arable land per capita as compared to the 
communities in the upper parts of the valley. The average 
household in the Zarafshan area consists of circa six to seven 
persons, which comprises the family nucleus of parents and 
children, plus relatives as elderly parents or single siblings (Hannah 
2011; Welthungerhilfe 2012b; 2015: 11). Population pressure is high 
in the lower sections of the valley, although households have 
comparably less access to arable land in comparison to the elevated 
parts of the valley. The minor size of land plots provides for the 
usual smallholder household only labour between 20-30 working 
days per year. Thus, smallholder agriculture is in most cases 
economically not sustainable and is combined with income from 
non-farm labour (Justino and Shemyakina 2012; Welthungerhilfe 
2012b). High numbers of rural dwellers seek employment outside 
agriculture – on construction sides and in factories in Russia, or 
services in Tajik cities – especially from communities in the middle 
and lower parts of the Zarafshan Valley where land scarcity is 
particularly oppressive. Under these conditions the risk of poverty is 
high (Welthungerhilfe 2015: 5).81 Poverty in rural households results 
from the lack of access to arable land, missing means to 
commercialize agricultural produce, but also the lack of labour 
force. In the Zarafshan Valley the highly static access arrangements 
to land comprise a central obstacle to potential investments in 
agriculture (Mandler 2015, 2016). The result is economic 
underperformance and stagnating agricultural production, as 
                                                          
81 In 2015, 85.2 per cent of households from the middle Zarafshan Valley 
numbered their annual income with less than TJS 7200 [ca. 1116€] 
(Welthungerhilfe 2015). The value of the official poverty line was TJS 146.77 
per month when it was set in 2013, and stood at 175.2 per month in 2016 
(www.worldbank.org/poverty  accessed 10/2017).  
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namely smallholders are very reluctant to invest in their household 
farm.  
 
Photograph 6  Potato field in the upper Zarafshan Valley near Revomutk 
village. Source: The author. 
Segmentation of the Zarafshani Rural Society 
The sub-regionally divers restructuration processes of agricultural 
production result also from the diverging interests of local 
stakeholders. Farmers’ responses to agricultural reforms are 
cautious and heterogeneous. Beside the different groups of 
farmers, a vast spectrum of institutional, organizational and 
individual actors is involved in shaping the Tajik agricultural sector. 
National authorities, international organizations (IO) as well as non-
state actors (NGO) are providing punctual assistance to farming 
households, focussing on the provision of information, loans, seeds 
or administrative advice. However, the role of authorities with 
regard to the implementation of agricultural policies is, as will be 
elaborated further below, ambivalent. Bellow, Table 3 presents a 
relational diagram to outline who are stakeholders in agriculture in 
local communities in northern Tajikistan. The size of the subsections 
is indicative of the relative size of the different social categories of 
local stakeholders. Data of the present diagram results mainly from 
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the Zarafshan Valley, figures will be further specified in Table 4 
below.  
 
Table 3  Relational scheme of the distribution of rural stakeholders. Source: 
Author’s compilation 
Smallholder Farmers and Female-headed Households 
Main actors of the agricultural sector in Tajikistan are smallholders. 
Rural livelihoods and living standards have declined in comparison 
to the late Soviet Union. More than one third of the rural 
population is considered as poor, with figures slightly higher in than 
in urban areas (RuralPovertyPortal 2012; Spoor 2005; The World 
Bank 2015: 11).82 The majority of rural dwellers in Tajikistan are 
                                                          
82 I am following the distinction provided by Spoor: “Relative poverty rates, 
mostly defined as those who are below 50 percent of the median income, are 
being used to compare poverty between countries (or regions). However, when 
a country, for example such as Moldova or Tajikistan, has a vast majority of very 
low incomes, the threshold of 50 percent of the median might well 
underestimate the seriousness of the problem. Therefore, as there are, by now, 
internationally comparable data on absolute poverty rates, these are used in 
this paper, in order to stress the size of the poverty problem, in particular in the 
SEE- and CIS-7” (2003: 14f). See also data provided by the World Food 
Programme: Tajikistan Food Security Monitoring System (WFP 2015) as well as 
www.worldbank.org/poverty for Tajikistan. 
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smallholder farmers, i.e. belong to farming households which have 
access to marginal pieces of arable land.83 Smallholder farmers are 
typically low-income part-time subsistence producer, with no or 
very small agricultural output that is being commercialized. Despite 
the high figures of smallholders, these contribute only marginally to 
the commercialized agricultural output. Tajik smallholder farmers 
livelihoods usually consist of part-time farming in combination with 
non-agricultural income; i.e. remittances of household members 
working outside the village (Welthungerhilfe 2015; WFP 2015). 
Livelihoods are discussed in the realm of this research as household 
strategies to fulfil their subsistence needs (Wisner et al. 2004).84 
Remittances from labour migration have paramount significance in 
Tajik livelihoods (Justino and Shemyakina 2012; Mughal 2007).85 The 
majority of Tajik rural dwellers are forced to pursue a “combination 
of subsistence agriculture, labour migration and shuttle-trading 
through which the poor seek to earn a living” (Heathershaw 2009: 
39). As I will explain below in detail, smallholders’ investments are 
rarely scheduled to the own household farm. Instead rural dwellers 
seek to diversify income opportunities by working as driver, day 
labourer, shopkeeper, dressmaker, midwife, shepherd, etc. Due to 
male household members are on labour migration, many 
households are effectively run by women, sometimes for several 
years. The feminisation of agriculture is a phenomenon throughout 
the whole Central Asia, although with female-headed households in 
particular risk of poverty (Mukhamedova and Wegerich 2014). This 
                                                          
83 Smallholder households in the mountainous Zarafshan area considered to 
have access to less than 0,5 ha of arable land (Table 4). Rural households (hh) 
are composed on average of six to seven people.   
84 A livelihood is "the command an individual, family, or other social group has 
over an income and/or bundles of resources that can be used or exchanged to 
satisfy its needs” (Wisner et al. 2004: 12).  
85 Money is sent back by labour migrants as remittances that contribute to 
about the half of Tajik GDP (World Bank; Lemon 2015). 
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is because female farmers are confronted with additional obstacles 
and threats in a structurally male dominated society (Harris 2004; 
Stephan 2010). For women farmer it is thus highly difficult 
negotiating with men at family, neighbourhood [mahalla] or 
communal meetings (Harris 1998, 2012; Tett 1996).86  
Medium Farmers, Local Agricultural Champions, 
Authorities and Elites 
In comparison to the dominant group of smallholder households, a 
few households in rural communities actually manages to pursue 
full-time farming, potentially investing in the farm business and 
generating major parts of the household’s income from agriculture. 
Such farmers belong to the few rural households that are 
potentially in the position to emerge as future agricultural 
champions. These households manage to safeguard property and 
even potentially enlarge access to rural assets. This is achieved by 
maintaining close relations to powerful authorities that are 
indispensable to market produce. Nevertheless, there are a few 
characteristics that predestine these households in particular for 
farming; a slightly better access to arable land than smallholder 
farmers, adequate family working power, an energetic and capable 
head of household. It is mainly these features that enable this group 
of households to potentially succeed in becoming agricultural 
champions that link directly to markets, focussing on intensifying 
agricultural production. Non-state actors and potentially medium 
farmers may be the main mullah [domulloh], the mediator of 
neighbourhood conflicts [oqsaqol], the chief of the neighbourhood 
association [raísi mahalla] (Grundmann 2004; Stephan 2010). Their 
authority is linked to functions in everyday life and mainly based on 
                                                          
86 Harris (2004, 2012) elabourates how male domination in the Tajik society is 
maintained in everyday life.  
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individual reputation. Thus, this personal has some outreach to 
governance processes which may help them to climb above the 
level of ordinary local smallholders. In contrast to the before 
mentioned groups of villagers, local elites are actually leading rural 
communities as they dominate decision making processes and 
arrange to have decisions implemented. Although rural elites are no 
homogenous group, they can be characterized by being affiliated to 
the state, although following their own agenda.87 Local elites in 
Tajikistan usually fulfil positions with close relations to authorities 
and the government, as for instance the chief of the collective 
dehqon farm, village or district authorities, members of the police or 
army and also the director of the school. Elites mobilize and 
represent the community; they pre-shape village governance 
arrangements through their patronage networks. Heathershaw 
argues that state-society relations in Tajikistan are based on patron-
client networks (2009: 50) with local elites being the local 
intersections of such networks (Boboyorov 2013a). In the course of 
post-Soviet farm restructuration, former rural elites as the chief of 
the collective dehqon farm, the production manager [brigadir], the 
production expert [agronom]88 and other top-level kolkhoz/sovkhoz 
personal (Abashin 2017) transformed into the category of “Soviet 
rural elites-turned-farm managers in contemporary Tajikistan” 
(Nekbakhtshoev 2016: 18). For these persons, a close relation to the 
representatives of the state is indispensable. This implies, in return 
for getting under the umbrella of the state – as part of the public 
administration or being direct client of some authority – elites are 
required to agree and promote the ideology and ruling paradigm of 
                                                          
87 A comparable point is made by  the `cunning state’ introduced by Krastev, 
quoted in Zürcher (2005: 22). 
88 Agronom refers to principal or higher agricultural education, however 
commonly the title is usually applied to knowledgeable people with experiene 
and perhaps technical training. 
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the state and government (Driscoll 2015; Heathershaw and Herzig 
2012).   
Unequal Access to Arable Land and Non-Agricultural 
Income  
Generally, as the tables bellow outline, access to agriculturally 
suitable arable land is scarce.89 The highlighted communities from 
different administrative districts stand for the diverse agricultural 
production throughout the Zarafshan Valley. Arable land is the 
resource on which virtually all Zarafshani rural dwellers ground not 
just their livelihoods, but also the spiritual foundation as a farmer. 
Rural people have a strong understanding of their identity as a 
farmer. Being a farmer is not simply seen as a business in the first 
row, but as lifestyle and ontologically just way of living (Dudoignon 
and Qalandar 2014; Tajik Farm Diary 2013). Farmers clearly foresee 
their families’ future in the village and do not want to give up the 
agricultural livelihood (Revomutk 18.06.2012). Looking at the size of 
arable land available per household in the Zarafshan Valley reveals 
the difficulty to base the household’s livelihood on market-oriented 
agricultural production. The limitation of access to land constrains a 
significant part of rural households to pursue subsistence 
cultivation, combined with non-agricultural income. Table 5 below 
shows the distribution of land per household in the Zarafshan based 
on various sources. Figures were compiled by the author using data 
from World Bank, DFID, UNDP and DFID et al. (2008). Information 
from jamoat statistic office were combined with Ege (2008) and 
available data (Welthungerhilfe 2015). Furthermore own 
                                                          
89 I differentiate between distribution of arable land, what means the factual 
allocation in a community. Access to arable land is mainly from the perspective 
of rural dwellers who are able to control a piece of land, despite e.g. unclear 
property relations.  
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calculations were made based on data collected in selected 
communities (Tajik Farm Diary 2013).  
Arable land per 
household in the 
Zarafshan Valley 
Garibak village, 
Panjakent 
district* 
Ayni district Kŭhistoni 
Mastchoh 
district 
Landless households 2 % 17.4 % 0.6 % 
Less than 10 sotiq** 2 % 32.5 % 1.4 % 
10 – 20 sotiq   22.6 % 27 % 4.5 % 
21 – 50 sotiq 55.2 % 9.4 % 13.2 % 
51 – 100 sotiq  10.2 % 2.2 % 20.5 % 
101 – 200 sotiq 4 % 3.2 % 34 % 
201 – 500 sotiq 2 % 1.6 % 16 % 
More than 500 sotiq 2 % 5.4 % 9.8 % 
Table 4  Distribution of arable land in the three administrative districts 
along the Zarafshan River. Source: Own calculation based on Tajik Farm 
Diary (2013).  
Table 4 outlines the very limited access to arable land of the 
majority of rural households’ especially in lower and mid Zarafshan 
Valley. In the lower Zarafshan districts more than 80% of rural 
households are smallholder. This situation results from high 
demographic pressure on the available natural resources, i.e. on 
arable land and water. The sub-regional demographic development 
in the Zarafshan Valley slightly exceeds the general figures for 
Tajikistan with a fertility rate of 3.5 in 2013 and annual population 
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growth of 2.2 % in 2014.90 Birth rates in rural areas are usually 
higher than the national average, plus significant internal migration 
made the population of Ayni and Kŭhistoni Mastchoh districts 
significantly grow since 1991 (Welthungerhilfe et al. 2008). 
Significant population pressure occurs in the central parts of the 
Zarafshan Valley, such as Ayni district, where about 77 per cent of 
the households have access to not more than 0.2 hectare. Such 
scarce availability of land provides neither labour nor income for 
one household during the year. Significantly more land is available 
in the upper parts of the Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district, where 
population density is lower compared to the villages in the lower 
parts of the Valley. The majority of households in Kŭhistoni 
Mastchoh district (ca. 60%) has access between 0.5 to 5 hectares of 
arable land. These figures display the disparities in access to land 
and, at the same time, the generally small sizes of plots available. 
Table 6 displays a relational comparison of household size in various 
Zarafshani districts to provide the social background of households, 
based on their access to land. 
  
                                                          
90 In the context of the Zarafshan Valley arable land is understood as irrigated 
land plots including kitchen garden. See: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=TJK&se
ries=&period=  (accessed 01/2016). 
*Garibak village, Panjakent district, n= 49 (not statistically relevant), **One 
sotiq equals a 1/100 of a hectare; i.e. 1 sotiq = 10m2. 
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Table 5  Relational comparison of households and provision of livelihoods 
in the Zarafshan Valley. Source: Data compiled by the author, based on Ege 
(2008). 
The figures in Table 5 underline that more favourable farming 
conditions are currently found in the very upper parts of the 
Zarafshan Valley as villagers benefit from enlarged access to arable 
land. In the Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district, only about 20 per cent of 
the rural households are smallholder, while circa 70 per cent have 
access to 0.5 and 5 hectare of arable land. In fact, this finding 
coincides with Table 2 that showed that labour migration in this 
district is significantly lower as compared to Ayni and Panjakent 
districts. While the quality of arable land is comparable in the 
various districts of the Zarafshan Valley, there are differences due to 
climatic conditions. In lower areas of the valley easily two crops are 
feasible per year, which is hardly possible in the upper Zarafshan.  
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The figures presented above illustrate that the majority of 
Zarafshani’ farmers are smallholder. Access to land is 
heterogeneous, land less households and large farm entrepreneurs 
are found within the same communities. Not all agricultural actors 
in the Zarafshan Valley benefitted the same way from agrarian 
individualization. This implies there are different livelihood 
strategies in place that rely to various degrees on agricultural 
production. Smallholder farmers’ livelihoods do not derive from 
agricultural production, but from mixed income opportunities 
combined with agricultural subsistence production, e.g. remittances 
from family members abroad and income from services. It becomes 
apparent that the individualization of agriculture in the Zarafshan 
Valley has not led to increased productivity and income, but is 
primarily a challenge to smallholders’ livelihood provision. 
Agriculture only contributes partially to the households’ income, 
mainly due to the fact that given the size of land plots, climatic 
conditions and obstacles to commercialization provide for rather 
limited yields with very narrow profits. Against the background that 
agriculture does not provide for the smallholder households 
livelihood, Zarafshani farmers’ complaints about the present state 
of agriculture are very common (Tajik Farm Diary 2013). Many 
farmers see their livelihood at risk due to the shortage of arable 
land and water, an unfavourable economic environment and the 
lack of alternative income opportunities. Low yields, poor quality of 
harvests and low revenues render agriculture a rather uncertain 
livelihood. In order to farm professionally, regular investments in 
seeds, irrigation, pesticides, soils, and fertilizer are required, which 
most smallholder farmers cannot afford. Consequently most 
households urge to enlarge access to natural resources to increase 
output and income from farming, potentially making full use of the 
available labour force. In an interview in Madrushkat village, one 
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young smallholder farmer stated: “If you have 50 sotiq land and 50 
sotiq garden, you can easily live here” (13.06.2012). Otherwise, 
having less arable land available, puts the household’s livelihood is 
at risk: “I am trying to get additional land [from the former 
collective dehqon farm, A.M.], otherwise for only 18 sotiq, I will not 
stay here” (Revomutk 15.06.2011). Shortage of land implies the lack 
of employment: 20 sotiq of irrigated land means 15 days of work for 
an average household of seven people. As alternative income 
opportunities outside agriculture are missing, migration remains the 
only option to gain an income. Another smallholder farmer with a 
20 sotiq land plot stated: “40 per cent of the income come from the 
land, 60 per cent come from construction sites in Dushanbe” 
(Madrushkat 13.06.2012). As a consequence to the shortage of 
access to land, smallholder households are constraint to seek an 
additional income outside farming. Especially male workers from 
the Zarafshan Valley migrate to Russian or Tajik cities accepting 
heavily underpaid work as hairdresser, taxi driver, craftsmen or 
construction worker. The Zarafshan Valley provides almost no 
alternative labour market to agriculture; therefore seasonal and 
long term labour migration is high. One smallholder farmer from 
Obbudon village explains: “You can earn 1000$ a year here in the 
[Zarafshan] valley or 10000$ in Russia” (14.06.2011). In 
consequence, most local livelihoods in the Zarafshan Valley consist 
of part-time farming combined with remittances from short or long 
term labour migration (Table 2 and 5). This means, rural households 
are often led by women, while their husbands are temporary or 
permanently away. Despite the fact that the house and land plots 
are usually registered on the husband’s name, maintaining the 
household and agricultural production are managed by females in 
Tajikistan (Mukhamedova and Wegerich 2014). In the following, I 
illustrate a typical example from the upper Zarafshan study area. 
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Intersection: The Household of Hokima, Female Farmer 
Hokima is a woman of around 40 years, she runs expertly a 
smallholder household of five females. Her husband died seven 
years ago.* At the time of my visit her two teenage daughters still 
went to school. Her two sons work since several years in Russia, 
sending irregularly money home. With one son already married the 
daughter in law [kelin] lives in her household. Although the kelin is a 
trained teacher [mualimma] she cannot find work in her profession 
and works in the household. Further, there is the old mother of 
Hokima also present in the household. Hokima owns 22 sotiq of 
irrigated land where rice is cultivated, plus 12 sotiq of kitchen 
garden where she grows vegetables. Apart from this she has one 
cow, two calves and four chickens. Depending on irrigation water 
available, it is possible to get two harvests from the kitchen garden. 
This would provide fresh vegetables for most of the year. She is 
doing most work together with the three young females and only 
occasionally hires some workers [mardikor] or asks relatives. In 
spring time she would like to raise silk worms [pilla], because there 
is some spare space in the house and the sticks of the mulberry 
branches are useful. However, she says she is not seeking for more 
land, because she cannot work more than what she already does. “I 
am satisfied with what I have, I can’t do more”. Whenever money is 
needed she is selling rice at the nearby city market [basar]. 
Previously Hokima used to work as kolkhoz member in an animal 
production unit with cows. When her sons will come back, or at least 
one of them, she is planning to buy a tractor so they continue the 
profession of their father. She counts especially on the second son, 
who received an education as mechanic. Maybe they will come back 
this year or next year, just when the money is enough (lower 
Zarafshan 2012).  
* In the 1990´s her husband bought a tractor from the kolkhoz, but 
respective documents were not immediately ready. After some  
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Managing the Households Working Power 
Smallholder households as Hokima realize a medium livelihood 
through a combination of farming and income from remittances. 
Generating the main part of income from farming is currently only 
for a very small group of Zarafshani farmers possible, i.e. an elite 
group of households who have access to more than average arable 
land. It was commonly believed in Zarafshani communities that full 
time professional farming implies access to at least one and a half 
hectare of irrigated land and having available the respective 
working power in the own household. The latter displays by now a 
challenge to many rural households, as male family members 
migrate to work abroad. Households with just one male are hardly 
able to intensify production. Professionalizing agriculture in a way 
that it provides a basic income to the entire household requires 
cultivation twice a year, ideally including labour intensive high value 
crops such as vegetables. Additional production such as livestock 
rearing or dairy production provides important swaths to the overall 
income. To increase profits, transport, processing and sale of the 
produce should also be taken care of by family members. Daily tasks 
are socially divided by gender conceptions, they require a balanced 
household with adequate working power of male and female family 
weeks a man from the sub-district forest administration [leskhoz] 
claimed the tractor on the basis that the kolkhoz had depths towards 
the leskhoz and the tractor was signed as collateral. The kolkhoz thus 
was not entitled to sell the machine. Hokima´s husband went to court 
and invested money in the process, but he could not get the tractor 
back. The machine was still entitled on the name of the kolkhoz, so he 
had to cheed it to leskhoz. Hokima stated: “My husband got sick by all 
this thinking” (field diary 2012). 
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members in different age cohorts. Field studies by NGO 
(Welthungerhilfe 2015: 14f) and own observations indicate that 
smallholder households are not able to level out an equilibrium 
between working power and the available resources. In 
consequence, many landless and smallholder households abandon 
market-oriented production and turn to part time subsistence 
farming combined with non-agricultural income (Welthungerhilfe 
2015: 5).91 
Access to Arable Land 
Access to land is perceived by most farmers the single most 
challenge to their household’s livelihood. In virtually all 
communities in the Zarafshan Valley the availability of natural 
resources, i.e. arable land and water, is considered insufficient 
compared to the number of inhabitants, especially as local 
communities continue to experience rapid demographic growth. 
Arable land is severely limited and not equally distributed. 
Competition and disputes over the potential access to natural 
resources cause frequent discontent and conflict among villagers. 
Access to arable land is the principal basis of rural livelihoods, it is 
regulated in the Tajik land code (Republic of Tajikistan 1996). 
Gaining access to plots of arable land is fundamental for agricultural 
production; however the entire process is in a twilight zone of the 
Tajik political economy. Officially land cannot be sold as it belongs 
to the Tajik state. Land distribution schemes introduced by the 
various land reforms were completed circa 2005, thus there is no 
regular and transparent way to gain further land. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
91 Farmers seek to establish especially male offsprings with own households 
within the village. Ideally they are able to realize another income from non-
farm labor. Only better-off households can permitt not to send their relatives to 
labour migration. Daughters are not equally considered in working and 
maintaining the families property. 
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farmers’ focus on land is dominant topic in discourses on livelihood 
and agricultural production throughout the whole Zarafshan Valley.  
Conflicts over Land – Race to Access 
Repeatedly farmers refer to the shortage of arable land and unclear 
mechanisms established to buy, lease or render access to arable 
land: “There is no land available, only dangerous areas, which will 
be washed off by the river. It is useless!” (Garibak 15.05.2012). De 
facto, the shortage of arable land is complemented by the 
experience that there are no viable way to increase the individual 
access to land. This “race to access” is widely mentioned as the 
main drawback to prosperity or wealth in the area. Increasing one’s 
access to arable land would allow farmers to enlarge their business 
and consequently building a livelihood that allows all members of 
the household to remain in the village. Despite administrative 
deadlock and limitations, there is ongoing competition among 
farmers to access natural resources. In some communities village 
harmony [tinji] is seriously jeopardized due to a situation of unequal 
access arrangements. Virtually there are no reasonable ways to 
employ legal procedures to re-negotiate access arrangements. 
However, as the tables above already indicated, the determined 
status quo of land access arrangements is in the interests of local 
elites. Elites are basically those households, household chiefs 
respectively, who dispose access to above average land plots in the 
community. Enlarged access allows them to maintain more 
household members in the village and employ their labour force. 
Under conditions of the Zarafshan Valley, elites are often 
households that manage to engage full time in farming.   
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Manoeuvring Access: Buying and Leasing Land Rights, 
Underhand Deals 
However, the majority of Zarafshani households are smallholders 
who rely on labour migration to Russia and elsewhere to safeguard 
their livelihood. Most of these households seek to enlarge their 
access to land in order to build a livelihood from agriculture.92 One 
and a half hectare of irrigated land is commonly believed to be the 
threshold necessary to start an individual or family dehqon farm, i.e. 
engaging in professional full-time farming. Farmers concede “it 
would be best creating my own private dehqon farm. But money is 
needed, because at first I need to get additional land” (Garibak 
28.04.2012). Thus, despite the allegedly completed distribution of 
land plots, it seems possible to access additional land through 
networking, smartness and underhand payments. Farmers usually 
apply to different forums parallel, in order not to miss out potential 
opportunities. Farmers mentioned to enlarging access to arable land 
by creating land plots on presently non-irrigated dry lands. 
However, given the alpine character of the Zarafshan Valley, 
irrigating dry lands is labour-intensive and expensive. Creating new 
land plots will have to arrange with unfavourable places that are 
prone to natural risks such as water and mud slides. Furthermore, 
creating new land requires intensive administrative and communal 
action. From the perspective of the individual household there 
appear to be a few viable ways to get access to additional arable 
land. Farmers reported that occasionally it was possible to buy long 
term land use rights from the local collective dehqon farm or other 
public entities such as schools, the forest [leskhoz] or water 
                                                          
92 At time of the field research, the majority of families had considerably less 
land at their disposal than the mentioned one and a half hectares, so they 
tended to cease struggling for the individual or family dehqon farm and to 
remain under the cover of the former collective dehqon farm. 
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[vodkhoz] administration and the like. Despite the constant refusal 
of the dehqon farm management to sell land rights, it appeared 
possible to lease land plots on short term contracts, so called 
arenda plots, from the collective dehqon farm.  Until recently the 
local collective dehqon farm was the main land broker in the 
community. The majority of requests for land were addressed to the 
collective farm. Potential land deals or thereof refusals were poorly 
transparent and regularly triggered conflict and discontent in the 
community. Only very few requests to the collective dehqon farm 
for land allocation or temporary leasehold were actually considered. 
Close ties to the chief of the collective dehqon farm and his staff93 
are indispensable to benefit from land allocations (Mandler 2013: 
16). Structure and room for manoeuvre of the communal collective 
dehqon farms differed throughout the Zarafshan Valley. In the lower 
Zarafshan area such communal collective farms held an important 
role in village affairs. The central position of the collective dehqon 
farms in the village was mainly maintained because they have kept 
significant parts of farm land as property. A particular leasehold 
system was found in a village where the local collective dehqon farm 
has kept 102 hectare of arable land. The enterprise leases land plots 
as arenda for one year to those farming households who agree to 
rear silk worms during spring months. Households are free to 
choose this option, what seems especially attractive to poor families 
with surplus of labour and little access to land. Some communities 
benefit also from another source of long term leasehold 
arrangements, that is the forest administration, called leskhoz. The 
leskhoz administers land plots that are beyond the territory of the 
village. Accordingly, villagers make considerable efforts to maintain 
                                                          
93 As legal successor of the Soviet kolkhoz or sovkhoz farm, the Tajik collective 
dehqon farm inherited and maintained such structures as e.g. the accountant, 
the agronom, the brigadier or the ingenieur. In some communities the collective 
farm disposed also of a kind of advisory board [uski	slov].  
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close relationships to the forest administration and related 
administrative bodies as through personal relations and potentially 
extra payments land plots may be acquired in form of long term 
leaseholds [arenda]. Such leasehold arrangements are very 
attractive as they potentially become private property in future. 
Competition for such plots is therefore high; applicants with 
liabilities to important or influential people will use their networks 
to manipulate the decision making process. Such arrangements do 
not work on ad hoc agreements, but on long standing relationships. 
A well connected bidder expressed confidence regarding the 
forthcoming distribution of some hectare land by the forest 
administration [leskhoz]: „He [the chief of the leskhoz] will not say 
no to me“ (lower Zarafshan 28.04.2012). Taking into account the 
strong demand for arable land, intensifying short term arenda 
leasehold arrangements would potentially offer mutual benefits. 
Due to massive labour migration of male family members, not all 
households are able to cultivate the fields intensively twice a year. 
Leaving land plots fallow for some time is reportedly neither an 
option. The Land Code of the Republic of Tajikistan (1996) specifies 
the principle of “purposeful use of land”, which has been used 
earlier to sanction households. Different farmers mentioned that 
authorities seized property on such grounds, thus it was considered 
not advisable to do so. However, temporary leasehold 
arrangements to balance the available working power and natural 
resources in the community are hardly happening. Especially in the 
upper Zarafshan area farmers had reservations to leasing out land 
plots, because “the good farmer never gives his land to strangers” 
(Madrushkat 15.06.2012). Only among close relatives such temporal 
leasehold arrangements occasionally take place. Renting out land 
plots bears the danger that the respective land is not returned by 
the lender. Poor households, as for instance lead by women, risk 
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that their property is challenged, because they are also weak in 
defending their property. Subsequent disputes regarding the 
legitimacy of property are not easy to settle as jurisdiction, be it 
through local institutions or state courts, is a protracted and opaque 
process, and poorly predictable (Mandler 2013: 21f). Such adversary 
proceedings that require external arbitration commonly end in 
favour of the more resourceful party with access to more powerful 
networks.94 Although difficult to estimate, underhand dealings with 
fellow villagers or persons working in the sub-regional 
administration occasionally enable farmers to acquire land use 
rights. Such arrangements were repeatedly stated by farmers. For 
example, in various communities of Kŭhistoni Mastchoh and 
Panjakent district it was mentioned that it is possible to buy or 
obtain the use rights of one sotiq of [0.01 ha] for 1000$ (upper 
Zarafshan 28.03.2012). One way to contrive such underhand deals is 
through a formal letter [ariza] to the jamoat land committee to 
request shifting land use rights from one person to someone else in 
form of a gift. In this way the land formally changes owner, without 
payments involved. However, the due payments are then arranged 
privately (mid Zarafshan 09.05.2015).  
Certification of Land Plots 
In fact, during the time of the field research some farming 
households started to certify their property in order to safeguard it 
from requests by others and as a first step towards founding the 
private dehqon farm. I will elaborate on farmers’ considerations 
regarding the setup of a privatized individual or family dehqon farm 
in the following chapter six. Exemplary is the case of one farmer 
who runs a medium sized farm, mainly cultivating potatoes, 
                                                          
94 The scattered availability of short term arenda arrangements throughout the 
communities in the Zarafshan Valley reflects the capacity of local institutions to 
come to decisions and implement them (Revomutk 18.06.2012). 
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urgently trying to certify his arable land, because other villagers 
already have questioned his property. “They request parts of the 
land and write letters [ariza].Therefore I now want – before other 
villagers understand or act – to transform this land quickly into a 
private dehqon farm. But money is needed to get the certificate 
from the hukumat” (upper Zarafshan 15.06.2011). He hurries, 
because he got the land as bobogi – what is illegal as he admits.95 “If 
someone comes and requests land from me, he is right and he 
should get the land. But he will not get the land, as he would have 
to pay – the hukumat, the police, the court – so that someone 
enforces his right” (upper Zarafshan 17.06.2011).96 Originally the 
jamoat land committee has agreed to certify his land, but later on 
another institution disagreed. He urges to get this land, because 
otherwise, so he explained, for the potentially remaining 20 sotiq, “I 
will not stay in the village” (upper Zarafshan 17.06.2011). However, 
at present time his request is stalled as he cannot afford the 
required extra payments to speed up the process. Until about 
2014/2015 land certifications issued by the district administration 
hukumat were considered the strongest evidence for property. 
Certifying land plots meant to disable previous access arrangements 
and legalize the access as the certification overrides previous 
property documentation. It was commonly assumed that no legal 
ways possibly dissolve or expropriate certificated land plots. Thus, 
the certification allowed to legalize the diverse ways to claim access 
to land, which is important as I will outline in with regard to bobogi 
land claims in chapter seven below. Again, the certifying land 
property was reserved to the thin layer of local elites (mid Zarafshan 
                                                          
95 Ariza is the name of complaint letters sent to authorities. Bobogi is a local 
institution that underlines the belonging of property. I will elaborate on both 
terms in depth in chapter seven and eight of this thesis. 
96 The farmer continues: “By law everyone here, every family, should have 10 
sotiq. So when poor people write letters [ariza], nothing happens. You need 
money.” (upper Zarafshan 17.06.2011). 
 188 
23.06.2011) who eventually opted to establish an individual or 
family dehqon farm. Smallholder farmers, on the contrary, refused 
to certify land due to a lack of financial and organizational 
resources. Manifold administrative difficulties and involved costs to 
certify land plots made heads of poor households simply decline to 
take action (upper Zarafshan 28.06.2012). There were undefined 
costs involved in certifying land: “[O]fficially I should be able to 
receive land certificate for less than 50 Somoni [app. equivalent to 
$15 USD], but in fact you can get no certificate without giving 200 
greens as a shapka [bribery, A.M.]” (Shaumarov 2008: 71).97  
 
Photograph 7  Pasture above Garibak village. Source: The author. 
Zarafshani’ Agriculture as Limited Access Order 
Limited access to land and unequal distribution are two factors why 
the individualization of the Tajik agriculture did not increase farm 
income and livelihoods. Beside this, due to the remote situation of 
the Zarafshan Valley, access to markets is linked to high transaction 
costs. Major markets for Zarafshani producers are the cities of 
Khujand and Dushanbe, both rather distant and barred by high 
                                                          
97 The currency of Tajikistan is the Tajik Somoni [TJS]. The average exchange 
rate at the time of field research in 2011 and in 2012 was at 1€ = 6 to 6,45 
Somoni. For price calculations throughout the study the exchange rate of 6,45 is 
used.  
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mountain passes. From the topographical point of view, the markets 
of nearby cities of Samarkand and Bukhara were easiest to reach, 
however the border to Uzbekistan is currently closed, farmer cannot 
sell their produce there. A senior agricultural advisor from the lower 
Zarafshan assumes:  
“There is no local market [in the whole upper Zarafshan 
area, A.M.]. People buy all things at once in autumn when 
money is available [from bypassing lorry drivers, A.M.]. We 
have no wholesale market. But if the borders to Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan were open, Kŭhistoni Mastchoh potato 
farmers would live like kings” (Soosun 21.06.2011). 
Inadequate infrastructure, volatile markets and rent seeking elites 
and authorities create poor economic incentives. Many Zarafshani 
farmers perceive their own business situation as rather grim, as 
they count the demographic development and limitations of the 
natural environment as risk to the households’ livelihood: “In 
future, only a few people in the village will work with land” (Garibak 
01.05.2012). Smallholder farmers are concerned with the prospect 
of being forced out of agriculture that is ever less able to provide a 
livelihood, while a small group of village elites will manage to 
increase access to land. A pensioner put todays’ competition for 
land more drastically: “[In future] the rich will get even richer and 
will leave the country, while the poor will die in epidemics. The 
situation will be like in some states in Africa” (Soosun 11.06.2011). 
Economic concerns do not only relate to the unequal access to land 
and elevated transaction costs, but also recognizing the own 
weakness with regard to interferences by authorities, elite persons 
and co-villagers that easily force economic projects to halt. During a 
period of increased food prices, the state government decided to 
stipulate meat prices in spring 2011. Authorities imposed price 
limitations on central markets in the capital and elsewhere and 
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eventually detained several butchers for selling overprice 
(Eurasianet, 2011; RFE/ RL Tajik Service, 2011). Zarafshani farmers 
stopped thereupon selling livestock, which in turn led to a further 
increase of meat prices (lower Zarafshan 18.05.2011). Despite this 
intervention turned out to be short term; however such 
interferences cling to farmer’s common knowledge and corroborate 
the general perception of negative conditions for investments in 
agriculture. Interventions in the individualized agricultural 
livelihoods exemplify restricted access opportunities that are part of 
the limited access order (North et al. 2012) present in Tajikistan. 
Characteristics of the LAO, as leaders rent seeking tactic, disinterest 
for reform and the race for assets prevail throughout the Zarafshan 
Valley. Tajik LAO patterns include excessive bureaucracy to 
effectively condition farm households.  I will come back to the 
patterns of Tajik policy making in the case studies below. However, 
with direct reference to the previous social system of the Soviet 
Union, state and elite interventions are not necessarily seen as a 
problem, mere as misguided exceptions. Some villagers even 
formulated principal objections towards the liberal market 
economy98 as represented by the free land market: “Opening a land 
market is dangerous, because some rich people would buy all land” 
(Garibak 04.05.2011). Accordingly, some farmers spoke out against 
the complete privatization of land that would lead to many poor 
people in rural areas due to the absence of alternative work 
opportunities “in mines or factories” (Garibak 04.05.2011).   
Limitations to Female Headed Households 
The LAO as underlying pattern of Tajik policy making is not just a 
matter of top-down regulations. Instead, LAO patterns as the race 
                                                          
98 In the terms of North et al. (2012) the so called Open Access Order OAO as 
opposite to the LAO. 
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for assets are produced bottom-up as well. Regulations of the LAO 
unfold through deliberate interventions of bureaucracy, powerful 
elites or administration, but embrace cultural aspects too. In Central 
Asia, cultural and religious institutions determine precisely the role 
of women in society or maintain exclusive positions for certain clans 
or families (Massicard and Trevisani 1999; Trevisani 2007). Thus, 
LAO arrangements do not only impose rules on societies, but also 
deny rights to society. Due to the widespread labour migration of 
men, much of the agricultural production in the Zarafshan Valley is 
currently managed by women. Women are traditionally in charge of 
the kitchen garden, plant protection, the cultivation of vegetables 
and post production of agricultural produce. Male household 
members usually take care of livestock, transport and staple crops 
as potatoes and rice. The head of the household, however, is 
overseeing the general timing of agricultural activities, the 
commercialization of products, the finances and negotiation with 
others. In Central Asia, this role is usually taken by the senior male 
of the household. However, under current livelihood conditions the 
feminisation of agriculture took also root in the Zarafshan Valley 
where by now many women act as heads of households. Although, 
women are neglected in village governance processes and side-lined 
in negotiations regarding transport, agro-techniques, services and 
commercialization (Boboyorov 2013a:95f). Considerable social 
pressure is exercised to reduce the sphere of influence for women 
in local communities. Limitations are attached to beliefs of 
adequate Islamic behaviour as “[…] women should not leave the 
house so often” (Garibak 10.05.2012). Following such fundamental 
arguments or even personal intimidation, it is no surprise that 
female headed households in consequence are inclined to accept 
low retail prices (Garibak 04.05.2012) or unfavourable land 
allocations (Madrushkat 02.07.2011). By no surprise, none of the 
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new individual or family dehqon farms visited in the Zarafshan 
Valley between 2011 and 2012 was legally led by women – what 
contrasted, for instance, with the situation in the cotton areas of 
southern Tajikistan.99 Nevertheless, de facto many Zarafshani 
smallholder farm households are currently run by women. 
Husbands or sons are providing remittances that are earned outside 
the village, while the daily livelihood depends on women. Female 
farmers rely in many ways on the assistance of men to maintain 
agricultural production. Support is provided by relatives; who may 
however potentially exercise power over the respective household. 
As mentioned above, there are cases of intra-family land grabbing, 
often at the expense of female headed households (upper 
Zarafshan 02.07.2011). Several times I encountered female-headed 
households that had to cede parts of their arable land due to 
requests from other villagers100 as they were not able to mobilize 
enough support to defend their land. Female farmer Nasirat, whose 
parents moved to this village before her birth, stated: “I wrote 
letters [ariza], but no one helped. In this village is local favouritism 
[millatci; treating others as strangers, A.M.]. Nothing happened, 
because I don’t have background [pusht] here” (upper Zarafshan 
01.07.2011). The reference to the powerful background [pusht] is 
interesting as it denotes the power a person is presumably able to 
mobilize through its networks. To have a background [pusht] means 
to have access to important people, i.e. friends, relatives, 
                                                          
99 During a visit in the southern Shartus region in 2012, I met several female 
headed households who managed fully privatized individual dehqon farms with 
up to 10 ha of land, including male employees – at the time a very unlikely 
situation in the Zarafshan area.  
100 Talking with a group of farmers, I observe how in the background another 
group of people cuts the branch of the drinking water tap for one or two 
households in order to reinforce the water supply for the water taps in another 
sub-quarter of the village. While they cut the tube, one woman arrives outraged 
on the spot. There are wild discussions, but she can’t stop the process. 
Obviously she was not consulted before. (Garibak 08.07.2011) 
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acquaintances, who act when necessary. Pusht is for instance 
important to get an employment with the state, but also to resolve 
trouble with authorities. It is common knowledge to seek a 
livelihood where you have pusht, as nothing works without pusht. 
Eventually, Nasirat had to cede parts of the household’s arable land 
to her husband’s family while her husband was working abroad. 
“When the brother of the second wife [who claimed her land, A.M.] 
came to resume the land, people said that it is not true and fair to 
take the land. However, the land was passed on to the brother, with 
the reason that my family is not from here” (upper Zarafshan 
01.07.2011). Once the other party has appropriated the piece of 
land, it is very difficult to claim it back as local institution consider 
the case as settled and state organizations will rarely agree to 
interfere. Thus, in consequence, such conflicts are often reason for 
violence.101 This corroborates that female headed households are at 
risk to become marginalized (Bakozoda et al. 2011: 8, 10; Boboyorov 
2016) and subsequently being overreached in business affairs too. 
Female farmers are certainly disadvantaged in local governance 
processes that are based on male superiority over women and rule 
out debates of social development. Women are de facto less able to 
generate pusht and mobilize power in governance processes. Taking 
into account the absence of state authorities to guarantee women’s 
participation in village affairs, there is very little margin for female 
farmer to challenge male-dominated governance decisions. Hence, 
female headed households have less room for manoeuver than 
their male counterparts. Talking with the young female farmer 
Nasirat who heads a smallholder household, she acknowledged 
difficulties in land negotiation processes: “Land distribution was not 
so good for us as my husband was not active to claim farmland 
                                                          
101 In one village in the upper Zarafshan Valley a shootout had taken place that 
was sparked off by a conflict regarding pasture land. 
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when it was necessary. Now we own only 30 sotiq and a small 
garden” (Madrushkat 30.06.2011).102 Taking the example of the 
village assembly [majlisi umumi] the most visible local governance 
body in the community, the individualization of agriculture in the 
Zarafshan marginalized the role of women to a minority, 
occasionally intimidated by competitors.103 During a talk with the 
main facilitator [oqsaqol] in a big village, he explains how to call 
attendance for majlisi umumi.  
“I call people together. They tell the neighbours and inform 
others. People have to attend, it is mandatory. If someone is 
in Russia, the neighbour attends and reports to his wife. The 
wife will then inform the neighbour’s wife” (upper Zarafshan 
13.06.2012).  
Thus, in Zarafshani communities women’s attention at the village 
assembly is actually no matter of course. The systematic 
discrimination of women in agricultural and communal matters, 
legitimated with cultural and religious reasons, is in fact a post-
Soviet phenomenon intended to stop local competitors. In practice 
Zarafshani female household heads are hardly in the position to 
invest in agriculture as they struggle with competitive disadvantages 
induced by male dominated governance processes (Mandler 2015: 
10, 13). This situation is effectively sustaining the LAO, as the state 
undertakes no efforts to advocate for female farmer.  
Protracted Investments in Household Farms 
The difficulty to increase access to arable land remains the central 
obstacle to rural economic activities in the Zarafshan Valley. Given 
                                                          
102 Field research showed that female led households are more likely to 
exerperience poverty.  
103 The subordinated role of women in public meetings is expressed in the 
statement of a male farmer: “Women only agree with all arguments, they have 
no own point” (lower Zarafshan 08.07.2011).  
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the states monopoly on land, there is basically no incentive that 
awards talented producers to increase business. Chapter seven will 
outline how local conditions in the Zarafshan Valley do virtually not 
permit to enlarge the production area. Provided that minimum 
access to land is available, there is no lack of farmers’ future 
projects.104 Under the current conditions of land scarcity 
smallholder households refuse to make substantial investments in 
agriculture. Further, this is a consequence from the lack of financial 
resources that repeatedly compel farming households to cultivate 
crops without proper agricultural inputs or preparation of soils 
(Tajik Farm Diary 2013: HOK, ORZ, BAH). Seasonal shortage of 
money is a severe challenge, partially solved through barter trades 
with lorry drivers especially in Kŭhistoni Mastchoh or possibly 
access to micro-credits. Smallholder households however, are very 
reluctant towards investments in agriculture as there are 
unbearable risks involved concerning agricultural production, 
commercialization and the political environment. Addressing 
potential investments in agriculture, farmers repeatedly referred to 
negative experiences to justify their reluctance. Narratives of failed 
business investments are commonplace. One repeated example was 
a kamaz [truck] driver who took several tons of dried sardolu 
[apricots] from local farmers for 0.8 Somoni [ca. 0.12€] per KG in 
commission. He went to the city of Khujand, but could not sell the 
                                                          
104 The Tajik Farm Diary (2013) provides some information about farmers ideas 
for possible investments:  
- Establishing a post-production sector: E.g. canned and dried fruits. Processing 
meat and dairy products 
- Revitalize vine production and processing in the lower Zarafshan region 
- Establishing a chicken fabric, i.e. egg and poultry meat production 
- Intensify livestock rearing and Yak breeding 
- Diversifying production to avoid local monocultures of potato and rice  
- Extending the cultivation period through intensified irrigation and the use of 
seedlings or greenhouses 
- Production and processing of high value crops such as vegetables and fruits. 
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fruits for this price, instead only for 0.5 Somoni [ca. 0.07€] per KG. 
He had to cover the debt by selling all his livestock (Soosun 
12.06.2011). A similar story describes a collective deal of a group of 
farmers from Ayni district who bartered apples with rice from the 
Panjakent district. It was agreed to exchange 2 KG of apples for 1 KG 
of rice. Several tons of rice was shipped to Ayni, but by the time the 
apples arrived in Panjakent, most of them had gone bad. The rice 
producers wanted their crop back. But the rice was not available 
anymore. In the end the villagers from Ayni agreed on paying for 
each KG of rice (Soosun 12.06.2011). Thus, the difficult access to 
markets in remote areas facilitates unfavourable business. One 
example is the practice of barter trading in the upper Zarafshan, 
which is stable but provides marginal profits. Such arrangements do 
not contribute to the transition of smallholder households from 
part-time subsistence to full-time market-oriented farming. 
Approaching towards commercial farming is a complex option for 
Zarafshani farmer, suitable only for those households which have 
settled the multiple challenge of safeguarding the livelihood.  
Summary: Challenges to Rural Livelihood Provision 
The chapter elaborated various factors complicating the 
productivity of individualized Zarafshani’ agricultural production 
systems. Farming households must cope with harsh natural 
conditions, limited access to arable land, poor infrastructure and 
distance to markets. Income from agriculture is very low so that 
many rural households rely on remittances from family members 
working outside the village. For these reasons, smallholder 
households are not able to maintain or develop full time agricultural 
livelihoods. Complicated regulations and uncertain land access 
arrangements limit the households’ production capacities. Due to 
significant labour migration, smallholder households are often led 
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by women. Translocal livelihoods have established as significant 
parts of the local working power have left rural communities. 
Female lead households do not enjoy the same room for 
manoeuver in village affairs as their male counterparts. Together 
with state regulations such arrangements effectively implement and 
maintain limited access orders (LAO) in rural communities. In this 
context, farmers are not disposed to channel resources to invest in 
their farm business. The individualization of agriculture in the 
Zarafshan Valley has therefore not led to increased productivity and 
income, but is primarily a challenge to smallholders’ livelihood 
provision. 
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6  The Individualization of Agriculture as 
Crisis of Expertise 
The previous chapter illustrated how the individualization of the 
Tajik agriculture unfolded as a challenge to the livelihoods of 
smallholder Zarafshani farmers. This chapter discusses how farmers 
refer to knowledge, information and expertise to maintain and 
improve their farming livelihoods. It is argued that farmers consider 
agricultural expertise with caution. Farmers hesitate to act or invest 
upon available agricultural expertise, i.e. knowledge, locally 
considered as significant for agricultural production, because it 
turns out that quality and trust are central issues when approaching 
new knowledge assets. Hypothetically I assume that especially 
smallholder farmers have difficulties to access trustable agricultural 
expertise, which explains why this group only reluctantly invests in 
innovations or implements changes upon new knowledge. The 
chapter starts with a synthesis of how agricultural information and 
expertise is available in the Zarafshan Valley, including farmers’ 
reflections regarding the usefulness of these knowledge assets. 
These sources are not for all rural dwellers in the same way 
accessible. The second part of the chapter presents the case of 
selecting seed potatoes, demonstrating how knowledge sources on 
local level turn out as unreliable and not trustworthy. The example 
of seed potatoes shows the detrimental effect on investments and 
production practices. The third part of the chapter describes 
farmers’ considerations regarding the founding of the individual or 
family dehqon farm. This case shows how information and advice 
become incalculable for small and medium farmers so that they 
abstain from this potential household consolidating opportunity. 
Both examples reveal that individualized farm households 
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experience a crisis of agricultural expertise, because it is hardly 
being implemented or guides farmers operations 
Agricultural Information and Expertise in Zarafshani 
Rural Communities  
Recalling the failed business examples described in the previous 
chapter five makes apparent that it is not simple for Zarafshani 
farmers to obtain reliable information about developments in the 
agricultural sector. Sub-regional or national information channels 
that provide timely and trustworthy news are hardly established in 
the Zarafshan Valley. Information and advice is exchanged 
selectively in some communities, often with support from 
authorities or NGOs linked to special extension efforts. Request for 
expertise and knowledge sharing beyond the local level is rather 
rare. Some villages benefit from their vicinity to administrative 
centres; however the district agricultural offices [agroprom105] are 
hardly providing professional and quality advice. Still, the agroprom 
provides at least a kind of political picture of present developments 
in the district government [hukumat], for example if central political 
directives coming from the capital are sustained by district 
authorities. Potentials for sharing knowledge have much increased 
nowadays due to better travelling conditions, mobile phone 
network coverage, TV broadcasting and in some cases even 
internet, which reaches also remote parts of the Zarafshan Valley 
today. Interestingly, newspapers or farmer associations were not 
                                                          
105 Agroprom is the Russian abbreviation for the agricultural department at the 
district government or administration [hukumat]. Every district has an 
agricultural office, which is subordinated to the provincial agricultural 
department. “Agroprom is an agency of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
maintains offices in all regions and districts; their main tasks are collection of 
statistical information and establishing production forecasts” (De Danieli and 
Shtaltovna 2016: 163). The agroprom occasionally conveys seeds to farmers 
and provides advice, however, it is considered outdated information. 
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mentioned in the long term farm survey as sources for information 
(Tajik Farm Diary 2013). Generally, in-depth agrarian information 
from academic or political organizations is poorly transferred from 
the centre to the periphery. In the Zarafshan Valley only few 
farmers associations are operating, often dependent on support 
from international NGOs. Respectively low is the average knowledge 
of rights as farmers’ and citizens’ or knowledge regarding the 
national legislation (Bakozoda et al. 2011; Welthungerhilfe 2006).  
Expertise in the Local Arena 
Questioning farmers on agriculturally relevant knowledge in remote 
rural areas is both stating the obvious in form of everyday’s 
knowledge and dealing with particular individual expertise. Thus, 
agricultural expertise is an open concept, concretized against the 
particular local affairs. Zarafshani farmers usually acknowledge 
proudly their thorough understanding of how to cultivate rice and 
potatoes; how to harvest and process apricots etc. However, at the 
same time they indicated that currently agricultural expertise is not 
considered the relevant knowledge required to run a farm. Through 
family training, every farmer is specialized on practices that suit his 
farming household best and contributes particular innovations to 
increase efficiency. General knowledge and concrete know-how to 
solve agriculture related problems is present in each household. 
One elder medium farmer in Garibak village in the lower Zarafshan 
Valley states:  
“I am myself an agronom [agronomist]. New sorts and 
advice are not necessary, because I have a long experience 
as brigadier. I am able to see from the potato if the seed is 
good. There are two types of corn: fodder and wheat. I am 
myself advising people, even better than students who 
graduated from TAU [Tajik Agrarian University in 
Dushanbe]” (09.05.2012). 
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Such refusal of nascent agrarian education and external agricultural 
expertise appears as overestimation of one’s own capabilities, but is 
rather the norm. While the statement sounds ignorant and odd; 
farmers present their expertise with defiance, referring that the real 
problems of agricultural production do not stem from these issues. 
However, generally expertise is not appreciated and as esteemed as 
it used to be in Soviet rural environment “engineering -oriented” 
epistemic cultures (Van Assche et al. 2016: 38). There is also anger 
tangible that agricultural expertise is not suitable and irrelevant 
under present conditions, while instead other domains of 
knowledge enjoy higher esteems and are simply more requested. 
Due to the absence of centralized kolkhoz structures, that 
incorporated various communities, the disposition to research and 
knowledge sharing significantly decreased.  
Local Networks and the Consideration of External 
Expertise 
Agricultural expertise in the Zarafshan Valley is concentrated 
around the locally predominant production systems as livestock 
rearing, i.e. sheep farming or fruit and vegetables cultivation, i.e. 
potatoes, apricots, vine, fodder grass, wheat, and rice. Including the 
seasonal cycle of agricultural labour, these are mainly recurring to 
routine tasks as preparing soil and irrigation. Farmers then 
concentrate on decisions regarding the acquisition of fertilizer and 
its application, the correct timing of harvesting, processing and 
selling produce (Tajik Farm Diary 2013). At the same time financial 
resources must be at hand to handle necessary investments. A 
typical week plan for a smallholder farming household in the lower 
Zarafshan area in June 2012 reads as follows:   
“Taking care of fertilization and weeding of rice field and the 
vegetable land: potatoes, carrots, onions, cabbages and 
tomatoes. Preserving fodder for animals and taking care of 
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big animals [i.e. cows, A.M.]. Prepare construction materials 
[mud and stones] to repair the buildings of the household. 
To buy two sheep for making them big and fat. Planning to 
care for 0,5 hectare of vegetable growing land; watering, 
providing mineral fertilizer and 0,5 KG of ammonium 
nitrate” (Tajik Farm Diary 2013: BAH I, 103ff). 
The long term perspective of a one year survey reveals that farmers 
are busy to organize the cycle of investments and 
commercialization, while tackling challenges of financial shortages 
in between (Tajik Farm Diary 2013). When the farmers were asked 
about potential sources of new knowledge, there were hardly any 
answers apart from the standard ones that farmer refer to their 
local networks: “[I ask the] local master [ustod] on land processing, 
rice and vegetables growing. [Then I ask] relatives and friends on 
when to plan, how to give fertiliser and how to grow vegetables” 
(Tajik Farm Diary 2013: BAH O 152ff). Locally available agricultural 
expertise is usually attached to individuals that are considered 
experienced in certain sections of farming and who gain in the 
course of time attributes such as master [ustod], agronom or 
muhisafed. Farmers usually seek expertise first within the 
community, as this is available without costs. In fact, at present time 
the readiness of local households to invest in external knowledge is 
rather low. Farmers underline the importance of their individual 
efforts to acquire knowledge in order to manage change process 
which started with the end of collective farm work. The perception 
of being individually responsible of property and livelihood is 
grounded in the experience that counting on authorities or co-
farmers for assistance or subsidies is in vain. A young smallholder 
farmer from Garibak village, lower Zarafshan Valley, noted:  
“I rely on my own brains. I am attentive and have always 
been working and never damaged anything. For advice I 
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turn to an acquainted person in Dushanbe who helps me out 
with agricultural advice, seeds and other stuff. This person is 
related to the agricultural department and has good 
knowledge” (01.06.2012).   
Technical agricultural advice is mainly provided through individual 
networks. These are perpetual networks, which are currently being 
reinforced. Very often farmers state that advice is requested from 
the elder generation of farmers with experience who have 
knowledgeable reputation. The generalized term for such persons in 
the Zarafshan area is muhisafed.106 A common statement reads: “I 
decide on my own, but sometimes I ask experienced elders 
[muhisafed]. There are various muhisafed [with different expertise, 
A.M.] around: animals, garden, and soils” (Madrushkat 12.06.2012). 
Advice is not necessarily retrieved from immediate neighbours 
within the same mahalla [neighbourhood], especially as they are 
often competitors i.e. regarding scarce land and water resources. 
Naturally, there seem to be preferences and antipathy among 
neighbours, just as some prefer to seek information from either 
within the extended family or outside the village. “I cooperate with 
my neighbour. He gives me advice on cultivation, time schedule, 
applying fertilizer, plant protection and so forth. For further 
questions there is the agronom of the former kolkhoz [i.e. the 
collective dehqon farm], people come to ask him” (Garibak 
30.07.2011). Famers know very well which kind of expertise is 
available in the village and how to approach the various resources. 
One elder smallholder female farmer states: “Two people from this 
village work at the district agroprom. So first I will visit those elders 
                                                          
106 Muhisafed means literally white hair and denotes experienced elder, a source 
of wisdom. With regard to agriculture these are usually experienced elderly 
men or women who in some cases had a professional training during Soviet 
times. The institution muhisafed exists communally for various matters and has 
its female equivalent kampir or hojji	bibi.  
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who have experience, even though they live in other mahallas [..] 
then I will ask the two acquaintances from the agroprom about 
prices and what to cultivate too” (Garibak 09.05.2012). As soon as 
farmers manage to increase their room for manoeuvre in terms of 
reputation, administrative permissions or financial resources, they 
explore also other potential crops and techniques. Among those 
farmers who manage to secure the household’s livelihood, 
readiness for innovation is high. One mid-age smallholder farmer 
explains how he tests new crops: “I learn on the basar from sellers if 
there is any interesting new sort [variety of seeds]. If I decide to try 
the new variety, I will then take a probe of it and sow it on two sotiq 
of my terrain to try it out and compare with other crops” (Garibak 
05.05.2012).  
Distrusting Expertise 
Zarafshani farmers generally appear reluctant to speak about the 
actual knowledge necessary to farm. This results from the 
potentially irritating interview situation with a foreigner which 
despite my extended presence in local communities continued to 
exist. Certain trade-offs in communication and comprehensions 
remain inevitable. However, farmer tend to marginalize the specific 
agricultural expertise which provides their daily livelihood, such as 
timing to cultivate certain crops, treating soils or preparing 
irrigation.107 Principle farming knowledge is considered to be 
commonly known, thus nothing that is much emphasized. As 
mentioned above with regard to farmers’ casting aspersion to 
agricultural research and training organizations, the quotations 
below outline considerable suspicion that is expressed regarding 
advice coming from outside experts. Small and medium farmers do 
                                                          
107 For this reason the Tajik Farm Diary (2013) was established to learn about 
local knowledge practices and processes related to the agricultural livelihood. 
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not seem to value much external agricultural expertise, instead 
potential advice and sources of information about agricultural 
practices are regarded dismissive. A considerable number of 
interviewed farmers presented themselves bluntly as experts 
without need of further instruction. The quotes above showed how 
farmers’ reservation turned into severe and persistent distrust 
towards third party knowledge providers by international NGOs. 
The response of the head of a poor household in the upper 
Zarafshan Valley to my question for potential sources of advice 
summarizes this attitude: 
“I don’t need any advice. I do everything on my own. There is 
a veterinary available in the city. He knows that there are 
diseases in the soil. To know this I don’t need the 
laboratories. The laboratories do not tell the truth. Why? 
What is the truth? Here is no alternative to potatoes” 
(12.06.2012). 
This perception of knowing things better than outside experts and 
authorities, and in consequence distancing oneself from national 
and international institutions, was rather widespread especially 
among small and medium farmers. One typical statement reads, 
here from a smallholder farmer: “Regarding advice I am well set up. 
I know the potato business better than the agronom. Sometimes 
the NGO holds seminars on potatoes [but I cannot follow most 
advices] because there are no means to do so. I need to grow 
potatoes anyway” (Madrushkat 13.06.2012). The latter part of the 
statement gives an explicit reason for the problematic of 
agricultural expertise. Most households lack opportunities to put 
expertise into practice. Farmers in the upper Zarafshan know very 
well that under current conditions there is no realistic alternative to 
the cultivation of potatoes. Limited resources, lack of political 
participation to lobby for subsidies, administrative support or the 
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rule of law and the difficult economic environment leave virtually no 
room for manoeuvre to change the mode of cultivating potatoes. 
External knowledge and agricultural advice therefore appear as 
request, incompatible with the daily reality of local farmers. 
Poverty as Constraint to Expertise 
The difficult relation of Zarafshani farmers to agriculturally relevant 
expertise becomes even more complicated among distinctly poor 
households. The phenomenon that poor rural dwellers are least 
interested in knowledge assets and communication was 
experienced a couple of times in different Zarafshani communities 
and has been observed also elsewhere in Tajikistan (MEDA 2006). 
My observation in a village in the lower Zarafshan Valley confirms 
this:  
While being invited for tea in a marginalized neighbourhood, 
a group of elderly men and women from rather poor 
households had gathered. I asked about irrigation of their 
rice fields, knowing that this is a sensitive topic in this water-
scarce community: “Do you know the mirob [person in 
charge of the water distribution]?” One older woman 
responds: “No, this is unknown to me. The neighbour is 
telling us all that we need to know about water“. The 
surrounding other seven or eight people, of whom two male, 
agree. I am taken by surprise because I considered the mirob 
an important figure in the community as he schedules the 
water to the field. His services must be paid. I reformulate 
my question, but the response is the same: “We have never 
been to anyone; [and we] don’t know where to go”. In fact, 
their households even are not linked to the communal 
drinking water conduit. As they don’t pay nor pressure the 
mirob, their rice fields receive water last, which means less 
amounts of water than others. Visiting another humble 
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household in this neighbourhood I am to make a similar 
experience. We talk about taxes, local prices, the need of 
official documents and individual relations to the collective 
dehqon farm in the village. As this household is very short on 
land and water, the collective dehqon farm would be 
naturally the first address to request additional arable land 
on short or long term. However, the elderly lady leading this 
household refuses to apply for anything. “No, no, no, I don’t 
go there”. I continue to ask about other institutions were she 
potentially could appeal to, such as the committeti kishlok 
[the village committee], the domkom [local name for 
mahalla], the committeti sanho [women committee]. The 
response is negative again. Abruptly her neighbour, also an 
elderly lady, sitting next to her shouts: “Frankly, no one will 
ask women committee [committeti sanho]. We do not 
frequent this. We ask each other. We go nowhere” 
(04.05.2012).  
Especially poor households seem disinterested and detached from 
local and sub-regional networks. Poor farmers have little interest in 
knowledge initiatives and offers on agricultural expertise result from 
profound political and social exclusion. Firstly, poverty makes it 
difficult for the household head to build and maintain networks, 
especially with respected and important people. Such relations are 
based on reciprocity and prestige (Boboyorov 2013a), which poor 
households simply cannot provide. Secondly, there is feasible social 
stigmatization of poverty; poor people are implicitly excluded and 
withdraw themselves from attending meetings, entering 
households or taking fully part in social and religious procedures. 
Encounters at other households usually imply further obligations as 
future hospitality or gift exchange, which poor people cannot 
afford. Poverty is de facto a stigmatization that limits social mobility. 
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The deadlock of economic opportunities caused among poor 
households defeatist mood, which among others expresses itself as 
denial of almost any kind of external advice. One elder farmer, head 
of one household in the land-scarce community Revomutk on the 
upper Zarafshan, summarized his situation:  
“I cannot do anything because I am poor. Anyway, I will stay 
poor; it is rizq [individual fortune and destiny in Islam]. My 
brothers here and in other places, they are all the same. 
Nobody borrows, no credit, no arenda for one year [short 
term leasehold]. Everything is money [pul]” (20.06.2011).  
Eventually, this poor farmer stopped its already low level market-
oriented production, shifting the households’ livelihood on to 
occasional wage work of the father and his two adolescent sons in 
nearby villages and the northern city of Khujand. The reference to 
the prescribed individual fortune rizq is telling in this regard. It 
denounces an unclear personal shortage that causes the poverty of 
the household. As we will see in the case of access negotiations in 
the chapter below, poverty is implicitly a sign for being a bad 
believer. A households’ tight material situation and poor access to 
land is linked to individual shortcomings of present and even 
previous generations. This way poverty turns into a stigmatization, 
equalling poor people with bad followers of Islam.   
Restrained Investments in Seed Potatoes  
Against the background of the social dynamics that shape the 
approach to knowledge in Zarafshani communities, the following 
section will present the case of selecting seed potatoes. Following 
up farmers’ selection criteria for seed potatoes illustrates the 
importance of knowledge to identify unreliable and not trustworthy 
information. At first, farmers value and calculate pros and cons of 
the various available seed potato varieties. It appears that due to 
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unreliable sources of knowledge and information, especially 
smallholder farmers eventually abstain from investments in new 
varieties and remain with the local seed material. The example of 
seed potatoes corroborates thus the hypothesis that especially 
smallholder farmer face difficulties to identify and access locally 
adequate, trustable knowledge. The sphere of uncertainty regarding 
agricultural expertise has a detrimental effect on farmers’ 
investments and production practices. 
Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district in the upper part of the Zarafshan Valley 
is a famous potato growing area in Tajikistan and has in recent years 
also gained importance as potato seed producer. In 2010 the 
president of Tajikistan visited Kŭhistoni Mastchoh and declared the 
sub-region “National Potato Seed Producer of Tajikistan” 
(Welthungerhilfe 2012a: 10) what in analogy to Tajik cotton 
production equals an official order to engage in potato production.  
In fact, natural conditions are particular suitable in the elevated 
parts of the valley to engage in potato seeds production, because 
the soils are less infested with nematodes and the Colorado potato 
beetle (leptinotrasa decelineata) pest is significantly reduced at 
altitudes above 2000 meters. Seed production requires decisively 
more labour, but provides significant higher revenues. Virtually, all 
local farmers are producing seed potatoes for own consumption, 
which are traditionally selected from the seasonal harvest of table 
potatoes. Basically, small and proper potatoes are hand sorted and 
stored for the next sowing. The remaining potatoes form the actual 
volume of harvest, which is then either sold, bartered or consumed. 
Farmers well understand the economic potentials of producing 
potato seed material for the national market. Since professional 
seed production requires available land plots and significant 
financial investments, professional reproduction of potato seeds in 
the Zarafshan Valley is the domain of a few leading farm 
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households, who possess sufficient arable areas and who are able to 
handle the extra efforts. The majority of households in Kŭhistoni 
Mastchoh carefully evaluate the options of the different available 
potato seeds, to find meanwhile an economic niche as table potato 
producer, selling only occasionally potato seed material. In 2012, 
local farmers were able to select from three major types of potatoes 
to cultivate.  
Firstly, there are locally produced, traditional potatoes. These are 
usually bartered or sold at production costs among producers from 
other villages. Such exchange happens between every one and 
three years. Due to the age of the variety and long-time infestation 
with diseases, yields of the local type of potatoes are very low. The 
reproduction rate of this sort is with less than 1:3 very low. 
Secondly, farmers may opt for regionally imported seed potatoes. 
Acquiring seed potatoes is possible at the main markets in 
Dushanbe and Khujand or through truck drivers [kamazistiy] who 
act as travelling merchants passing through the villages. Prices vary 
between 1.8 and 2.5 Somoni per KG. A famous and widespread 
variety is pakistanez a hybrid seed allegedly imported from 
Pakistan.108 Also other varieties are available (e.g. gallanda, condor, 
picasa, romanzyi). It was stated several times that pakistanez seeds 
contain nematodes and therefore harm the soil. However, their 
performance is consistent and the reproduction rate ranges from 
1:3 to 1:5 even on bad soils. A third option that exists in the valley is 
to target on imported elite or super-elite seeds or the locally re-
produced elite seeds of these varieties. However, such seeds are 
not always available as they were donated and imported through a 
European Union funded development project and professionally 
increased by members of the local NGO Potato Association 
                                                          
108 See the forthcoming work of Michael Spies on agricultural production, in 
particular potato-growing, in Gilgit-Baltistan (Pakistan). 
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Kŭhistoni Mastchoh (PAKM). The potato association received super-
elite seeds with the task to establish a reproduction pyramid for 
seed potatoes in the district. The benefits for local farmers are 
apparent: Elite seeds degenerate with much less speed and bring 
above average results for six and more years. The organization 
PAKM itself sells self-produced, i.e. re-produced seeds of the 2nd 
and 3rd offspring from the imported elite sort norika at prices 
between 2.5 and 3 Somoni per KG. Cultivating these seeds promises 
reproduction rates of 1:10 and above. It is obvious that the 
differences in the reproduction rate have an enormous economic 
impact. Selection and cultivation of the right potato seeds can 
provide for potato producers already within one season big 
benefits. If farmers manage to produce seed potatoes, profits would 
be even higher, especially if they don’t sell the harvest right away, 
but reproduce the seed material in the following season. Yet, in 
practice, farmers cannot simply consider yields and profits, but have 
to calculate income with more complex variables. Thus, not only the 
selection of the right seeds is technically difficult as it needs careful 
coordination with the household’s resources, i.e. arable land, 
irrigation and soils, but also regarding work force, capacities and 
wholesale network. Considering the selection of seed material is at 
the same time a choice of entering in lucrative business of seed 
potato production.   
Selection of Seed Material 
Field research showed that only a few households in Kŭhistoni 
Mastchoh communities actually had elite seed potatoes available. 
Large parts of the interviewed farmer made experiences earlier, but 
were rather sceptical towards these seeds today. By itself, selecting 
and purchasing the appropriate seed material requires from the 
single household considerable efforts, expert considerations and 
eventually long term investments. Each variety contains specific 
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economic challenges and inherent risks. Key to success is good and 
trustworthy seed potato material which is difficult to choose and 
not always available. Local seed potatoes are mainly bought or 
bartered by subsistence farmers with acquaintances in nearby 
villages. Despite the very low reproduction rate, independent lorry 
drivers [kamazistyi] often buy or barter local seed potatoes to sell 
them in the lower parts of the Zarafshan area, e.g. in Panjakent 
district. Under the conditions of Kŭhistoni Mastchoh, full market 
oriented production on the basis of local seed potatoes is hardly 
possible because the results usually fit just subsistence needs. Thus, 
these seeds are selected by households with small arable land plots 
available, who usually receive substantial parts of their income from 
elsewhere.  
Another option are imported seed potatoe sorts as pakistanez, 
gallanda, condor, picasa, romanzyi that bring safe and stable 
results, but will only provide a moderate productivity growth in 
comparison to the local potato variety. Small and medium farmers 
use these seed potatoes very much in order to produce table 
potatoes for the market. Especially the sort pakistanez is often 
available and farmers know it very well. In the first year the 
reproduction rate is likely to be the double of the local sort, 
although farmers state that this ratio later sharply drops. Still, this 
provides safety for planning at least for the first two years and the 
household can count for a surplus to sell or barter. Common 
knowledge has it that the imported seed potatoes, especially the 
sort from Pakistan contain nematodes and is “contaminated by 
GMO” (Madrushkat 21.06.2011).109 Farmers recognized that 
                                                          
109 Rumours had it that important families linked to the government are 
involved in the import business of the Pakistani seed material to Tajikistan 
(Dushanbe 21.06.2011). This would explain the generally good availability of 
these seeds on local markets. It was common belief that pakistanez seeds are 
genetically modified organisms (GMO). 
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reproducing pakistanez seed material for longer than 3 years is 
impossible. Apparently it is a hybrid variety, where seeds cannot be 
reproduced arbitrary (Madrushkat 21.06.2011). 
With respect to yields and seed reproduction, elite and super-elite 
seeds as well as their locally re-produced offspring of the first or 
second generation might technically be the best choice. These seeds 
are imported and reproduced through the Potato Seed Association 
PAKM. Members of PAKM are in charge of reproducing the 
imported seed potatoes several times and may then sell their 
produce. For being a PAKM potato seed multiplier, the household 
must resort to a strong economic basis, i.e. access to sufficient 
arable land, as this requires “crop rotation, disease clean fields, and 
obeying the pyramid of seed production [i.e. breeding rules, A.M.]” 
(Revomutk 27.06.2011). Thus PAKM members are almost always 
part of the village elites. Furthermore, a full programme of 
agricultural expertise is attached to these seeds for which PAKM 
offers a training curriculum to its members. So, reproducing elite 
seed material and selling both, seed and table potatoes, appears to 
be potentially the best solution for households in Kŭhistoni 
Mastchoh, however is neither suitable nor available for ordinary 
farmers. In fact, there is high request of elite seed potatoes, either 
for the reproduction of seeds or table potato production. 
Reproducing seeds is a long term business, as with every season 
only a certain proportion is sold. Profits are higher in the long run, 
dispersed over years. Selling all seed potatoes at a good price at 
once yields immediately immense profits, although it ends the long 
term system of the pyramid of seed production. The conditions of 
high demand have contributed to an opaque distribution practice of 
elite potato seed material in Kŭhistoni Mastchoh. Elite seed 
potatoes are apparently circulated among PAKM members who 
belong to local elite households. High quality elite seeds arrive to a 
 215 
lower degree at relatives, village notables and other farmers from 
the sub-region. The very selective availability caused distrust and 
anger among the village community, because due to shortage of 
supply many requests were not served. However, local outrage 
peaked when eventually available elite seed material failed to 
perform as expected. Several smallholder farmers reported a 
complete loss of their seasonal harvest (upper Zarafshan 
29.06.2011). Local farmers had various explanations for why their 
crops failed. Since it is not easily possible to distinguish seed potato 
varieties by just seeing and touching them, many smallholders are 
convinced that the “good seed potatoes from Germany are 
exchanged or mixed with bad regional seed potatoes. How can I see 
from the potato which variety or quality it is?” (upper Zarafshan 
05.07.2011). It is reasonable that farmers do not have much 
confidence in the certificates of origin of potato seeds as these may 
be falsified too. Those farmers who had seen their cultivation fail, 
mentioned that they were constrained to sow pakistanez seeds 
afterwards to have at least some results for this season. Such 
failures of elite seeds deriving from PAKM were widely known in the 
sub-region. Commonly it was believed that PAKM exchanged the 
potato seeds in the storehouses [tsharor] and sold bad local seeds 
instead. „Money is scheduled into the pockets of certain thief-
farmers. No one knows what happens in the storehouse! They take 
the good seeds only for themselves” (upper Zarafshan 05.07.2011). 
Hence, after negative experiences, the reputation of elite seeds is 
rather biased. In fact, the option to cultivate elite seeds has often 
been ruled out by smallholders as these seeds caused a risk to their 
livelihood, in particular as these farmers often do potato 
monocultures. A considerable number of farmers frankly declined to 
use them and work with local varieties, pakistanez or other medium 
varieties instead (upper Zarafshan 12.06.2012, 14.06.2011). 
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Contested Expertise  
It is beyond doubt that elite seeds, either for reproduction or as 
table potatoes, require professional treatment in order to provide 
best results. For obtaining optimal yields, a strict regime of crop 
rotation is necessary, precise sowing and the application of the right 
amount of fertilizer with the right timing. These conditions are 
rarely met by smallholder farmers who lack sufficient resources to 
finance long term innovation processes. Smallholder households are 
constrained to keep all possible natural resources in use during 
cropping season, which often means maintaining potato 
monocultures for livelihood means. Beside this, the household 
needs to hold available the capacity to organize the required labour, 
to provide additional inputs as fertilizer and potentially pesticides. 
Furthermore storage and commercialization capacities are required. 
A very few households in the Zarafshan Valley were actually 
technically able to respond to such challenges and thus to engage 
fully in professional potato and potato seed production. In 
consequence, at time of the field research this led to a bias of 
mainly economically potent households being active members of 
PAKM who engaged in professional seed production. Rejecting 
accusations of fraud around the distribution of elite seed material, 
PAKM members who are part and parcels of the village elite 
indicated the lack of knowledge and experience of smallholder 
farmers that had caused crop failures. Indeed, many of local 
smallholder farmers throughout the Zarafshan Valley acknowledged 
difficulties in ensuring the required crop rotation110, provision of 
sufficient fertilizer or correct cultivation. An external expert working 
for an international NGO in the Zarafshan Valley summarizes: 
“Farmers have no money, no capacities to ensure crop rotation. And 
                                                          
110 To increase the quality of soils, crop rotation schedules annual shifts with 
legumes as lucerne, beans and others.  
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they simply do not earn with Lucerne and Beans” (Madrushkat 
29.06.2011). One particularly disputed argument was the technique 
of cutting the seed material. Some farmer cut the potato seed one 
or two times, thus the material is tripled or quadrupled and costs 
significantly reduced.  
 
Photograph 8  Cutting germinated seed potatoes of local variety. Brown 
spots in the centre indicate the poor quality of seeds. Source: The author. 
External agronomists state that such a treatment will indeed reduce 
the performance of seeds; however it is not entirely unreasonable 
practice (Panjakent 13.04.2012). For the sake of maximal 
productivity, elite seeds shall not be cut, when used for seed 
reproduction. However, cutting seeds for table potato production 
seems technically not a problem and economically justified. It 
belongs to farmers’ local expertise to calculate the potential loss in 
productivity against the reduction of investment costs for seed 
material. One mid-aged elite farmer, member of the potato seed 
association PAKM explained: “Cutting seeds, yes is practiced, but 
you shall not do it. If the sort is adapted to local conditions after 3 
to 4 years, maybe yes. However, only table potatoes [may be cut, 
A.M.], not for seeds” (Madrushkat 15.06.2012). With regard to the 
above mentioned failure of elite seed material, local elite farmer 
and PAKM members refer to the issue of cutting seeds to create 
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doubts about smallholders capacities to deal with elite seed 
material. Crop failure and shortcomings are quickly linked to the 
incompetence of the respective individual farmer (upper Zarafshan 
18.06.2011).  
Failure of Agricultural Expertise  
As a consequence, a considerable number of local farmers refused 
to request elite seeds material and to opt instead for other available 
seeds. Given the restricted availability together with local farmers’ 
negative experiences which did not match with the statements of 
alleged productivity of the PAKM elite seeds, the majority of 
farmers, i.e. local smallholder, deliberately remain with the local 
and medium seed potatoes. These are in terms of productivity 
second best, but nevertheless imply reliable investment and 
guarantee livelihoods. Although farmers are well aware of the 
potentials of elite seed material, there risk not to receive the right 
seeds, cannot be ruled out. In consequence, most smallholder 
farmers arranged themselves with a mix of medium and local seeds 
which are modest towards soil requirements. Despite the high 
request for fertilizer and providing only satisfying results, such 
disadvantages of local seeds are considered against the risk of total 
loss caused by ill-working elite seeds. “I have reservations against 
PAKM seeds. I prefer to get seeds from neighbours and from other 
villages” (upper Zarafshan 12.06.2012) said a younger smallholder 
farmer.   
Even though medium farmers try to catch up with commercial 
production, in the case of potato production in Kŭhistoni Mastchoh 
they mainly do this by investing in the second best seed material to 
maintain general risks of economic failure at a tolerable level. 
Decisions regarding potential efficiency innovations are rather 
simple: “I cannot do crop rotation; I need the money every year” 
states a poor farmer in the upper Zarafshan Valley (05.07.2011). 
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Farmers primarily interest in obtaining optimal results is limited by 
the obligation of reducing risks to the household’s livelihood as 
much as possible. From this perspective, the option of elite seeds is 
dismissed as the attached risks are considered incalculable by 
smallholder households. Dwelling into the rational of local seed 
selection reveals how utterly complex and unsecure the available 
knowledge is. The narrative linear yield increase told by elite 
farmers is misleading, because smallholder farmer have no 
guaranteed access to elite seeds. Reliable information on elite seed 
material is not available unless strong personal bonds are made 
with elite circles of the potato association PAKM. It is in this regard 
that especially for smallholder farmer’s this particular expertise has 
become problematic. Smallholder households have very little 
chances to verify reliable and trustworthy information about issues 
that are partly above the local level as the imported seed material. 
At the same time, local domains of knowledge and expertise are 
also contested – as the cutting of seed material indicates. This 
makes it very difficult for smallholder farmer to make definite long 
term decisions, as would be required for professionalizing potato 
seed production. Since there is no reliable knowledge broker acting 
as interface between local production and regional 
commercialization, farmers arrange with the status quo and 
abandon investments in innovation. The selection process of the 
seed potatoes shows the high degree of uncertainty around 
agricultural knowledge and agricultural expertise. Knowledge assets 
are considered not reliable and leave farmers uncertain with regard 
to decision making. In consequence, the investment in elite seed 
material is cancelled and farmer deliberately arrange with low 
quality local seeds. Thus, the example underlines that trust is an 
essential criterion in Zarafshani farmers approach to expertise and 
knowledge sharing. Especially smallholder households face 
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difficulties to validate knowledge and making subsequent 
investments in agricultural production. 
Considering the Dehqon Farm  
The following part describes farmers’ considerations regarding the 
founding of the individual or family dehqon farm. This case 
corroborates the conceptual individualization of agriculture as a 
long term process in Tajikistan that refers especially to individual 
production, but is separated from the actual privatization of 
agriculture. The push towards individualized farm enterprises dates 
back to early state reform efforts to restructure local agricultural 
enterprises as described in the previous chapter. However, the 
implementation of these reform efforts was realized only recently 
since about the end of 2015 due to increased political pressure from 
the state government and international partners. However, before 
that date, despite farmers’ general interest in changing their status 
from member of the collective dehqon farm to becoming a legally 
independent producer, the conditions for this process were rather 
negative. Information and advice regarding this transition appeared 
incalculable. Thus, for the time of the field research the privatization 
of farm enterprises in the Zarafshan Valley was protracted and the 
majority of farmers abstained from this potentially household 
consolidating opportunity. By the end of 2012 the vast majority of 
Zarafshani farm households were individually producing and 
economically independent, however formally still part of the local 
collective deqhon farm. Individual or family dehqon farms, as 
completely private enterprises, were very rare in the Zarafshan 
Valley with merely a few such farms per community (Mandler 
2016). Table 6 below shows the distribution of individual or family 
dehqon farms in the mainly visited villages of the research area at 
the end 2012.  
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District Villages Inhabitants 
per village 
Number 
of hh 
Approx. 
number of 
individual or 
family
111
 
dehqon farms 
Kŭhistoni Mastchoh Padask 520 91 2 
Kŭhistoni Mastchoh Madrushkat 952 174 1 
Kŭhistoni Mastchoh Revomutk 820 124 2 
Ayni Soosun 2658 518 3 
Panjakent Garibak 2939 721 4 
Panjakent Chinor 1896 347 3 
Table 6  Individual or family dehqon farms in the research communities at 
the end of 2012. Source: Author’s compilation based on Welthungerhilfe, 
DFID et al. (2008), own calculations and the jamoat statistic office. 
At that time, in all mentioned communities collective deqhon farms 
prevailed, which legally assembled the majority of farm households 
of the community. Figures in the Zarafshan Valley significantly 
changed only in 2016, when the government exercised considerable 
pressure on district administrative bodies to register also 
smallholder assets as dehqon farms.112 However, the above figures 
display the previously low numbers of individual and family dehqon 
farms (Mandler 2016). At time of the field research 2011 and 2012 
many farmers considered the setup of the individual or family 
                                                          
111 The two family dehqon farms that were found during field research in the 
Zarafshan Valley comprised three households, i.e. parents and the households 
of two sons. 
112 I.e. farm households with less than 1,5ha of arable land available.  
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dehqon farm as a future project (Bakozoda et al. 2011: 7, 32f; Tajik 
Farm Diary 2013), without undertaking concrete steps. Actually, it 
became clear during the interviews with local farmers that only very 
few people knew how to start the administrative procedure and had 
an idea about the involved procedures and costs. A majority of 
farmers recognized the investment in the privatized dehqon farm as 
desirable and necessary for the near future, however faced great 
difficulties to access reliable information to base decisions on it. The 
parallel presence of various farm enterprises and distinctively of low 
numbers of individual and family dehqon farms in the Zarafshan 
area at the time revealed exactly the lack of quality knowledge that 
stopped farmer from making investments. In the elevated districts 
of Ayni and Kŭhistoni Mastchoh, reluctance towards organising the 
household as individual or family dehqon farm was commonplace. 
Only wealthy and powerful households, e.g. those with more than 
average access to irrigated high quality land, had started certifying 
land plots and registering their request for an individual or family 
dehqon farm enterprise. The fully privatized farm seemed to be in 
all visited communities a project of local elites. Usual smallholder 
farmer postponed the issue as mid or long-term target, mainly 
because they were far below the commonly believed threshold of 
1.5 hectares.113 Generally, there was immense uncertainty sensible 
regarding details and concrete steps to the setup the own dehqon 
farm. Despite interest in the project, confusion, deliberate 
misinformation and the lack of information characterized the local 
perception of the individual or family dehqon farm. From the 
perspective of Zarafshani farmers, no clarity about the actual 
                                                          
113 Sub-regionally the assumption changed between 1 and 1,5ha of farm land 
necessary to found the dehqon farm. Such figures were repeated by the district 
administration. These appear as sub-regionally imposed rules; literature and 
the legal framework do not specify the minimal amount of land necessary to 
found the dehqon farm (Caccavale 2005).  
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conditions to found and maintain the deqhon farm could be found. 
Evidence provides the survey of Bakozoda et al. illustrating that only 
very few farmers were actually informed about the concrete 
process of how to set up an individual or family dehqon farm, i.e. 
which documents are necessary and which offices need to be 
approached (2011:45f). Media as sources of information were 
hardly available, and worse, statements by the president and the 
MoA are hardly specific. Equally, administration and state 
institutions on sub-district [jamoat] and district levels [nohiya] were 
poorly prepared and even unwilling to foster the registration of new 
dehqon farms, thus denying their responsibility. A senior farmer, 
part of the local elite and well connected even with the capital 
Dushanbe, stated:  
“It is good when you manage to do it [to set up the dehqon 
farm], to eventually arrange it. The government promotes it, 
the president and the media talk about it. However, the 
hukumat [on district and sub-regional level] has to do it 
without money. Therefore they have no interest and are 
reluctant to deal with the requests. They simply don’t care” 
(Madrushkat 12.06.2012). 
This way the midlevel administration was bluntly trapped in 
between the incongruence of national policies and realities at local 
level. Panjakent’s agroprom [district agricultural department] found 
itself unable to provide farmers with advice how to implement 
dehqon farm as it had no directives regarding required farm sizes 
prepared. Agroprom staff indicated that the centrally designated 
form of the private dehqon farm did not fit with the conditions 
found in this district. With reference to the assumed lack of 
profitability a senior agroprom officer outlined the office’s 
reluctance to start registering dehqon farms in this district:  
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“Yes [we advise people who want to become individual 
dehqon farmer], but there are very few. People cannot 
become dehqon farmer with just 6 sotiq of land. It is not 
viable to do so. There will be no profit, just costs such as 
pension schemes and taxes. Such farms are too small for 
efficient work. Agricultural machinery cannot be used 
efficiently, due to the small size of arable areas. […] Families 
may work on their land, but 6 sotiq is work for only 10 days” 
(Panjakent 09.08.2011). 
Such statements provide a good explanation for the selective 
presence of state organizations in rural areas. The lack of 
communication and support from the centre leaves the district 
administration virtually paralysed.114 It is therefore no matter of 
course for state organizations to provide a statement to agricultural 
policies at all. In Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district, it was widely believed 
that certifying land means automatically being eligible to an 
individual dehqon farm; thus falling under another taxation scheme. 
Private individual or family dehqon farm enterprises are subject to 
elevated taxes and increased payments for social benefits, i.e. the 
pension fund and a minimum wage scheme.115 However, although 
the administrative bodies’of the jamoat and hukumat were in 
charge of registering the new dehqon farms, they were not able to 
provide clear information on these issues.  
                                                          
114 Later, upon political requests from the central government for sub-regionally 
higher numbers of individual dehqon farms, the district administration removed 
the obstacle of the required minimal size of land by abandoning the 1,5ha 
regulation (Mandler 2016). 
115 Separate payments for the pension fund and minimum wage scheme are due 
for each employee and member of the household above 18 years. 
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Registration Procedures, Involved Costs and the 
Impossibility to Invest 
Caccavale (2005: 7) describes the administrative procedure to set 
up an individual or family dehqon farm in Tajikistan as formalized 
process of eight steps. It goes without saying that this procedure is 
easily protracted through additional financial requests from local 
authorities. From the perspective of farmers, the administrative 
procedure to arrive at the individual deqhon farm looked rather 
confuse, involving incalculable costs. Farmers repeatedly mentioned 
high initial costs required to establish an individual or family dehqon 
farm. The necessary investments appear as serious obstacle for 
starting the private farming business. Such calculations, however, 
have to be seen in context of the generally unclear procedure. The 
entire calculation may easily double and triple explains an energetic 
medium farmer who managed to access additional land.  
“You need stamps, documents, registrations – this alone 
makes 1000 Somoni [ca. 155€]. Some of these papers are 
only in Khujand available. Further, you need one stamp that 
is only available in Dushanbe. You need a bank account. All 
in all 2600 Somoni [ca. 403€] are needed. The tax 
department doesn’t know what to do. For this little land 
[referring to ca. 1 hectare, A.M.] it is not worth the efforts” 
(Garibak 28.04.2012). 
In order to obtain the necessary documents, it is obvious that extra 
costs are involved. A range of documents, certifications, stamps and 
expert consultations is necessary – on jamoat, district and even on 
national level. This mandatory documentation consumes immense 
amounts of time and money as it has to be requested from 
notoriously slow and underfunded state authorities (Bliss 2011; 
Boboyorov 2016). It is common knowledge and de facto praxis that 
bribes and extra benefits need to be provided to the administration 
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as “[b]ureaucracy and vested interests permeate the whole 
process“ (Caccavale 2005: 7). Being dependent on the collaboration 
of the administrative bodies, farmers have little leverage to avoid 
unlawful extra payments. Eventually, farmers know such procedures 
very well. One young medium farmer, who complained about 
pending administrative issues, reported:  
“You pay 2000 Somoni [ca. 310€] for certification. The price 
is the same from 1 to 5 hectare. The full sum goes to the raís 
of the land committee. He divides between jamoat and 
hukumat. The rest is for him. If you pay, the process is fast, 
otherwise slow” (upper Zarafshan 17.06.2011). 
Such investments require financial resources and sustained 
organizational efforts that many farmers are not able or not willing 
to take up.116 Financial resources theoretically are available from 
remittances; however there are principle difficulties to invest in the 
smallholder farm in the Zarafshan area. Interestingly, remittances 
from labour migration are rarely being invested in realizing the 
individual or family dehqon farm, as the project is simply not being 
considered profitable in the short run. Especially, as it is virtually 
impossible to invest in additional arable land. While some better off 
farmers acknowledged that buying land is potentially possible, 
smallholder farmers stated: “You cannot buy land. Even if you come 
home from Russia with 10’000$ you cannot buy land” (upper 
Zarafshan 18.06.2011).  
Calculating the costs involved in individual and family dehqon 
farming made most small and medium farm households in the 
Zarafshan Valley opt to remain as long as possible under the 
umbrella of the collective dehqon farm. Both local administration 
and farmers appeared to have very low incentives to shift the 
                                                          
116 Loans from financial institutions or NGO are potentially available, although 
contain immense interest rates of around 30% per annum. 
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present farm status. One better off farmer from the lower Zarafshan 
Valley summarizes:  
“Right now, being in the collective dehqon farm Shamsi 
Nasarov is better for me. The tax for 1 sakhm is 50 Somoni 
[ca. 7.75€] per year. For arenda land [leasehold land] it is 32 
Somoni [ca. 4.96€] per sotiq per year. The money is paid to 
the raís [chief] of the dehqon farm or to the brigadier either 
monthly or at the end of the year. I can pay in kind if I want” 
(Garibak, 01.05.2012).  
Regarding payments, there are ostensibly no incentives to leave the 
collective deqhon farm. Only households which are convinced of 
future sales and business may take the risk of higher taxes. Parts of 
tax payments have to be provided in advance, every month at least 
15 Somoni [ca. 2.32€] to the district administration [nohiya]. On top 
of this there would be the necessary pension fund contributions, 
minimal wages and increased costs for water and energy. Farmers 
in Garibak village reported that for individual and family dehqon 
farms increased input costs for electricity and irrigation are due 
(09.07.2011). Especially in the eyes of most smallholder farmers, the 
sum of such extra costs shifts the cost-benefit ratio of the dehqon 
farm project into the negative. “It is better to stay in the collective 
dehqon farm at the moment. Taxes per year are 40 Somoni [ca. 
6.20€] of unified standard tax per sakhm [land plot of 6 sotiq] that’s 
all” (Garibak 28.04.2012). The real costs for the individual dehqon 
farm are hardly to calculate and farmers know by experience that 
operational costs of are likely to increase. Another point adding to 
uncertainty are further collateral costs. One medium farmer 
explains: “The hukumat will force you to take part in stupid 
meetings, you need to contribute in kind to all kinds of gatherings 
and subscribe to several government newspapers” (lower Zarafshan 
28.04.2012). Such events cost time and money as the household is 
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obliged to contribute in one or another form. For this reason, 
another retired farmer advised his sons not to set up a private farm 
at the moment, because “the [individual or family] dehqon farms 
were asked to contribute to the new fountain in Panjakent, to pay 
for the construction of the [Roghun] dam,   117 to take over silk worm 
rearing in spring and the like more” (lower Zarafshan 08.05.2012). 
As the above example of pressure on meat prices show, state 
interferences in business are serious and cause strong risks to the 
livelihood of smallholder households. Against this background, 
farmers explained bluntly that for the time being it was much better 
to remain member of the collective dehqon farm as this means 
fewer expenses and less interference with government 
representatives. The above mentioned medium farmer from the 
lower Zarafshan are concludes: “So far it is not clever to leave the 
collective dehqon farm as there are too many costs and unintended 
interventions involved if you are an individual dehqon farmer” 
(08.05.2012). 
Summary: Crisis of Expertise 
The cases illustrated the crisis of agricultural expertise in the 
Zarafshan Valley. The individualization of agriculture had a 
significant impact on the presence and quality of knowledge in the 
Zarafshan Valley. Previously centralized knowledge and information 
structures deteriorated and are today only sporadically in modified 
forms available. Therefore, as a consequence, agricultural expertise 
that is linked to organizations, i.e. as in the case of the district 
                                                          
117 The national campaign to donate for the construction of the Roghun dam 
turned into compulsory levy for state employees, business men and other 
citizens with a supposedly above-average income. Private dehqon farmer are 
considered to belong to the latter group. The district administration and other 
state representatives required so called voluntary contributions of a full annual 
salary (Wikileaks 2010; Ergasheva 2010; Eurasianet 2010). 
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agroprom, is of disputable quality and poorly requested. Large 
swaths of agricultural expertise shifted from formerly public or 
semi-public domains to the local level of individualized farm 
households. However, shifting sources of agricultural expertise are 
only one part of the transformation of knowledge in the Zarafshan 
Valley. The individualization of agricultural production in the 
Zarafshan Valley caused also suspicion regarding the quality of 
information. The examples of seed potato selection and farmers’ 
considerations regarding the private dehqon farm underlined that 
many sources of agricultural expertise and advice are not 
considered reliable. Thus, a trusted relation to the source of 
knowledge is considered essential, as otherwise knowledge and 
information is hardly being implemented nor guides farmers 
operations. In consequence, the examples outline the 
transformation of rural epistemic cultures in the Zarafshan Valley, 
where not only sources of specialized knowledge change, but also 
the quality of expertise itself. Thus, farmers are required to inform 
themselves differently. Due to the generally difficult natural, 
economic and political environment to farming in the Zarafshan 
area, many households do not consider agriculture as the principal 
livelihood strategy anymore. Instead non-agricultural knowledge 
assets are requested to verify agricultural expertise, dealing with 
meshwork governance and the assemblage of political and 
economic processes in the realm of agriculture. Thus, farmers focus 
on other knowledge assets, poorly request expertise and remain 
reluctant to base decisions and investments on it.  
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7  Negotiating Normative Systems: Bobogi 
Access Arrangements  
This chapter exemplifies how a central issue for agricultural 
production, access to arable land, is negotiated in the Zarafshan 
Valley. Legally access to land is regulated by the Tajik land code. 
State organizations are in charge to implement and observe land 
reform legislation; however the respective authorities are only 
selectively present on local level. This means in the Zarafshan Valley 
that important for instance decisions regarding the access to land 
are not only taken in the framework of the land code, but also in 
different other forums under diverse normative signatures. Parallel 
and overlapping governance processes have some negative effects, 
i.e. unequal distribution of land, competition and conflicts among 
rural households and subsequently a high number of poor 
households.118 In the context of considerations regarding the 
potential foundation of the individual or family dehqon farm, the 
race for assets to land has further exacerbated. Due to the absent 
land market and officially finished land reform, which coerce any 
requests for land to follow subcutaneous strategies, Tajikistan is 
considered a case of limited access order (LAO). To realize access to 
additional land, farmers refer to many different organizations, 
institutions and processes, which are settled in different normative 
systems.  
This chapter outlines the presence of diverse normative systems in 
the Zarafshan Valley that structure local access to land and natural 
resources. Firstly, the example of bobogi arrangements is singled 
                                                          
118 See Table 4 above. Especially the few extraordinary large estates that came 
to existence in a number of communities lead to massive discontent. Basically, 
each village visited had a few households with large land plots, way above local 
average, at disposal. 
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out to discuss how normative systems determine local access to 
arable land. So called bobogi claims have been, and occasionally still 
are, in the Zarafshan Valley a common way to claim land on the 
basis of former belonging. The notion of bobogi refers to the 
previous ownership of a particular land plot and subsequently to 
claim its restitution. Bobogi arrangements have been important and 
widespread throughout the Zarafshan Valley especially in the 1990’s 
and 2000’s. Bobogi arrangements are not considered in the land 
reform legislation. They are partially disputed in local communities; 
however claim legitimacy from representing local values and 
moralities. The second part of the chapter argues that in the 
Zarafshan Valley at least three different normative systems can be 
identified which are brought forward in local governance processes: 
Norms related to Islam, norms related to the state and its 
organizations and norms derived from local values and moralities. 
Looking at access negotiation processes shows that there are 
various institutions, organizations and processes that offer 
governance. However, these institutions, organizations and 
processes are in a competitive relation to each other, eventually 
delivering highly variable access arrangements. Against this finding, 
the chapter concludes that access negotiations emerge as local 
meshwork governance, which builds on and integrates different 
normative systems, eventually enabling strong governance 
arrangements. Earlier parts of this chapter have been published 
elsewhere (Mandler 2013, 2015). 
Bobogi Access Arrangements: Values and Moralities 
In the Zarafshan Valley, land distribution processes did not 
exclusively follow the land reform legislation. Instead local 
negotiations had an important impact on access arrangements too. 
The rationale of the various Tajik land reforms foresaw the division 
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of collective land among the former employees of the collective 
farm enterprises. However, local land arrangements insisted on the 
individual belonging of land plots. One example for the latter 
arrangements is called bobogi, which literally means `from the 
grandfather’. The term implies the restitution of arable land plots to 
the supposedly previous proprietors.119 Bobogi arrangements are 
known and were implemented not only in the Zarafshan area, but 
also elsewhere in Tajikistan.120 The practice to re-claim the property 
of the ancestors is said to have started in the Zarafshan Valley 
during the late 1980s, when formerly resettled inhabitants returned 
from the northern low-land district Mastchohi Nav to their previous 
settlements in Kŭhistoni Mastchoh districts (Zevaco 2014: 159ff).121 
Former villagers and their descendants claimed that certain land 
plots were allegedly created or owned by their ancestors. On this 
basis massive land distribution occurred during the 1990s when re-
migration to Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district peaked and the newcomer 
claimed the restitution of former family property. Consequently, 
through the returning offspring of resettled families many villages in 
the Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district observed considerable demographic 
gains. In recent years however, due to the end of land distribution 
on the part of the collective dehqon farm and severe shortage of 
land, the inflow of people has diminished. For example, farmer 
                                                          
119 Bobogi requests may also refer to houses and other property. However, in the 
Zarafshan area the term was almost always used with regard to arable land.  
120 Comparable legendary stories of grandfathers involved in the distribution of 
land were reported also in Shahritus district, south Tajikistan, in April 2012. 
Supposedly, the institution bobogi is called differently in other parts of 
Tajikistan, e.g. azhdody – from the ancestors, bibigi – from the grandmother. The 
elaborations in this chapter refer mainly to the Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district. 
121 Similar to other mountainous valleys, the inhabitants of Kŭhistoni Mastchoh 
were during the Soviet Union focrefully resettled to uninhabited lowland areas 
in 1950’s and 60’s in order to cultivate cotton. The settlement area was in the 
northern lowlands of the Sughd province and was named Mastchohi Nav: The 
new Mastchoh. There, new settlements with identical names as in the 
mountainous Mastchoh were founded (Zevaco 2014). 
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Abdukosir, who returned to the Zarafshan Valley in 1992 together 
with other young men from Mastchohi Nav district122, explained: “It 
was our wish to come back to vatani bobogi [the homeland of the 
grandfathers]. We asked the hokim [district governor] for land and 
he gave us the land” (upper Zarafshan 18.06.2012).123 He admits 
that they had no documents or evidence of proof regarding their 
right to request certain land plots. People knew the family names, 
thus “local inhabitants didn’t say anything; they just returned the 
land of our grandfathers to us” (upper Zarafshan 18.06.2012). 
Nevertheless, there is actually no legal basis for bobogi requests. In 
the early 2000 years, the Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district administration 
[hukumat] based in Mehron village issued the order 201 [ukas, 
farmo] not to consider bobogi requests anymore (Madrushkat 
13.06.2012). However, bobogi requests continued to be dealt in 
different forums at various levels; locally, at district and even at 
national level. Important actors in the process decide about – and 
eventually implement – the distribution of land, such as the local 
raísi hodshagi dehqonon, e.g. the chief of local collective dehqon 
farm124, the jamoat land committee at municipality level and the 
hokim himself at district level. Requests were also communicated 
through village institutions, such as mosques, local committees and 
the board of elders. In some villages, requests for land were 
discussed at the majlisi umumi, the grand village meeting. 
                                                          
122 The young men deliberately chose their wives from the village of their 
forefathers with the intention to better integrate into local society.  
123 Young people from Mastchohi Nav were sent by their families to live in 
Kŭhistoni Mastchoh. There they issued requests on the previously possessed 
houses and arable land. Nowadays, people from Kŭhistoni Mastchoh do the 
same when they send some of their sons to settle in Zafarobod in the northern 
plains of Tajikistan.  
124 The chief of the local collective dehqon farm was elected on un-limited terms. 
If people wanted the chief to leave office, they request a meeting [maclisi	
umumi] and vote for a successor candidate. It was no anomaly to find chiefs of 
collective farms that were in charge since 20 years and more.  
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Nevertheless, the raís of the local dehqon farm and the district 
governor, the hokim, apparently had decisive influence on bobogi 
decisions. These actors dealt with the practical implementation of 
the request, i.e. eventually the local raís was in charge of granting 
access to land. Bobogi requests basically referred to the name of the 
family and its public acquaintance, as it was almost impossible to 
bring evidence in the form of documents. One elder farmer 
explains:  
“Old people know very well where the land plots are and 
how they were distributed. This information [regarding 
family land property] is passed through the generations. No 
documents were available or necessary. They [the board of 
elders] unite and discuss and finally decide unanimously” 
(Soosun 28.06.2012).  
The board of elders approves the legitimacy of bobogi claims. This 
institutional level may have been sufficient in most requests, so that 
the community ceded access to the respective household. Local 
communities align the institution of bobogi with common values, 
such as: Land is the private good of the family; one has to respect 
the ancestors, those who created the land plot should use it and so 
on. These principles reflect the common sense in the community 
and are hardly contradicted. Additionally, the spiritual attachment 
to the inherited family land is frequently emphasized and, in the 
sense of reference to the hard work of the forefathers and the 
divinity of the agricultural livelihood, it forms an argument of its 
own. Talking with two experienced farm advisers from the 
Zarafshan Valley, both underline that even during Soviet times land 
tenure patterns did not change:  
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“Bobogi land distribution is in place in the whole 
Mastchoh125 district. It is permitted and fair, as it was also in 
place during the time of the kolkhoz. People officially 
rendered their land to the kolkhoz; unofficially they 
continued to work their family land and paid taxes. [..] It is 
better that the law on land reform is not implemented here 
as it means civil war [..]. In Mastchoh you can’t do anything. 
How can you take from one and give to others?” (Ayni 
22.06.2011).  
Due to the harsh environmental conditions, in most cases arable 
land plots had to be made cultivable from dry and uneven mountain 
slopes. Thus, parts of the legitimacy of present days bobogi requests 
derives from the physical efforts of the grandfathers who created 
the land by levelling it, providing topsoil and irrigation. Legends of 
smart and hard-working grandparents are very popular among 
villagers. Such building stories apparently back the strong narrative 
of bobogi that is virtually shared by the majority of people in the 
Zarafshan area. I will come back to this point further below as this 
argument implies also a reference to religious values.   
Habitual Land Use and the Legacy of the Grand 
Parents 
Linking land plots with the own family history entails high legitimacy 
of access claims. In Kŭhistoni Mastchoh district bobogi requests 
refer either to a time right before the forced resettlement around 
1956, which would refer to already a situation of collectivized 
agriculture.126 Or it refers to pre-Soviet property structures before 
                                                          
125 In the local perception, the term Mastchoh indicates the whole area of the 
upper Zarafshan Valley, more or less starting after the city of Ayni.   
126 The collectivization of agriculture in the Zarafshan Valley took place during 
the 1940’s. There is a small museum maintained in Soosun village to remember 
a clerical from a local sacred family who was shot by the Soviets as basmachi in 
the course of the collectivisation.  
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circa 1920, thus about three generations ago? Both explanations are 
problematic. The first one would refer to a time of collective 
agriculture when officially only marginal private land plots were 
allowed (Eisener 1999; Rogowin 2006). The latter explanation points 
to a time period before 1920, thus more than 90 years ago, when 
the grandparents were infants. Furthermore, this disguises 
important changes that followed from Soviet policies between 1920 
and 30’s as well as the subsequent period of central farming and 
planning with its effect on land plots, irrigation and soils (Eisener 
1999). This implies that the reference of farmers in Mastchoh to 
their forefathers and ancestors not necessarily links to well-defined 
pre-Soviet property structures, but instead to a continuum of family 
business in the community. In fact, not all claimants of bobogi 
family land were able to claim particular plots built by their 
grandfathers, instead were satisfied with any suitable land available 
(Revomutk 18.06.2012). This implies that the institutions implicitly 
rest on a broader concept based on an “identity group coupled with 
private plots owned by a father and his sons (even married), which 
has been inherited from the past, [and that] has been repeated 
within the kolkhoz system” (Roy 1999: 113ff). Roy’s finding 
corroborates the structures found in the Zarafshan Valley today as 
mentioned in the quote above. Farmers, at least partially, 
maintained a sense of belonging through the continuance of land 
and property use during Soviet collective agriculture and post-Soviet 
privatization. While former land tenure of grandparents may be 
questionable, the current, habitual and everyday connection with 
land plots is not. Similar to family legacy, farmers underline habitual 
use to support access claims for land. Such claims are corroborated 
by the personal efforts and inputs made throughout the kolkhoz and 
post-kolkhoz period. Thus, for example, an apricot gardener 
successfully claimed land use rights of the former kolkhoz fruit 
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garden where he worked all his life (mid Zarafshan 11.06.2011). 
Similarly managed the former employees of a weather station in 
another village to maintain control over the adjoin land (upper 
Zarafshan 14.06.2012). Thus, plausible requests for land can be 
developed through narratives mixing family history and habitual use 
(Boboyorov 2013a: 137ff, 197ff; 2016; Roy 1999). The following 
brief account of the arrival of the Russian teacher in an upper 
Zarafshani village sheds light on how bobogi arrangements are still 
infiltrated in community affairs today. 
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 Intersection: Mualimi Russi and his Wife  
The new Russian teacher [mualimi russi] came two years ago from 
Mastchohi Nav district where he grew up to this village. He works 
two hectare of land and garden as bobogi from his family, i.e. land 
that he took with reference to his grandparents as previous 
proprietors. Actually, the land was used by his sister, but taken from 
her, also because her husband is not present in the village. The 
neighbour who informs us on the story of mualimi russi underlines 
that the sisters’ children are now without land. Accepting the 
request for bobogi land was an exception, says the school director, 
because the village needed a Russian teacher. His wife in Mastchohi 
Nav did not want to move to this village. Therefore he found himself 
a second wife in the city of Panjakent. The new wife, who arrived 
together with her children, thought this village was a city, just like 
Panjakent. Her first husband is in Russia and did not call since the 
children were born (upper Zarafshan 17.06.2011). 
 
Photograph 9  The Panjakent wife with her daughter. Source: The 
author. 
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Conflict, Mistrust, Legitimization 
Despite the actual period of bobogi arrangements in the 1990’s and 
2000 has been passed, the example of the Russian teacher shows 
that bobogi arrangements occasionally continue to happen. 
Acceptance for the institution of bobogi prevails in the Zarafshan 
area; however concrete bobogi requests are stirring up conflicts 
among villagers. While core values of bobogi is a family, homeland, 
hard work or the respect to forefathers are generally agreed, 
practical implications of bobogi are not easily accepted because 
they already created severe inequality of access to natural 
resources. Farmers are well aware that bobogi restitutions are 
contradicting state legislation and, if applied, affect individual and 
communal livelihoods. Additionally, rural dwellers understood that 
references to these values may be manipulated and contradictive. 
Many farmers questioned during informal conversations the 
legitimacy of bobogi arrangements, as they feel outsmarted by a 
few elite families within the community. The reference to the 
underage children deprived of their heritage in the case of mualimi 
russi provides evidence for farmers’ sensitivity. However, as long as 
local elites favour particular arrangements, as expressed by the 
school director, alternative arrangements are still possible. 
Accordingly, some farmers linked bobogi to money, indicating that it 
is just a cover for corruption: “Bobogi comes with money” 
(Madrushkat 01.07.2011). For one farmer who earlier benefited 
from bobogi himself, it is just a means of additional income for 
elites. Bobogi requests are made up by powerful persons that are 
using the narrative to succeed in local governance processes and 
achieve implementation. Another young man who partially studies 
in Dushanbe and works on his parents’ farm, expressed the way of 
manipulating arrangements as a long term project to accumulate 
power:   
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“You get bobogi by requesting it. Then you need pusht 
[background, A.M.]. Then you also need money, not to buy 
things but to appear important, to build your reputation of 
being boi [rich] and important. And then your word will have 
value, this allows you to speak” (upper Zarafshan 
01.07.2011). 
Thus, addressing the important and delicate issue of access to land 
requires skills and some kind of status-adjusted preparation to 
potentially realize success in access negotiations. It is common 
sense among farmers that governance processes are closed by elites 
and rigged by their interests. Depending on the situation in the 
locality, land access negotiations may be dominated by one elite 
group or subject of discussion in elite competitions. Respectively, 
smallholder farmers approach to such processes must be adequate. 
In the present context, this either means being ready to make 
payments or submitting to patronage networks. One smallholder 
farmer soberly summarizes the perspectives for bobogi requests in 
his community: “Of course it is not according to the law if I want 
land somewhere, but of course, I give the money and I get the land” 
(upper Zarafshan 05.07.2011). Due of such unlawful practices, that 
vividly contradict local values, the legitimacy of the institution 
bobogi has been repeatedly questioned throughout the Zarafshan 
Valley. Incoming claims today are considered usually as “not fair”, 
“painful” (Madrushkat 02.07.2011; 15.06.2012) and normally 
refused.127 Questions are raised about the justice and fairness of 
land distribution that favours a few people, while “according to 
                                                          
127 Such requests create discontent. The chief of the village mahalla committee 
somewhat bitterly summarized the matter: “There are people who request 
bobogi, but they are not getting it. It hurts a little bit, because we work hard and 
pay taxes and they come and want to take it. There are still coming people from 
Mastchohi Nav, but they just build some small houses like datcha [bungalow]. 
They stay only for some months here in summer” (upper Zarafshan 
13.06.2012). 
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Islam all people should benefit equally from the land” (Revomutk 
16.06.2011). In some communities farmers mentioned that also the 
local mullah spoke out against the legitimacy of bobogi 
arrangements (Revomutk 15.06.2011). Earlier, during the early post-
Soviet transition period of the 1990’s, strong local institutions such 
as bobogi compensated these shortcomings by providing gradually 
security where otherwise insecurity prevailed. Especially in the 
years after national independence, this meant quite a lot as local 
forums that provided decisions and ensured their implementation 
changed frequently. Bobogi arrangements showed in this regard 
strength as they were decided, implemented and maintained. 
Eventually, to avoid questions about underhand dealings, in the 
curse of the latest land reform many beneficiaries of bobogi 
arrangements have certified their land plots at the jamoat and 
district authorities and thus legalized their access rights. 
Subsequently, earlier bobogi land distributions cannot be 
questioned anymore.  
Mobilizing Religion: Relating Bobogi Arrangements to 
Islam 
Local rhetoric puts the institution of bobogi implicitly and explicitly 
next to Islamic justice and practice. However, households with only 
marginal access to land find it difficult to accept this argumentation. 
One young farmers’ critic refers to religion that in his perspective 
teaches equality: “What happens here is not according to Islam” 
(upper Zarafshan 16.06.2011). Religious values are substantially 
supported by villagers; however it is apparent that some references 
to Islam are simply used to support individual claims. Mistrust is 
voiced towards bobogi requests, because “people just say it, but 
they lie” says a young farmer from Madrushkat village (13.06.2012). 
It is commonly understood that sometimes individuals are using 
religious references just to enhance their private claims. Although 
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people find such bigotry inopportune, linking up with Islam is 
however an efficient support for own claims. This affirms the case of 
one powerful villager, who is considered rich and important as he 
used to be part of the Soviet nomenclature and who is active also 
today in different committees and boards in the village and at sub-
regional level. Nobody in the village expressed much sympathy for 
him, allegedly because he is considered an unbeliever [kofir] whom 
one cannot trust: “Yes, he cites the Qur’an and prays at the end of 
the meal in Arabic, but it is a game, he knows the rules” (mid 
Zarafshan 11.06.2011). Thus, there is a clear sense for the possible 
manipulation of religious statements. The same way suspicion was 
articulated that bobogi decisions are in favour of persons coming 
from Mastchohi Nav because they are able to tell a “story” 
(Revomutk 28.06.2012). When talking about bobogi arrangements, 
the repeated reference to the alleged quality of the ancestors 
points in fact towards the manifestation of power by establishing a 
strong narrative. Presenting a plausible narrative in favour or 
against a particular request appears to be crucial for the involved 
parties. Highlighting the significance of the own ancestors and 
demonstrating individual religious determination contributes to 
establishing a powerful reputation within the community. The 
display of an orthodox lifestyle128 appears convincing; it allows to 
question competitors’ relations to values and moralities especially, 
in particular as some the ostentatious strong believers are also 
economically successful.129 The reason for that is the positive 
                                                          
128 This means dressing in Afghan or Pakistan style, attending the mosque five 
times a day, being severe with household members and publicly following an 
Islamic lifestyle.  
129 Making Islamic lifestyle explicit is a strategy to deal with government bodies. 
Demonstrating the own dedication to Islam as a party member of the Islamic 
Renaissance Party or cultivating martial rhetoric’s or behaviour was at the time 
of the field research effective to somewhat scare off power organs (see: 
Dudoignon and Qalandar 2014; Zevaco 2014: 174).   
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narrative of the hard working family, right belief and prosperity 
holds true inversely. Land shortage and poverty are likely to be 
explained as results from personal or family shortcomings in the 
past. Not every household in the community was able to build 
successful bobogi requests on the aforementioned grandfathers. 
“Other people don’t have bobogi land because their grandfather 
didn’t work but slept” (Revomutk 18.06.2012). In Zarafshani 
communities, household poverty is likely attributed to grandfathers 
who played cards or contentious daughters in law130 who fought 
with others instead of working. In this regard the reputation of a 
grandfather and the diligence of the respective family are highly 
important. Supposed laziness and gambling of grandfathers are 
important arguments during unfolding governance processes 
regarding access to certain plots of arable land. In this regard, poor 
households are not considered eligible for receiving bobogi land as 
the family is not up to common moralities. Poverty, and therewith 
unequal distribution of land, is explained deterministic. Talking with 
a better off farmer and bigoted layman indicates how adamant such 
negotiations are conducted on local level. “The poor are not poor, 
they go to Russia instead. They build big houses. You have to work, 
to think, to use the brain, then also 10 sotiq will be enough” (upper 
Zarafshan 18.06.2011). With reference to the claims of the poor 
farmers about unjustified land distribution, including his own large 
bobogi property, he continues: “May their face turn black! Who has 
no land owns livestock! Many people lie! Rizq [a concept of 
individual fortune and destiny in Islam] is everywhere the same, 
independent from owning 5 sotiq or 5 hectare” (upper Zarafshan 
18.06.2011). Thus, eventually the unequal distribution of arable 
land is displayed as individual destiny. It is tangible how poverty and 
                                                          
130 In the Zarafshan Valley the daughter in law kelin, moves into the household 
of the spouse where she is responsible of cooking, housekeeping, taking care of 
offsprings, lower field work etc. 
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poor people are stigmatized – and partially stigmatize themselves – 
as bad Muslims. Several times I observed how explicitly negative 
rhetoric and crude theories were employed to corroborate the 
unique role of Islam. Such discourses are called amri mar’uf. It starts 
mostly trivial to then link common phenomena with Islamic 
explanations. This works apparently well to frighten and pressure 
farmers to shift to a more religious daily life: “Why don’t Tajik 
people develop? Because Tajik people are bad; people here are no 
good believers” (upper Zarafshan 17.06.2012). The rhetoric to 
denounce the Tajik people or entire communities as bad Muslims, 
who are punished by God with severe living and working conditions, 
was an often heard statement, communicated by ordinary villagers, 
i.e. laymen, not the local mullahs. Talking randomly about religious 
affairs and linking them to daily life is called amri ma’ruf and 
became popular since the end of the Soviet Union.131 Due to the 
sheer daily workload or work outside the village, ordinary farmers 
and especially poor people do not manage to attend mosque 
service five times a day. Thus, they miss the opportunity to make 
individual religious practices explicit and fail the opportunity to 
establish an orthodox reputation.  
These examples indicate already the interest of some actors to 
display the institution of bobogi as representation of Islamic 
orthodoxy, the basis of local values and moralities. Despite bobogi 
may lack a theological foundation, linkage to Islamic values is made 
through reference to the importance of ancestors in the popular 
understanding of Qur’an. Bobogi is considered as a legitimate 
representation of important Islamic values such as family, heritage 
                                                          
131 Amri	ma’ruf	kardan – laymen talk about the Qur’an in order to convince 
people about Islam. It is a try to proselytize, hastily campaigning for Islam, but 
without real convincing. In the Zarafshani sub-region some typical stories were 
circulating, e.g. scientific discoveries or future political developments already 
prescribed in the Qur’an. Some of these narrative topoi are often aggressive and 
partially beyond the limits of Tajik politeness (upper Zarafshan 28.06.2012).  
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and respect of the ancestors. These values are presented as 
consensual moralities (Stephan 2010) that shape everyday reality 
and constitute the local social order. The explicit reference to the 
grandfathers and the religiously accumulated respect towards 
ancestors leads to depicting bobogi as Islamic institution – which is 
hard to contest in rural areas. Thus, the extensive demonstration of 
religious values and lifestyle served many villagers to enhance and 
justify their individual claims. People, who sustained the institution 
of bobogi, presented themselves as severe Muslims, particularly 
attentive to Islamic daily routines, as the five-time per day religious 
services at the mosque. Distinctively pious individuals are very much 
present in today’s village affairs and did benefit – in my perception 
– comparably more from bobogi arrangements than others. 
Emphasizing Islamic lifestyle helps to legitimize decisions, even 
retroactively, as practiced in the case of valutating grandfathers in 
the case of bobogi decisions. As above indicated, this refers to the 
many occasions in the village, where individual or collective action is 
commented mainly from a lay understanding of Islamic dogmatism 
[amri mar’uf], which turn out, with respect to governance 
processes, to be significant statements in today’s village affairs.  
Kalidi Islom 
So to say, a maximum of clarity in resource governance processes 
was reached through the previous institution kalidi Islom [Tajik: 
Islamic key] which for a period determined local disputes. After Tajik 
national independence some communities adopted an arbitration 
procedure called kalidi Islom132 that was practiced in order to settle 
land disputes over access to land. Today, kalidi Islom is anecdotically 
remembered and appears to be outdated and not in use anymore. 
The institution kalidi Islom functioned to determine legitimate 
                                                          
132 Literally in Tajik: The key of Islam. 
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claims; particularly in contradicting bobogi cases where different 
ancestors were said to have been the cultivators of the respective 
piece of land. Thus, kalidi Islom and bobogi are closely related to 
each other. Both institutions were not just local phenomena, but 
known also elsewhere in Tajikistan (Sayyod 29.03.2012). Kalidi Islom 
started a procedure to decide true and justified bobogi claims. The 
procedure kalidi Islom entailed that the protagonists, i.e. the bobogi 
claimants for the same piece of land, are asked to each hold a key 
tied into the book of Yoshin of Qur’an with one finger, as displayed 
in the figure below.  
 
Photograph 10  Re-enacting the procedure of kalidi Islom. Source: The 
author. 
Whilst holding the book and repeating prayers of the book of 
Yoshin, the piece of land went to whom the Qur’an finally turned its 
front side. Although much criticized and sometimes refused by 
villagers, the procedure was practiced throughout the Zarafshan 
Valley. As a strict religious practice, kalidi Islom permitted 
immediate interference in land use disputes; because the ordained 
rationale was hard to contest.133 It derived legitimacy from being an 
                                                          
133 Also single fruit trees were declared as holy objects and thus confiscated for 
the benefit of the mosque or particular mullahs (Revomutk 20.06.2011; 
Madrushkat 05.07.2011).  
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Islamic institution, referring to an uncontested system of values and 
believes. However, at present times the procedure is commonly 
considered obsolete. One farmer in Revomutk village stated that in 
his villages the practice of kalidi Islom was abandoned only after the 
local mullah, who was in favour of kalidi Islom, passed away 
(20.06.2011). Nevertheless, the practice of kalidi Islom enabled for a 
certain period binding decisions build on the shared narrative of 
universal validity of Islam.  
Local Governance through Parallel Normative Systems  
Against the fact that bobogi arrangements are bypassing the legal 
framework and state land reform regulations, it becomes apparent 
that in the Zarafshan Valley alternative normative systems are 
present, which guide local governance processes. Bobogi 
arrangements build on a mix of Islamic values, local traditions and 
moralities. Tentatively, there are three different normative systems 
in present Zarafshan Valley that have a stake in negotiating 
agricultural matters: Norms related to Islam, norms related to the 
state organizations and norms deriving from local values and 
moralities. Although the institution bobogi is contradicting the state 
land reform, these arrangements are de facto in place, providing an 
example for the parallel and overlapping presence of the different 
normative systems. The following sub-chapter provides examples of 
how different institutions, organizations and processes are put 
forward in the Zarafshan Valley to influence agricultural decisions. 
These insights show that different regulation processes are parallel 
in place and overlap, which refer to diverse normative systems, i.e. 
to the state, to Islam, local customs etc. This situation explains why 
various communal institutions, virtually the entire community, are 
involved to regulate and implement important agricultural 
decisions. Due to the intransparent distribution of power and 
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authority it is necessary to consider the various normative systems 
and related organizations, institutions and processes, also those not 
immediately linked to agriculture. Their decisions eventually 
determine about the implementation, i.e. distribution of resources. 
Subsequently, local farmers navigate the different forums, i.e. 
institutions, organizations and processes, however with different 
success.   
Selective Presence of State Organizations in Local 
Agricultural Matters 
It has been mentioned earlier in the chapters above that the state 
administration and its organizations are only partially present in 
rural affairs. That means that important disputes as access to 
natural resources, input and markets are purposefully left with the 
communities, thus they are not solved through state organizations 
and procedures, as it is suggested by the land reform legislation. 
The above presented case of bobogi arrangements confirms that 
the state authorities in the Zarafshan Valley are either not willing to 
interfere, or not considered adequate by the local community. State 
organizations rarely interfere in local agricultural matters. Everyday 
farming matters are addressed on local level and usually solved 
there. State authorities use various pre-texts134 not to interfere in 
local affairs, referring to the lack of funds to travel to the 
countryside (agroprom) or insisting on local subsidiarity.135 
Authorities are often not interested in getting involved in local 
                                                          
134 Often authorities refere to the lack of resources to travel or the respect of 
local institutions as tinji and kishlokdori.  
135 Farmers stated repeatedly that authorities avoid getting involved in certain 
types of local conflicts as related to access arrangements, ensuring civil rights 
or economic agreements. It depends on the power and networks of the single 
farm household to mobilize the administration to act.  
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conflicts136 as this provides no benefits, just additional workload and 
trouble. The passive role of the district and sub-district 
administration became evident in the reluctant implementation of 
land reform, where the respective organizations “simply don’t care” 
(Madrushkat 12.06.2012). However, state authorities interfere 
selectively in rural matters. Sub-district authorities [jamoat] are 
active and visible in solving violent conflicts or implementing 
particular requests from the central government as eventually the 
establishment of individual dehqon farms. Though, there is very 
little predictability when and how the district level government 
[hukumat] in Ayni, Mehron or Panjakent actually will interfere in 
local agricultural affairs. Several powerful state institutions and 
organizations operate in rural areas that receive authority from 
straight links to the `power organs´ as military, police and the 
KGB.137 Smallholder farmers often in vain seek to enrol state 
organizations in their concerns, while authorities act in favour of 
elites who can afford underhand payments or are linked through 
patronage networks. The following scheme of administrative 
structures and local insititutions recapitulates the various actors 
present in the Zarafshan Valley as described in chapter three. Figure 
4 displays some key organizations and institutions from local level to 
municipal [jamoat], i.e. state administrative, level.  
 
                                                          
136 As outlined above, in the case of civil law cases local institutions and 
organizations seek to keep the state administration out of rural affairs. 
137 The Tajik State Committee for National Security (GKNB), the successor 
agency of the Soviet KGB, is still commonly referred to simply as KGB.  
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Figure 4  Scheme of administrative and local governance structures in the 
Zarafshan Valley. Source: The author. 
Institutions and Processes  
It appears that the bulk of agrarian affairs in the Zarafshan Valley is 
dealt with by local institutions such as the raísi mahalla [chief of the 
local neighbourhood association], the shuroi deha [village council], 
the majlisi umumi [grand community assembly], but also the 
oqsaqol [local facilitator and arbitrator of marriages, divorces, 
conflicts, etc.] and the board of elders. The board of elders is a 
widespread institution in the Zarafshan area, i.e. a gathering of 
elderly male persons in the local tea house, klub, or mosque to 
discuss and evaluate village actions and policies.138 Although, the 
board of elders is not sanctioning body, however it can be an 
                                                          
138 In some villages existed a kind of female pendant to the tea house called 
komiteti sanho. However, I rarely saw this in action. Institutions as the women 
committee, which at time of the field research still existed in many 
communities,  appear to lose influence on general village affairs. Such changes 
result from an emerging Islamic lifestyle, which does not foresee a public role 
for women.  
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important voice as it presents local traditions and ethics which 
concerns also the decision making on agricultural matters, as 
displayed in the case of bobogi requests. Interestingly, the ordinary 
mullahs or the domullah, as the main mullah of the village, usually 
did not play a prominent role in everyday decision making.139 Only 
in the case of the kalidi Islom procedure a straight link between 
decision making and Islam was acknowledged. Throughout the 
Zarafshan Valley religious authorities did not appear legitimized or 
interested in interfering in agricultural matters. References to 
Islamic values are consensus throughout the Zarafshan Valley. With 
regard to southern Tajikistan, Boboyorov confirms:  
“[T]raditional authorities, such as elders and religious 
notables [..] enforce indigenous institutional arrangements 
to regulate local political structures, control access to land 
and provide socio-political stability, and they also refer to 
indigenous sources of legitimacy which often contradict the 
principles set by formal sources such as laws” (Boboyorov 
2013a: 40).  
This finding applies to the Zarafshan area as well. Islamic values are 
very much present in everyday governance processes, to a degree 
that perceived illegitimate governance decisions and 
implementations are publicly contested as being “unfair” and “not 
according to Islam” (upper Zarafshan 20.06.2011). However, even 
though local mullahs or the domullah disagreed with communal 
affairs, particular processes and decisions, i.e. bobogi decisions, 
their statements did not cause a reconsideration of access 
arrangements. Thus, the legitimization through Islamic institutions 
on local level is an asset in governance processes; however it is no 
veto-argument. Conflicts over agricultural matters in Zarafshani 
                                                          
139 Often, the heads of important families are involved in village affairs, as they 
present themselves as proper institution.   
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communities are handled by a variety of institutions. Issues over 
land and water, but also the cutting trees etc. among nearby 
households will certainly involve the raísi mahalla [chief of the local 
neighbourhood association] or the village oqsaqol respectively. 
However, especially economically relevant issues are not easily 
solved on this level. Usually, the inferior party will proceed to other 
structures that potentially provide governance. A central institution 
in the community is the grand community assembly, majlisi umumi, 
which takes place in each village one or two times a year. All 
inhabitants may request additional majlisi when necessary. Typically 
only male will attend and may speak up to request decisions to be 
made. Village elites, not necessarily play a prominent role at such 
assemblies. Rather, the majlisi umumi appears to be the place to 
publicly criticize elites and administration. In many cases the 
discussion of decisions taken ends in follow-up discussions at other 
forums, so that the implementation of decisions massive is 
postponed or completely neglected (Madrushkat 13.06.2012). Elite 
figures even publicly reject majlisi decisions or simply refuse 
implementation. Thus, in most communities visited in the Zarafshan 
Valley the majlisi umumi did not give the impression of providing 
powerful decisions and ensuring their implementation. However, in 
Madrushkat village for example, people agreed in an earlier majlisi 
umumi village assembly around 2005 not to accept bobogi requests 
anymore. People explicitly spoke out against the institution: “Bobogi 
is not according to law and not according to shari’ah [..] the 
majority of people will be harmed by bobogi, as it will only make a 
few people rich” (Madrushkat 05.07.2011). Effectively, only a few 
cases of bobogi distribution were mentioned in this village. 
Reportedly, requests for land restitution were denied with 
reference to the earlier community decision and distribution was 
then conducted according to the land reform legislation.  
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“Last year, 2010, a person from Kŭhistoni Nav came to the 
village with a truck load of building material and occupied a 
piece of land that belonged to his grandfather. He unloaded 
everything there. The respective land plot is leasehold 
[arenda] of a local farmer. Consequently the sub-district 
[jamoat] organized a village meeting [majlisi umumi] were 
the majority of villagers approved that bobogi is not valid in 
this village” (Madrushkat 05.07.2011).  
In this case, the respective farmer was able to mobilize public 
support and effectively enforced the ruling attitude on how to 
distribute natural resources. As a matter of fact, the public 
neglecting of bobogi arrangements resulted in less social tensions 
expressed in this community in comparison to other villages nearby.   
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Intersection: Darvonho, Guard of the Graveyard 
One villager, Mirzadi*, denounced another villager, Darvonho, head 
of a rather poor household and guard of the village grave yard 
[posboni kabriston], to the district ecology department by writing a 
complaint letter [ariza]. In that, Darvonho is accused to cut some 
dead, dried up trees that were on the land of the graveyard. Since 
the local pump station burned, the area of the graveyard is not 
irrigated anymore, so the trees had been dried up several years ago. 
Darvonho admits to have cut the trees, although this happened in 
accordance with the community which he had addressed before 
whether to chop the trees or not. After chopping the trees, the 
wood was distributed among villagers. However, the letter writer 
wrote about it to the ecology department and consequently the 
guard was fined to pay the enormous sum of 43’000 Somoni [ca. 
6718 €]. Since it was impossible for Darvonho to pay this amount of 
money, he faced either to go to jail or to sell the house. In order to 
defend the position of the guard the villagers requested an 
extraordinary village assembly [majlisi umumi] to discuss the case. 
At the meeting, one representative from the ecology department, 
the chief of the jamoat and representatives of community 
committees sat on the plenum. Everybody knew who wrote the 
letter, however the person himself, Mirzadi, didn’t show up. Mirzadi 
is a powerful elite figure in the village with excellent contacts to the 
district government hukumat. The majlisi umumi declined the letter 
of Mirzadi and he was requested to withdraw the letter. Eventually 
it was decided that the guard shall not pay the sum. A few days later 
I learned that Mirzadi declined to withdraw the letter and that the 
further decision is somewhere stalled at another committee in the 
hukumat [district government]. Events were unfolding rapidly and it 
was not really clear what is the state of affairs. It turned out that the 
fine to the guard was significantly reduced: “The case is now at 
another committee, nobody knows what happens next. Maybe he 
has to pay less. It was first stated that he had cut 64 trees, but it is  
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The Village Council Shuroi Deha  
The example of the Darvonho case illustrates that the majlisi umumi 
has restricted means to solve conflicts timely and completely. At 
least, the majlisi reshapes the issue, bringing it potentially closer to 
a solution. Thus, the conflict moves in a modified form on to other 
governance structures. As mentioned earlier above, since circa 2011 
the village council shuroi deha has been introduced in the lower 
Zarafshan Valley on request of the district government. Due to the 
backing of the district and sub-district administration, the shuroi 
deha is understood to concentrate local affairs and substitute other 
local institutions. However, the shuroi deha is no direct government 
organization as its members and its chief are locally elected. The 
institution is widely diffused in Zarafshani communities. In some 
communities it substitutes the previous existing committeti kishlok 
and runs commonly under this name (Madrushkat 15.06.2012). In 
practice however, the shuroi deha appears an elite committee, 
formed of the important figures of the community. It consists 
predominantly of male, between 45 and 60 years. In Garibak village, 
the acting chair of the shuroi deha explains that the village council 
exists on suggestion of the raísi jamoat [sub-district chief] since 
2011. It exists supposedly in every village, because “it is ‘by law’. 
The hukumat supports it. The raísi jamoat came and invited the 
most active people of the village and advised them to form this 
now only four” (28.04.2012). So, the issue is likely to be solved with a 
significantly reduced payment to the ecology department and a 
communal collection of money to support Darvonho with the due 
payment (Garibak 26.04.2012, 28.04.2012).   
* Names have been changed 
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committee” (04.05.2012). During the inaugural meeting the chair of 
the village council [raísi shuroi deha] was elected by acclamation, he 
then invited successively around 30 people to participate in the 
council (Garibak 04.05.2012).140 The significance of the village 
council is commonly accepted: “The most important committee is 
the shuroi deha. It had earlier fifteen members, now between thirty 
and thirty-two. Also women and the different mahallas [domkom] 
are represented” (Garibak 07.05.2012). Regular meetings take place 
once a month, all members have to attend and “only proper excuses 
are accepted” (Garibak 04.05.2012). Nevertheless, the structure of 
the organization may vary throughout the Zarafshan Valley; there 
seems no fixed number of board members. In Madrushkat village 
one member of the shuroi deha stated: “There are eight persons, 
including two women. We meet about one time per month” 
(15.06.2012). Also in this village, important figures of village affairs 
were requested by the municipality [jamoat] to enter the shuroi 
deha. This precondition helped to enhance the significance of the 
institution. The chair of Garibak’s village council explains: 
“People go to their neighbourhood association [mahalla] 
with written complains [ariza] or suggestions and request 
for some action, for instance the channel cleaning procedure 
is too slow because nobody shows up at hashar [voluntary 
                                                          
140 In the village Garibak, it was made clear that this new organization shall 
summarize the existing governance structures in the community. The chiefs of 
the 8 local mahallas [in this village called domkom] and the chief of mahalla 
committee, total 9 persons, were requested to take part in the new village 
council. Similarly the chief of the still existent collective dehqon farm, the sub-
district chief [raísi	jamoat], the post-telegrafčik [local communications officer], 
the chief of the communal forest or rangeland administration [raísi	leskhoz], the 
director of the school, one representative of the local police [miliz] and, as the 
chair of the committee continuous “other active people, as well as 5 to 6 women 
which I cannot remember who exactly, and people that have good knowledge of 
their field or in general” (Garibak 04.05.2012). Thus, active people are 
considered those with a function or some public role. 
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neighbourhood work]. Such kinds of messages are processed 
to me and I negotiate a solution” (Garibak 04.05.2012). 
Ideally, the chair of the village council negotiates with the support 
of other council members practical issues of everyday community 
life such as infrastructure maintenance, implementation of orders 
from the district authorities141 but also cases of violence and 
difficult requests of divorce. In contrast to the mahalla [local 
neighbourhood association] the village council deals with issues that 
potentially concern the entire community. While the mahalla 
negotiates tasks and problems among immediate neighbours within 
village quarters, the shuroi deha is addressed if a solution cannot be 
found on this level. Among the issues that are being dealt with are 
also conflicts resulting from the negotiation of access to land. 
Complains are also referring to the incorrect distribution of land 
during previous land reforms or unjustified bobogi requests. Such 
complicated issues tend not being solved in this framework. Also 
the shuroi deha is not able to solve the Darvonho case. For land 
related conflicts lacks both, the basis for decision making, i.e. 
following state laws or local rules. Further, the institution lacks the 
necessary authority to implement eventual decisions. Thus, the 
shuroi deha carefully limits itself by protracting or avoiding certain 
cases. Respectively, it could not be identified which village 
institution actually had taken the decision of the bobogi restitution 
to the above mentioned Russian teacher. It appears that the issue of 
authority is yet to clear within the village council. While in some 
villages the shuroi deha seemed to work efficiently thanks to the 
chief’s individual authority. In other villages it did not became clear 
how the council generate authority within the community but also 
                                                          
141 Tasks of the shuroi	deha may be to take measures against a rabies epidemic 
in the village or collecting money from villagers for joint projects and 
investments, e.g. the provision of electricity or the repair of a burned pump 
station (Madrushkat 12.06.2012; Garibak 15.05.2012). 
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towards the own members and villagers. The means of the chair of 
the village council to exercise power in order to implement 
democratic decisions are not specified. The facilitation of decisions 
and their implementation, thus real governance results, significantly 
depends on the capacities of the chair of the organization. 
Consequently, I later learnt that the chair of the shuroi deha had 
just stepped back from his post on disputes regarding the access to 
land and water, complaining that “nobody is listening to me” 
(Garibak 08.06.2012).  
 
Photograph 11  Asleddin, the former chief of the village committee. 
Source: The author. 
Local Governance and Shift of Authority 
Competences and actions of local institutions and organizations 
overlap; however they are often not able to provide coherent 
decisions and implementation of decisions. Case-wise, decisions are 
being made or protracted; processes that lead to decisions are not 
transparent. Posing a request to district or local organizations is an 
unpredictable endeavour as availability and assertiveness of boards, 
institutions or processes are intransparent. The actual constitution 
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of institutions and organizations; persons present and their capacity 
to ensure the implementation of decisions are neither fixed nor 
transparent. In consequence, one and the same request for access 
to land may turn out completely different. Accordingly, it did not 
become clear in which institution the actual decision regarding the 
restitution of bobogi in the case of the Russian teacher has been 
taken. In the respective village, the chief of the collective dehqon 
farm was rich and considered very powerful. Assumingly, he 
approved the access arrangements made for the Russian teacher.  
Taking the position of the chief [raís] of the local collective 
agricultural enterprise as example, the position has been usually 
very important in rural communities, in fact it served as post-Soviet 
equivalent to the former kolkhoz chief. The position enables 
operational powers over resources, long-term influence on village 
development and establishes contacts to state structures and other 
relevant people. Often the chief of the dehqon farm appears as 
mayor of the community, thus contact person for village outsiders, 
which is an ideal condition for own business activities. However, in 
recent years the post lost attractiveness as it provides only minimal 
direct material benefits. It depends massively on the material 
background and individual reputation to be considered a leader in 
community. One farmer explained bluntly why he refuses to 
become chief of the collective dehqon farm: „Without money your 
speech is of no value“ (upper Zarafshan 15.06.2011). The straight 
relation between wealth and reputation was underlined several 
times in various circumstances. Farmers explained they were not 
wealthy enough to establish good relations with the hukumat and 
jamoat. Personal authority and reputation derives from family 
background, individual character and the capacity to mobilize 
resources. Higher ranking authorities possess plenty of means to 
hinder the action and initiatives in the village. It is expected that for 
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any agreement with higher authorities financial contributions fall 
due. Consequently the raís will need to invest private money to get 
things done at higher levels while otherwise villagers will reject the 
weak raís (upper Zarafshan 15.06.2011). Thus, suitable and popular 
candidates, but without sufficient financial resources will usually not 
apply for such posts (Bliss 2011: 47). The capacities of the raís are 
considered through his performance at village meetings, his mode 
of keeping promises and managing the remaining assets of the 
collective dehqon farm. A village chief is expected to present 
political projects and realized them at least partially. During field 
research I came twice across chiefs of collective dehqon farms who 
were apparently not as powerful and assertive as it has been the 
case in other villages. Given the described challenges, the position 
as chief of the dehqon farm was in some villages not considered 
attractive and powerful local elite figures deliberately abstained 
from the position. Thus, with respect to access negotiations the 
local governance situation is in fact confuse in the Zarafshan Valley. 
Field research shows that there are communities where strong 
elites maintain formally collective structures. However, field 
research provided also several examples where persons resigned 
from positions as chiefs of dehqon farms and village committees as 
these were deprived of authority (upper Zarafshan 19.06.2011). 
One former chief of the committeti kishlok justified his resignation 
from the post soberly: “Nobody listened to my words” (lower 
Zarafshan 28.04.2012).  
Summary: Access Arrangements as Meshwork 
Governance  
Summarizing the above, in the Zarafshan Valley there is not one 
dominant authority in agricultural matters. Instead, taking the 
example of agricultural access negotiations shows the assemblage 
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of diverse arrangements, referring to different normative systems. 
Consequently, access arrangements are potentially unreliable, in 
the Zarafshan Valley land is still redistributed through intransparent 
conditions. Zarafshani’ access arrangements refer to three different 
normative systems: Norms related to Islam, norms related to the 
state and its organizations and norms deriving from local values and 
moralities. Normative systems correspond with institutions, 
organizations and processes that negotiate local affairs. Nomination 
and constellation of the respective institutions, organizations 
developed differently throughout the single Zarafshani 
communities. Power and assertiveness of institutions, processes 
and institutions differ significantly even in nearby communities.  
Steering of land access negotiations is done by the central and 
powerful institutions of the community; however these differ 
throughout the various Zarafshani communities. Similar requests 
and disputes are differently negotiated, what renders predictability 
and security for local farmers more difficult. Effectively, different 
norms, i.e. from Soviet values to Islamic rules, determine the local 
social order and everyday practices in the Zarafshan Valley. Thus, 
institutions, organizations and processes that structure everyday 
affairs refer to a set of normative systems that are mutually 
exclusive, overlap and cooperate.   
Bobogi as Strong Institution 
We have seen that bobogi arrangements link neatly with local 
moralities in the Zarafshan Valley. This means at first, underlining 
family values and respect to the ancestors. Bobogi refers to local 
traditions through narratives of how the arable land was created. 
Further, it links diffusely to Islam by recognizing the rules of the 
elders etc. Therefore, bobogi requests implicitly capitalize on 
moralities and Islamic rules altogether, despite these references 
might also be rigged. However, bobogi and decisions are strong and 
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widely implemented in the Zarafshan area. The outreach of bobogi 
arrangements to different normative systems is considered an asset 
in governance processes. Other organizations, institutions and 
processes fail to determine access to land. Screening local 
negotiation processes shows that there are various norms that 
potentially offer governance in the Zarafshan Valley.  
People may refer to Islam, as through amri mar’uf, bobogi, kalidi 
islam. Such references may considered, however religious personnel 
as the mullah or domulloh hardly ever interfere in such 
negotiations. Governance requests based on religious practices as 
kalidi Islom may draw legitimacy from being close to Islamic values; 
however, these practices were only accepted for a very short 
period. Field works showed that land negotiations hardly ever can 
be solved on the local level; instead require at least the attention of 
strong local institutions. Local institutions such as the mahalla or 
the shuroi deha do not possess the political clout to settle durable 
access arrangements. The mahalla and other local institutions may 
decide for or against access negotiations, however lack the power 
instruments to implement these decisions. Ruling access 
negotiations through the state land laws is possible, but is neglected 
with the reply that all land has been distributed already. Although 
the state as normative system rules through selective presence and 
ambiguity, access arrangements are fairly improbable. Thus, there 
are different normative systems parallel present in the Zarafshan 
Valley. They potentially overlap and enhance or block each other. 
With regard to the request for land, related organizations, 
processes and institutions work with different success and often fail. 
In order to solve land shortage, Zarafshani’ farmers rely on various 
strategies; whereas the selection of the institution bobogi has 
turned comparably stable.   
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Meshwork Governance 
Against the complexity of normative systems on local level, the 
chapter concludes that access negotiations eventually finish as 
meshwork governance arrangements between the different claims 
and references to diverging norms. The assemblage of relevant 
institutions, hierarchies and processes entails that these, potentially 
bloc or compete with each other. With regard to the negotiations of 
access to arable land, changes are apparent in the Zarafshan area as 
the original assertiveness of formerly strong institutions and 
organizations has certainly decreased. Examples for this process 
may be kalidi Islom and bobogi, but also the state land legislation. 
The view on land negotiation processes in the Zarafshan Valley 
shows competition, overlapping, collaboration and bricolage of 
different institutions and organizations, the active protracting of 
processes or their complete avoidance. Zarafshani access 
negotiations have thus hybrid character. This situation is best 
conceptualized as meshwork governance, with a diffuse notion of 
authority in the sense that authority is not a monopoly of the State, 
but shared amongst “competing organizations, including corporate 
actors and public institutions both local and distant” (Manuel-
Navarrete et al. 2009: 3). Sharing and fluctuation of power and 
authority is characteristic for meshwork governance processes, 
which builds on and integrates different normative systems. The 
plurality of norms and processes allows farmers to seek power and 
support at different governance forums and networks, what means 
in the framework of the Zarafshan Valley to manoeuver parallel and 
overlapping normative systems. 
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8  Ariza Letters to Manoeuver Meshwork 
Governance 
Agricultural matters are steered, justified and determined in the 
Zarafshan Valley along different but overlapping normative systems. 
Governance, as decision making and implementation of decisions, 
evolves as meshwork arrangements of the diverse normative 
systems. This chapter focuses on ariza letters that depict a 
knowledge practice to interfere in governance processes with wide 
ranging influence on agriculture and rural livelihoods. Ariza letters 
are written complaints or requests that circulate frequently 
between local communities and district authorities in order to 
intervene in everyday affairs. I argue that in the present situation of 
parallel and overlapping normative systems, farmers employ 
knowledge practices, as compiling ariza letters, to obtain favourable 
results in local governance processes. Ariza letters refer to the 
normative system of the state in order to limit the uncertainty 
stemming from meshwork governance. Farmers’ frequent use of 
ariza indicates underlying incentives to engage in letter writing for 
individual benefits. The chapter starts with a description of what 
ariza are and how these letters emerge. Unlike bobogi claims that 
emerged as knowledge practices that focus on Islam and local 
values, ariza letters build on the normative system of the state. 
Letters are submitted to any kind of authority with different impact. 
With particular regard to the agricultural sector, I take a twofold 
perspective on ariza letters that underlines first, individual or 
collective efforts to intervene in rural processes by focussing on 
concrete claims and requests. Farmers use letters to address 
numerous state authorities also with identic issues or requests. This 
mode of forum shopping reaches in the case of the Zarafshan Valley 
from sub-district level up to the presidential office. However, 
 266 
farmers benefit from letters with mixed success, i.e. authorities 
protract, refuse to act or even punish the letter writer. The second 
part of the chapter looks into ariza letters as means of political 
steering of the community, where the actual concern of the letter is 
secondary to the demonstration of power. The chapter provides 
evidence how ariza letter interfere in agricultural concerns, 
designed to address authorities and govern rural communities. This 
type of ariza letters affirmatively appeals to the normative system 
of the state, i.e. referring to dominant state narratives or 
hegemonic perspectives, and serves authorities as pretext for 
interventions. Identifying such narratives and perspectives within an 
apolitical post-Soviet public sphere and in context of incomplete 
information of the limited access order (LAO) is actually not easy. So 
called arizaboz, skilled and knowledgeable local writers, frequently 
produce letters upon which authorities are ready to intervene in 
rural communities. Complaint letters, in this case, serve the state 
and authorities to exercise power and control in rural areas. 
Frequent letter writers, so called arizaboz, effectively survey the 
rural community and report any state critical or independent 
behaviour. Thus, in the Zarafshan Valley ariza letters are knowledge 
practices used to exercise power. Farmers make frequent use of 
ariza in order to link local issues to the normative system of the 
state. Issuing ariza is a knowledge practice, not only to write the 
letter, but also to facilitate the right recipient, timing and selection 
of the appropriate forum. In particular arizaboz, as so called 
professional writers, dispose of suitable networks to enforce their 
writing.   
Ariza Interventions in Agricultural Processes 
Ariza is the Tajik term for written complaints or requests that are 
submitted to all kinds of authorities, from local institutions up to 
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national organizations and the president of the country. Ariza 
letters may be a suggestion, denunciation or a report, filed to 
complain about issues of daily life. Such letters are a means used by 
villagers to request third party interference in local affairs. On 
contrary to bobogi, rural complaint letters are sent mainly to the 
various branches of the district governance hukumat, however also 
to other authorities and administrative bodies on all levels of the 
Tajik state. Usually ariza seek to involve powerful actors as e.g. the 
respective district or provincial agricultural or corruption 
departments that are powerful to intervene in rural conflicts. Letter 
writing to authorities has a long history in the Soviet Union and in 
Soviet Central Asia and were part of everyday life and the public 
sphere (Fitzpatrick 1996; White 1983). Within the Soviet mind set of 
criticizing publicly individual and collective shortcomings in order to 
improve the society as such, letter writing was encouraged and 
widespread until the end of the political union. Remnants of this 
perception and attitude have prevailed in present day Tajikistan and 
letters are noted in the Tajik legislation(Одинаев et al. 2007).142 
However, in everyday life there is a very little margin for voicing 
critical opinions. As indicated in chapter two with regard to the 
challenges to data collection, state and society are not disposed to 
non-authoritative or critical contributions (Boboyorov 2013a: 42). 
The public sphere is at present severely limited, dominated by state 
ideology and related narratives so that people voice opinions, if 
ever, in the informal public. Ariza letters are at the intersection of 
                                                          
142 Ariza letters fulfil a particular role in Tajik conflict management and 
jurisdiction. Letter writing to authorities is a granted right of Tajik citizens. The 
quoted volume of Одинаев et al. sums up how to formulate ariza letters and 
where to send them (2007). Farmers are advised to write firstly to jamoat 
offices. If the subject matter concerns legal issues than letters shall be 
addressed to the court at nohiya level [district]. After that parties may address 
the provincial level [ҷумҳурӣ]. If there is no solution found, only then letter 
writers may call upon the president.  
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the informal public and the state. It is impossible to give an account 
of how many letters are written and what are actual results, 
however I consider the role of ariza very relevant in present rural 
affairs. Farmers in the Zarafshan Valley were frequently referring in 
one or another way to ariza letters. In many instances ariza letters 
relate to issues that derive from access arrangements to arable land 
and water. Authorities declared the distribution of land in course of 
the land reform finished; meanwhile numerous cases of contested 
access arrangements are left pending. In order to influence 
authorities on access decisions, small and medium households do 
not have many options at hand. Requests are formulated as ariza 
and addressed to institutions and authorities beyond sub-district 
level. This indicates the confrontational nature of ariza letters. 
Effective letters lead to governance decisions in favour of the letter 
writer. In order to be considered, letters does not need to be 
signed, authorities act also upon anonymous letters. This way, ariza 
letters are de facto an omnipresent phenomenon in Zarafshani 
villages, however, as the following examples will show, with 
incalculable outcomes.  
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Intersection: Public Request to Remove the Army Camp  
Walking through the village around midday, I am meeting by chance 
an acquainted farmer on the street and we talk a bit. There are 
unusually many people on the streets today. I learn that they are 
heading to a meeting with the district governor [hokim] to discuss 
the presence of the army camp in this village. The district hokim and 
his entourage came to the village – making a long one and a half 
hour drive from the district centre [rayon]. I did not see him yet, but 
people assure me that he is in the village. We proceed to the 
meeting place, maybe 50 men came together so far, only a very few 
women. My farmer friend comments: “This is not enough, they 
wanted to mobilize 300”. He mentions that actually women are not 
allowed to come. We are talking in the midst of the crowd; still the 
maclis [meeting] is not starting. Suddenly my acquaintance doesn’t 
want to stay any longer, although the hokim didn’t show up yet. I 
remember from earlier talks with this farmer that he is already 
under pressure by the authorities. We leave and he tells me that the 
KGB and other power organs [Russian, organy vlast, i.e. the police, 
the army, the secret service, the corruption department; A.M.] 
interrogated him three times while he was on duty overnight in 
another village nearby. They cornered him and wanted to find out 
who is taking the lead “in this ariza writing” that led to the meeting 
today. He says that some 15 to 20 people from this village wrote 
anonymous ariza letters to various branches of the hukumat asking 
to remove the army camp and to distribute the affiliated eight 
hectare land. When I get back to my house, I meet other people 
from nearby villages. They also know about the meeting and I ask 
why they do not attend the event. They respond that they would 
like to but cannot – it is forbidden for them. The district government 
hukumat and the KGB do not allow it. Why is this so? They insist that 
strangers cannot attend such events and it is everywhere in the 
Zarafshan like this. One of my local acquaintances states that he 
wants to join the meeting only in the afternoon at 2 p.m., which  
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appears strange to me as the start was scheduled for before midday. 
The other people around are from different villages however they 
know about the letter writing and say that the power organs will 
soon find out about the writers, because they have informers 
everywhere. 
 
Photograph 12  Majlisi [village assembly] in the lower Zarafshan 
area. Source: The author. 
Around 3 p.m. apparently the meeting is finished, but results are not 
yet clear. Nobody is willing to talk about it. I stop asking about it as I 
run the risk of being considered a spy. Later the day I ask the young 
guard of our house: “There are no results of the meeting. They will 
not remove the army camp”. It seems that this is all that I can learn 
about it at this moment. The day after I am asking all farmers I meet 
about the outcome of the meeting. Yes, the district chief [hokim] 
came, but he declared that it is not possible to remove the army 
camp, because there are no other spaces available elsewhere in the 
valley. When I ask why villagers are interested in having the army 
camp removed, various plausible and unlikely arguments are 
brought forward. The supporters of the removal state that the local 
hospital nearby is disturbed, because it is partially occupied by the 
army and allegedly sick people complain about the noise. Somewhat 
less openly social conflicts [alcohol and drug abuse, violence, 
harassment of women] are mentioned, which the army camp would 
have brought into the village.  No one mentions that there is also 
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Risks and Repercussions of Letter Writing: Spoiling 
Village Tinji 
The example of the debate regarding the army camp shows the 
urgency of farmers request for land and how sending ariza letters 
may cause diametric effects. Entanglement with state structures is 
not without risks. Despite its selective presence, the district 
administration dedicates attention and power resources to suspend 
the request to move the army camp. Engaging in ariza writing 
contains the concrete risk that the attention of authorities turns to 
the sender of the letter. Thus, farmer’s opinions are divided 
regarding the use or uselessness of letters to solve problems. It is 
common to acknowledge that ariza writing is “useless” (Soosun 
23.06.2011) and “creates only problems, because it brings confusion 
into the village” (Revomutk 28.06.2012), the majority of informants 
acknowledge the occasional engagement in letters writing. 
However, asking farmers straight forwardly why they do not write a 
letter to point particular problems to the authorities, their response 
is almost always negative and defensive. Many farmers 
acknowledge that they wrote letters earlier, however wouldn’t do it 
today. People are open about the fact that they submitted a letter 
the keen interest in the eight hectares of arable land held by the army 
camp. A couple of days later I meet again my acquaintance farmer and 
ask him if he has been later at the meeting with the hokim. “No and I 
don’t know what happened later on”. This sounds odd to me. He says 
the people that wrote the ariza letters simply want to distribute the 
arable land among them. “However the KGB will boil them down. They 
[the KGB] are present in each village.” He just doesn’t want to get into 
this story and therefore left the meeting before it started (upper 
Zarafshan 23.05.2012).  
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long time ago, but less easy in admitting to do so today. Later 
observations indicate that usually letter writing is happening in 
secret and – unless it is a form of blackmailing – not communicated 
to those denounced in the letter. Local perceptions of orderly 
behaviour were described as based in values and moralities, which 
refer in the Zarafshan Valley and elsewhere to concrete conceptions 
such as tinji, literally wellness, happiness or peacefulness or 
kishlokdori an understanding of village dignity and sense of 
community (Boboyorov 2013a). A typical first statement when 
visiting a village would be that “in this village, every family has land” 
(upper Zarafshan 15.06.2011, 18.06.2011). Nevertheless, after 
spending some time in the community, it turns out that there are 
numerous poor and very poor households.143 The motivation for 
such statements would be to respect village dignity [kishloqdori], 
underscoring the cohesiveness and peace [tinj] in the community. 
Writing letters conflicts with these conceptions. It is common 
opinion that ariza writing will jeopardize village tinji [village peace, 
harmony] and spoil the reputation of those who write. Prevalent 
opinion in the villages was that problems and conflicts among 
villagers shall be dealt within the own community (Garibak 
23.04.2012, Madrushkat 13.06.2012). The risk to appear spoiling the 
village tinji due to addressing publicly conflicts in complaint letters 
may cause further problems for the respective households, e.g. 
isolate them in everyday life and within the village community. In 
the Zarafshan Valley, famers refer to tinji to describe the community 
as solidarity group which is, at best, only partially the case. Such 
                                                          
143 It became clear very soon that this description was a friendly euphemism. 
During a walk through the respective community, I came across several poor 
households. Talking with a group of women in front of their households, one 
shouted: “This is how we live. You need to talk to women if you want to know 
how we live. There are some rich men down there [living in the lower, i.e. better 
parts of the village, A.M.] who say we all live well” (upper Zarafshan 
03.07.2011).  
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constructions are also a reason for why farmers and local 
institutions are reluctant to involve community outsiders beyond 
the sub-district level [jamoat] in conflict-settlement procedures 
(Boboyorov, 2013: 89, 152f).144 Only in rare occasions local requests 
for interventions are considered at district level and beyond. Letter 
writing usually does not lead to material benefits; however it easily 
harms relations with fellow-villagers. The normative conception of 
tinji is employed by elites to limit the room for manoeuvre of 
competitors, i.e. smallholder farmer, and thwart their request for 
external intervention in local matters. Letter writing contains the 
concrete risk of negative repercussions not only from fellow 
villagers. Authorities may ignore the intervention or give right away 
a negative response. Not seldomly, ariza provoke a furious response 
from lower tier authorities, who are themselves integral 
components of the local elite system. Land conflicts, as mentioned 
earlier, are particularly sensible cases. As a result, reportedly the 
responses to ariza letters go as far as threats of physical violence by 
authorities and police. One medium aged poor farmer plausibly 
explained that it is useless to write and even counterproductive as: 
“The police will come and punish you” (upper Zarafshan 
17.06.2011).145 Nevertheless, complaint letters serve the district 
administration to exercise power over rural areas. There appear to 
exist’ underlying obligations between authorities and selected local 
ariza writers, where certain letters are taken as pretext of the state 
                                                          
144 As outlined above already, communities virtually seek to avoid the 
application of the official legal framework in their locality and solve conflicts 
locally (Boboyorov 2013; Heathershaw 2009). It is a question of kishlokdori 
village dignity and sense of community belonging that local communities deal 
with conflicts independently, avoiding outside interference. This attitude 
corresponds, as mentioned earlier above, with the reluctance of authorities and 
state representatives to interfere in local affairs, unless there are financial 
incentives to interfere.  
145 The same farmer stated that the police once approached him with letter he 
wrote, then tore it into pieces and threatened to beat him up.   
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to exercise power over the rural population. Interfering state 
authorities, as the hukumat’s ecology or corruption departments, 
act in favour of one or another interpretation or narrative, which 
thus becomes effectively the hegemonic perspective while 
overriding alternative narratives and regulations. I will come back to 
this point further below.  
Conflicts Relate to the Access to Land 
The account of the army camp reiterated the general finding that 
the shortage and unequal distribution of arable land is the primary 
source of tensions in the rural society in the Zarafshan area. In 
almost every community visited, there were pending requests to 
the district or sub-district land committees or to the chief of the 
local collective dehqon farm to renegotiate access to land and 
water. Namely marginal households requested a general review of 
access arrangements by higher-ranking government authorities. As 
this rather unrealistic scenario is unlikely to happen; most farmers 
concentrate on individual arrangements. This meant in many cases 
to request firstly bobogi land and if this fails to issue an ariza letter 
claiming for land according to the land reform. One farmer 
managed through stoic repeated requests to eventually receive 40 
sotiq of arable land. Allegedly, he wrote eight letters to various 
committees of the sub-district government [jamoat](Soosun 
23.06.2011). The former chief of the jamoat describes the success 
of this request as a rare exception. According to him the requests 
for land plots are useless [be foida], because there is no arable land 
in the communities available anymore. None of the village 
households would give land away, neither would at the time still 
existing collective dehqon farm do. The former chief of the jamoat 
continuous: “If people request land from the administration, the 
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answer is: Please go to Zafarobod” (Soosun 23.06.2011).146 In fact, 
usual appeals for access or re-distribution of land through ariza 
letters are not successful. A smallholder farmer from the upper 
Zarafshan area explained how his repeated requests for additional 
land to the chief of the jamoat, the court [prokurator] and to the 
jamoat land committee repeatedly failed. Referring to the quota of 
land for his household according to the land reform, he did not 
receive any additional land: “Nobody helped; they will give land only 
to their relatives” (upper Zarafshan 29.06.2011). The farmer admits 
that requesting land in the village is a very sensitive issue as it would 
mean to reschedule significant parts of present property structures. 
“Addressing the land committee means war [within the community, 
A.M.]” (upper Zarafshan 29.06.2011), because the authorities do 
not take any decision and avoid responsibilities. Instead the conflict 
remains in the village and occasionally turns also violent as the 
shootout between two families in a nearby village proofs.147 In his 
village, the involved parties cannot agree on a common institutional 
framework, e.g. following the rationale of bobogi, state land reform 
legislation or an ad hoc ruling from the district government that 
would settle the request. According to the above farmer, only if the 
district hukumat redistributes the land, the distribution will be 
accepted by the community and thus implemented without turmoil: 
“The government must distribute [the land]. If I write a letter [ariza] 
and the land is distributed due to my letter, then people will come 
to me and ask: Are you the son of my father or why do you take my 
land” (upper Zarafshan 29.06.2011)? However, while the narrative 
of this farmer is obviously not shared by important parts of the 
village community, he seeks to enrol the district government in his 
project, which however shows little intention to interfere in local 
                                                          
146 Zafarobod is a district in the northern low lands of Mastchohi Nav in Sughd 
district where arable land is allegedly available, but apparently no water. 
147 See footnote 51 above. 
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arrangements. Approaching authorities directly without facilitation 
is prone to failure, nevertheless there is a small chance of 
favourable outcomes for which farmers engage and try.  
Forum Shopping with Ariza Letters 
Due to their role in Soviet everyday life and embeddeness in the 
Tajik legal framework, ariza letters are part of the normative system 
of the Tajik state. That means, letters refer to the realm of state 
forums, i.e. organizations and processes, from which they claim 
actions or which are advised to act. Accordingly, many different 
types of letters as complaints, reports, denunciations, whistle 
blowing are sent to the forums available. Accordingly, farmers travel 
with their requests to various forums on different levels, i.e. from 
sub-district up to the national levels. This kind of forum shopping is 
practiced extensively throughout the Zarafshan Valley, e.g. to 
maintain or achieve additional access to arable land, but also to 
limit the activities of agricultural competitors. As we have seen in 
previous cases, it is common to approach various administrative 
forums to request for decisions to be taken or for being 
implemented. However, while only a few letters are considered, 
however writing contains the risk of conflict with local and sub-
regional parties. Against this background, farmers repeatedly 
expressed the feeling of being subdued by local authorities and 
claimed that only external intervention from administrative levels 
above the local district would help to settle local conflicts. This 
means, the complaint letter is forwarded to the provincial 
government, sometimes even to the capital Dushanbe. Thus, district 
and local administration are potentially put in trouble by superior 
authorities. Often, such ariza letters are not submitted in secret, 
fellow villagers are informed and authorities are feeding this 
information back to lower tiers. Eventually, the state institutions in 
 277 
charge will need to respond to the letter what potentially leads to 
pressure on local level – as indicated above already.  
Addressing the President 
The head of a very poor household, who had written to politicians 
on provincial and national level earlier to complain about the 
shortage of land, managed that a representative of the ruling 
people’s party visited his house. However, following this meeting 
nothing happened; the farmer did not get any additional land or 
other benefits. Institutions in charge, especially the chief [raís] of 
the local collective dehqon farm, to whom the farmer had applied 
earlier several times, continued to decline his requests (upper 
Zarafshan 15.06.2011). Given the enormous imbalance of power 
between the poor farmer and the village elites on the other side, 
the next step of putting urgency in his struggle for land was, as he 
explained, to address the ariza letter straight to the president, 
Emomali Rahmon (upper Zarafshan 15.06.2011). Many smallholder 
or poor households consider this as legitimate step, because 
jamoat, hukumat are equally considered elite groups who work for 
their own interests and patronage networks.148 In a move of almost 
nihilistic refusal, after other strategies to get access to arable land 
failed, some farmers linked up the symbolic rhetoric of the state 
government to root out corruption and nepotism and accordingly 
declared to write directly to the president (Revomutk 17.06.2011, 
Madrushkat 13.06.2012). To approach the president and central 
government authorities is encouraged by the national TV station 
                                                          
148 There is the commonplace reference to the floors of the private houses of the 
authorities as metaphor for rampant corruption and extra-payments within the 
administrative system. “This is the third district governor [hokim] already. You 
cannot vote him away and it would also be no good to do so. The first governor 
built two houses with two floors. The second one did so. The third hokim has 
been newly appointed; he has just started the building site” (upper Zarafshan 
15.06.2011). 
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that broadcasts reports of presidential crackdowns on corrupted 
state structures (Heathershaw 2009). It is encouraged, as I will 
outline further below, also by authorities on district level such as 
KGB and corruption department. Images of bulldozers destroying 
illegally build houses do not miss its impact on rural dwellers and 
mid-level authorities; meanwhile the president himself is displayed 
in the public sphere as the father of the nation that cares for the 
poor and smallholders also in remote areas (Soosun 23.06.2011).149  
 
Photograph 13  Ritualized Compliance: Gestures of modesty performed by 
elite farmers during a visit of the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon. 
Source: Welthungerhilfe Tajikistan, Sadriddin Dshuraev. 
Organizations as hukumat and jamoat and its respective 
departments have the reputation of not easily dealing with requests 
from smallholder farmers. Decisions are sometimes left pending for 
years. Pushing authorities to take action is not done by simply 
writing letters, it needs additional means to come to a decision. A 
poor farmer in an upper Zarafshani village explains that nothing can 
                                                          
149 The president taking direct action on behalf of individual villagers is a topos 
of its own. References to the president are commonplace in the rural rhetoric, 
either in a form of neo-mystic apotheosis in the sense that the president is good 
and not knowing what is happening in the country because his staff is lying in 
his face. Media coverage of the president increasingly turns to the iconography 
of his divine-fateful role as “father of the nation” (Lemon 2015b, RFE/RL Tajik 
Service 2015). 
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be done about reluctant authorities. Due to his service for the 
Soviet army in Afghanistan he is entitled to a small pension as a 
veteran. He admits that finally, since a few years he receives half of 
the assigned pension, the other half is somewhere lost in the 
administration. He resigned to claim the other half of his pension, 
because “letter writing [to the district or sub-regional hukumat or 
jamoat] is useless, it leads to nowhere. To get my rights I would 
need to spend one month in Dushanbe to appeal to president 
directly” (upper Zarafshan 15.06.2011). Accordingly, in Dushanbe it 
would be necessary to get to know the right people and advance 
payments to get the request accepted and dealt with. Smallholder’s 
orientation towards the president is rational, as simply writing to 
authorities is hardly effective. The sender would need to sustain its 
letter with further networking, distributing gifts and favours or 
mobilizing power resources. Potentially, referring with the ariza 
letter to the omnipresent state propaganda may work well for letter 
writers as it put medium level authorities under pressure not to act 
against central policies. Hafiz Boboyorov (2013) describes the multi-
layered processes of conflict solving in rural areas between the 
government, local authorities, processes and institutions as 
subsidiarity principle, the attempt to keep the matter at the lowest 
possible local level. He explains using the case of southern 
Tajikistan, how governance representatives such as e.g. the district 
hokim [governor] promise to solve problems, however then the 
issue is not raised publicly again for a long period of time. Such way 
of skipping appeals is a strategic manoeuvre used by government 
functionaries to allow local mediators to resolve the problem. As 
one informant asserted: “You write the complaint letter [ariza] and 
they do not respond to it until the second time you re-write and 
pass it personally on to the government official, if you have personal 
relations [odam]” (Boboyorov 2013a: 144). Smallholder farmers in 
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the Zarafshan Valley usually lack the time and funds to raise interest 
for their appeals at higher administrative levels. It is common 
knowledge that authorities only act upon extra payments. Many 
farmers were convinced that it is best to network with powerful 
persons who then eventually support their claim.  
Exercising Power through the Ecology Department 
One inevitable organization in rural communities especially in the 
lower Zarafshan area is the so called ecology [ecologia] department 
of the district administration government hukumat. In the lower 
Zarafshan area, the department is reportedly in charge since around 
2010 (Garibak 28.04.2012). It maintains, among other things, the 
inventory of greens on the land plots. Cutting trees and shrubs, also 
in parts, is forbidden without the permission of the ecology 
department. Even though there is no cadastre of the existing trees, 
farmers insisted that the regulations of the ecology department 
include also dead trees (Garibak 26.04.2012, Soosun 11.06.2011). 
Thus, changing the present inventory of greens requires the formal 
consent from this department. Although the respective permission 
shall be available free of charge from authorities, usually extra 
payments are due. Namely smallholder farmer cannot afford these 
time consuming and costly procedures. Therefore, many farmers do 
not care and potentially do not even know about the regulations of 
the ecology department. Normally, the ecology department does 
not proactively control farmers’ properties. It acts upon request, i.e. 
anonymous denunciation of third parties. Central areas of the 
Zarafshan Valley are particular suitable for fruit production, 
especially apricots. Considerable apricot plantations dominate the 
landscape. Apricots can provide good income, because they are sold 
either fresh or dried. Their kernels may be processed separately, so 
apricot production is potentially a lucrative business. Talking with an 
experienced apricot farmer, he reveals that he is not very happy 
 281 
with the trees, because most of them are old and the tree species is 
from Panjakent; i.e. not exactly adaptable to the mountainous 
conditions of the upper Zarafshan. Since it is leasehold land 
[arenda], he may not cut trees or do pruning without the permission 
of the collective dehqon farm and the district ecology department. 
“If you do not cut old trees regularly, there will be no space and sun 
for the new trees to grow” so it is essential to take some trees out 
and do pruning. Thus, he cuts every year some trees, even though 
he has no permission to do so (Soosun 11.06.2011).150 Another 
apricot farmer from the lower Zarafshan spoke outraged about the 
unfair situation for farmers being conditioned by the ecology 
department. He planted 20 new apricot trees at the place of the old 
ones. Although he insists that he didn’t cut them, just replaced, or 
as he preferred to say: “I did some pruning [paivandci]” (lower 
Zarafshan 08.05.2012). Although this statement was a mere 
euphemism for cutting trees, however in case of an investigation it 
may make the difference. When I ask if he needed a permission 
from the ecology department to do this work, he replied: “It is not 
fair that they request documents and fine people, because they 
don’t know how many trees there are.” He continued to complain: 
“They also didn’t help last year when the trees were in danger of 
drying out. When I created the garden from scratch [by levelling the 
terrain, providing top soil and irrigation, A.M.] no one helped and 
no one cared. The government did not blame the vodkhoz [the 
water office] or sub-district administration for not providing 
water”.151 In fact, fostering individual initiative is no concern of the 
authorities. Implicitly the farmer acknowledges the risk of being 
denounced for cutting a number of trees, because “the ecology 
                                                          
150 The wood that the farmer is allowed to cut is ought to be returned to the 
collective	dehqon farm. 
151 Such investments cost the farmer, according to his own statements, two 
years of rice harvest and a cow to buy tubes and the water pump. 
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department comes only on request that means when someone calls 
or writes to them” (lower Zarafshan 08.05.2012). Administrative 
overregulation combined with unaccountability of state employees 
is not only a severe economic obstacle to individual farming. In fact, 
the ecology department appears useful for political, economic and 
ecologic purposes altogether, ready to exercise power on demand. 
By threatening basically every household with potential charges, it 
efficiently exercises power over a large number of farmers. For the 
authorities it presents further an easy means to siphon off revenues 
due to flexible rules and little accountability. The ecology 
department gets into action usually on external initiative, initiated 
by ariza letter denunciations (Garibak 28.04.2012). Writing to the 
ecology department is an easy means to put pressure on fellow 
villagers or competitors. Denunciations through ariza letters are 
conveyed to the respective administration, either the corruption 
department or the ecology department and are apparently 
accepted without questioning the motivation of the sender. “You 
can’t protect yourself from such letters. There are informants in 
every village” (Garibak 01.05.2012). Authorities’ willingness to 
accept letters corroborated many farmers prevailing perception 
that there are paid informants in each village that report to 
authorities. The situation differed slightly throughout the lower and 
upper parts of the Zarafshan Valley. While in the upper parts of the 
valley, the ecology department was hardly mentioned as an 
obstacle to farming. Communities situated closer to administrative 
centres appeared prone to denunciations, as easy means to exercise 
power over co-villagers, i.e. potential competitors.   
Letter Writing as Political Steering 
Other ariza letters point at the political dimensions of communal 
actions and processes. Such letters seek primarily to exemplary 
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exercise power in the rural community. The state as the main 
source of power in rural areas is affirmatively embraced and thus 
deliberately involved by this sort of ariza. This type of ariza letters 
also refers to concrete issues in rural communities; however link 
these with general norms promoted by state decrees and laws, 
hierarchies, historical narratives or language. This way, local 
agricultural affairs are transformed into affairs that concern the 
entire state. The actual issue of the letter appears not the central 
concern of the author of the letter, instead the possibility to 
demonstrate power. Such interventions refer to the specific post-
Soviet political economy prevailing in Tajikistan which has 
characterized earlier above as limited access order (LAO). This 
implies a restricted public sphere, dysfunctional and co-opted 
democratic institutions and organizations. It appears that some 
complaint letters belong to neopatrimonial governance 
arrangements with the task to maintain also in rural area a selective 
system of control. In many villages professional writers, so called 
arizaboz, are active who regularly write to authorities. These skilful 
and knowledgeable writers are suspected to maintain underhand 
arrangements with district authorities. Arizaboz are knowledgeable 
and capable to select governance forums of the state normative 
system, create attention for their case and accordingly pressure 
villagers and lower tiers authorities alike. Such ariza letters are 
made either public or informally, and are not seldom simply 
denunciatory.  
Professional Writers Arizaboz  
Following up the life stories of some frequent letter writers it 
becomes apparent that writing is also practiced as a profession as 
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such.152 Persons, who are regularly writing to superior authorities, 
are called arizaboz. As explained earlier ariza writing is widely 
considered as “betraying village dignity” (Boboyorov 2013a: 140), 
nevertheless many letters are being circulated. Rural dwellers are 
convinced that there are arizaboz in their own village who regularly 
report observations to authorities, thus that the community is 
effectively surveyed. Regular writing on different issues labels its 
sender as plaintiff or arizaboz [literally, player with ariza]153 and 
contains a bad reputation in the local society. Such a person “only 
strives for his personal profit and does not care about qawmdori 
[local village identity]”(Boboyorov 2013a: 141), neither about the 
harmonic living together [tinji]. Letter writing is thus considered 
“spoiling other people’s life” (lower Zarafshan 04.05.2012), 
especially when used to directly blackmail other people.154 While 
discussing the use of ariza with farmers, this immediate financial 
aspect appeared maybe less central today. Rather, letter writing of 
arizaboz is closely related to the execution of power. During a talk 
with the head of the local village council [shuroi deha] about how 
competition and conflicts around natural resources are being solved 
                                                          
152 In fact, also in other communities people referred to prefabricated 
denunciations to authorities that are used to blackmail people (lower Zarafshan 
06.06.2012). It is apparent that underhand dealings exist between authorities 
and selected writers. Allegedly officials request denouncing letters in order to 
have a reason to start investigations. In return, the letter writer benefits from 
the potential material extractions of the case. 
153 The appreciation of a person as arizaboz is negatively connoted, it refers to a 
person that frequently complains and thus spoils the community.   
154 Farmers see the motivation to write denunciatory letters in blackmailing 
money from others: “There are cases that people write about other villagers 
and inform governmental departments. Then they go to these persons telling 
them: I wrote about you, you are now in big trouble. Give me money and I will 
take back my letter” (lower Zarafshan 04.05.2012). In the early years after 
independence, groups of powerful were solving problems in the community on 
request for money with physical violence. “These people are fortunately gone 
now or in prison – thanks to governmental forces. But letter writing today is 
nearly the same; spoiling other people’s life” (lower Zarafshan 04.05.2012). 
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in his community, he receives a phone call that informs him about a 
new ariza letter to come from one notorious letter writer in the 
village (lower Zarafshan 04.05.2012). If he wants to know about this 
new letter, he should come now. So he goes off to learn about the 
letter. The head of the surhoi deha has no explanation of the 
writer’s motivation: “I also don’t understand him; he is present in all 
committees” (lower Zarafshan 04.05.2012).  The letter writer is a 
pensioner of about 70 years, called Mirzadi155, he is an exemplary 
case of an arizaboz. Earlier he has been working as a teacher; his 
father was an important communist “decorated with medals” 
(lower Zarafshan 02.08.2011). He is known to spend the whole day 
in the tea house [choixona] next to the main basar in the nearby 
city. People in the village and beyond have a bad opinion of him, 
because due to his writings to authorities he had created lots of 
difficulties to fellow villagers. This is not trivial, because beside of 
the concrete outcome of ariza requests, he demonstrated power 
through the capacity of mobilizing authorities. Getting the 
authorities to act upon a letter puts in evidence that the writer has 
backing from above [pusht]. Thus his words have value in the 
community, being able to design and dominate the governance 
process. It is commonly assumed that Mirzadi is a professional 
writer, i.e. being paid for writing letters to government 
departments. Several people stated that he is paid by various 
district offices, thus “sending an ariza letter is a feast for him” 
(lower Zarafshan 02.08.2011). His mastery in writing letters is the 
capacity to address different authorities in various administrations 
on district, provincial and national level and making the right 
argument. Mirzadi, however, maintained close relations to the 
Panjakent district government, allegedly especially the corruption 
agency, in the area widely known as the 6th otel [department]. The 
                                                          
155 Original name has been changed. 
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‘Agency against Corruption and Finance of the Republic Tajikistan’156 
is highly visible in the streets of Panjakent with billboards that 
encourage people to contribute information. Major parts of it 
consist of a picture of two hands exchanging dollar notes. Its 
background is widely decorated with Tajik bank notes.157 Under the 
headline "Your fight against corruption is of help for the 
government and for any person" one finds email and telephone 
contacts of Panjakent and Khujand offices.    
 
Photograph 14  Public relations of the Panjakent corruption department. 
Source: The author. 
However, this visual programme appears somehow as an invite to 
make underhand deals. Thus, the advert fits with the common 
saying that the corruption department works basically on its own 
agenda. ”The corruption department is happy about such letters 
[ariza, A.M.], because it allows them to start investigating. They do 
not question or cross-check the letter writer” (Panjakent 
02.08.2011). A critical examination of the sources of the ariza is not 
intended. Farmers assume that it does not even matter because “if 
                                                          
156 The full denomination of this organization reads: Agentii	nazorati	davlatii	
moliyavi	va	muboriza	va	korrupsiyai	jumhurii	Tojikiston.	Rayosati	agenty	dar	
viloyati	Sughd.   
157 This refers to the local understanding of corruption, which is rather clear 
cut: “Corrupt is who takes money directly.” (lower Zarafshan 07.08.2011).  
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they search, they will find something. The 6th otel people will earn 
on every letter. They will find something and then someone will pay 
to avoid trouble” (Panjakent 01.08.2012). Outcomes for those being 
addressed in such denunciations are almost always negative, i.e. as 
displayed in the case of Darvonho (see chapter seven) payments are 
due. Repealing to courts is highly unusual as it transponds the 
conflict on another level which may involve incalculable payments. 
Normally some agreement is found through local conflict solving 
mechanisms and institutions. However, ordinary people without the 
support of powerful networks face severe difficulties. People with 
money must pay to have the investigation stopped and poor people 
fall into dependency of powerful persons. This effectively means, 
the entire household is conditioned to the prevailing state doctrine, 
as represented by the local powerful actors. The aforementioned 
Mirzadi is potentially such a powerful actor, even though he does 
not assume a public role in the village. His knowledge of 
administrative and government structures and capacity to construct 
an argument allows him to put basically everybody in his 
community under pressure. He relates village decisions and 
villagers’ actions to state doctrines, laws and propaganda, knowing 
to whom to address the letters.158 This is apparently effective to 
attract the support of the state. According to fellow villagers, the 
insistence on his particular perspective had helped Mirzadi to 
acquire a big share of a well irrigated garden plot with many fruit 
trees of about three hectare. Allegedly, according to the official 
documentation, he has less land; but his land plot is set together 
from various types of land. So, in practice it forms a single area, 
                                                          
158 For those in the community with whom I talked about Mirzadi it seemed 
totally out of imagination to write a letter against this man to stop 
denunciations. The mismatch of knowledge, networks and capacities when 
struggling with him was considered so blatant that the adverse party has 
almost no means to respond, beside acts of violence. The below mentioned case 
of the school teachers served as warning example.  
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which is exceptional in the community. Originally, the collective 
dehqon farm, e.g. the successor of the kolkhoz, did not want to 
privatize the garden land as virtually everybody in the village 
wanted a share in this land. So the dehqon farm divided all other 
land, which Mirzadi did not want to take. At the same time, the 
collective dehqon farm had to pay taxes for the land, which it could 
not afford at that time. The writer, together with the family of the 
former kolkhoz gardener, sent several letters to the district 
government [hukumat] to claim the privatization of the garden. 
Villagers acknowledged that the two acted according to the law 
when insisting on this land (lower Zarafshan 23.05.2011), however 
the general opinion in the village was not to divide the garden. 
Mirzadis’ request was turned down in the grand community 
assembly [majlisi umumi], nevertheless in disrespect of this decision 
he went on to put the collective dehqon farm under pressure with 
letters to district and national authorities insisting on land reform 
legislation. Against the persistent series of complaint letters, the 
local community had nothing more to put against the requests of 
Mirzadi and the gardener. Eventually, in 2005 or 2006, “in order to 
make them quiet the dehqon farm gave them the land”, as one 
villager soberly put it (lower Zarafshan 01.06.2011). As a 
consequence to Mirzadi’s aggressive writings, villagers try not to get 
involved with him, but not to offend him either. It is apparent that 
Mirzadi is able to mobilize power, by translating his knowledge from 
the village into arguments that attract authorities. His knowledge is 
a resource of power, applicable on any occasion, which ordinary 
villagers do not have available. Farmers fear him, avoid his presence 
where possible, however pay respect to him and attend the regular 
cycle of ceremonies in his household around tui [wedding], 
commemoration of the death or new-borns [ma’raka] and so on.159 
                                                          
159 It appears the term ma’raka is used in the Zarafshan Valley to describe a 
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Nevertheless, people strongly advised me not to seek to talk to him 
and warned me “not to go to bad people” (lower Zarafshan 
01.05.2011). 
Exercising Power through Hegemonic Narratives 
Over the time that I visited the village, the list of letters sent by 
Mirzadi became longer and longer. I observed and heard of plenty 
ariza letters authored by him in the turn of roughly one year. One 
letter referred to alleged misdoings of the teachers of the village 
school.160 Another letter, elaborated above, was addressed to the 
district ecology department. A series of letters criticized a project of 
an international NGO in the village, which he denounced for fraud 
to the district corruption department. Other letters indicated 
further alleged misdoings to the district corruption department, but 
also to those at provincial and national level. Earlier he denounced 
two households of co-villagers who he accused for running an illegal 
Islamic religious school [madrassa] in the village. This way, Mirzadi 
frames village actions and puts them in a perspective that forces 
authorities to interfere. Due to this capacity to create narratives 
that make authorities act, Mirzadi is considered powerful. As far as 
his letters and interventions match with the interests of the state, 
these narratives become thus the hegemonic perspective. Due to 
the selective presence of the state in rural areas, the position of 
state authorities towards particular issues of everyday agricultural 
                                                                                                                           
feast or gathering in the household with many guests and when plov [a regional 
rice dish] is served. Occasions for ma'raka are the commemoration of the death, 
a wedding, circumcisions and other occasions of the many related to the new 
born child (Stephan 2010: 199).  
160 A group of local school teachers once wrote about Mirzadi to the authorities: 
“First Mirzadi wrote a letter about something in the school. Then the teacher 
wrote about his misdoings and corruption. His unlawful acquisition of land, 
garden etc. However, the corruption department (6th otel) turned everything 
against the teachers. The teachers had to bring evidences and testimonies. 
Mirzadi wrote against them in return. In the end all teachers went to apologize 
to Mirzadi, so he draw the letter back” (lower Zarafshan 08.06.2012). 
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matters may not be clear. Mirzadis’ letters tend to impose a 
hegemonic perspective on village matters by making explicit 
reference to state regulations, propaganda and ideology. It is this 
way that ariza letters coerce authorities, who are usually reluctant 
to intervene in rural affairs, to react accordingly. Through the focus 
on a particular perspective of everyday affairs, ariza letters may 
construct a dominant narrative while levelling out or even 
criminalize alternative meanings and arrangements. It is obvious 
that most claimants are not able to prepare their complaints 
accordingly, as for instance the example of the army camp outlined. 
The case of Mirzadi illustrates the highly political role that letter 
writing may entail. As long as one denies Mirzadi’s particular 
function for the district administration, the motivation for 
denouncing the guard Darvonho and others to authorities remains 
unclear. Mirzadis’ motivation does not lie in direct benefits, but it is 
his informal state function to maintain order in the community that 
provides him power. While state authorities demonstrated selective 
presence, he is effectively the permanent substitute of the state in 
rural areas. Thus, while Mirzadi does not enjoy a good reputation 
among co-villagers; people are afraid of him within the community 
and therefore powerful.   
Summary: Ariza Letters as Knowledge Practice 
The chapter illustrated the significant impact of ariza complaint 
letters on agricultural processes in the Zarafshan Valley, provoking 
interventions of state authorities regarding access to land, land use 
or the rule of law. Letter writing is a knowledge practice that 
attempts to interfere and manoeuver governance processes, i.e. 
local meshwork arrangements. With regard to the agricultural 
production in the Zarafshan Valley ariza letters focus predominantly 
on three issues: to address authorities, to outcompete competitors 
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or to control and subdue rural communities. The practice of ariza 
letters must be seen in the context of the limited access orders 
imposed by the neopatrimonial authoritarian Tajik state. Writing to 
authorities was a widespread practice in the Soviet Union as a 
means to control the system from within. Parts of this Soviet 
practice have prevailed in Tajikistan today. As the Tajik legislation 
foresees, letters are addressed to district authorities, requesting 
them to act on the ground of the normative system of the state.  
Skilled writers manage to juxtapose with their ariza letter the 
normative system of the state against uncertain institutions and 
meshwork governance in the rural Zarafshan Valley. Still, as 
displayed in the case of bobogi arrangements, this does not 
necessarily lead to action from the side of state authorities. Instead, 
as the case of the arizaboz Mirzadi showed, authorities are very 
responsive to political and economic matters to ensure their 
dominance over the rural society. Knowledgeable writers include a 
political component in their letter by outright affirmation or 
reversing to hegemonic narratives of the regime. The ingenious 
political alignment of letters leads potentially to a more attentive 
response by authorities. However, the examples above have also 
shown how smallholder farmers’ attempts of forum shopping, i.e. 
involving various administrative bodies to claim the rule of law, 
conclude rather useless. Authorities are reluctant to interfere in 
general issues on local level. Farmers’ eventually reverse to the 
President is a desperate reaction to this situation; however, this 
remains also an unlikely manoeuvre. Thus, knowledge and skills to 
compile ariza letters are relevant for rural dwellers because, as 
outlined earlier, letters are posing both, an option and a challenge 
to their livelihood. In order to make request more urgent, complaint 
letters focus on concrete persons, i.e. co-villagers, administrators or 
competitors. Denouncing others means to put pressure on this 
 292 
person, but also to initiate local conflict solving mechanisms. 
Despite disturbing village harmony tinji, requests come to the 
attention of authorities and responsible persons at the state 
administration. Without such deliberate conflicts, requests are 
simply put on hold. Pending letters in deadlock are currently the 
norm. Stalled negotiations e.g. around land distribution are in most 
cases in the interest of established village elites that benefit from 
the status quo. To overcome deadlock situations it is necessary to 
disturb the communal status quo. Denunciations for instance to the 
ecology or corruption department provide an example for such 
fabricated conflicts. However, the effectiveness of claims made 
through ariza letters remains dubious, only a few ariza actually lead 
to state interventions. Ariza letters require facilitation through 
networks, which is, at the conditions of the Zarafshan Valley, is a 
privilege of local elites.    
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9  Shifting Epistemic Cultures in the 
Zarafshan Valley  
With regard to knowledge in rural livelihoods, three main findings 
emerge from the empirical research in the Zerafshan Valley. Firstly, 
the devaluation of agricultural expertise among rural dwellers, 
secondly farmers’ strong interest in knowledge practices that deal 
with governance arrangements and thirdly, shifting epistemic 
cultures which develop away from agricultural expertise. Thus, 
referring to the primary intersts of this research, post-Soviet 
individualized expertise and knowledge practices, the findings show 
that despite the individualization of agricultural production, market 
oriented change processes do not entail an increased demand for 
expertise.  
The first finding underlines the crisis of agricultural expertise in the 
individualized Zarafshani agriculture. Local farm households refuse 
to invest in specialized knowledge and information of agricultural 
production. The results of the field research underline the 
importance of local knowledge practices that are prevalent in rural 
communities. Individualized agricultural production in the Zarafshan 
Valley evolves within limited access orders (LAO), thus regimes that 
seek to control not only economic realms but also access to land, 
knowledge, information and participation in political processes. A 
second, important insight from the field research is the way how 
farmers seek knowledge practices as bobogi and ariza in order to 
manoeuver LAO conditions and meshwork governance 
arrangements. Eventually, the chapter discusses thirdly how the 
decline of expertise against the raise of knowledge practices 
represents a change of farmers’ approach to knowledge. The pre-
dominance of governance matters in the everyday life of 
individualized farm households is identified as central driver of 
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shifting epistemic cultures. The findings indicate the dwindling 
significance of specialized agrarian expertise while other knowledge 
practices are considered more relevant to maintain rural livelihoods.   
Marginalization of Agricultural Expertise 
The post-Soviet individualization of the Tajik agriculture turned out 
to be a challenge to the livelihoods of Zarafshani farmers. On the 
one hand side external processes as the deterioration of 
infrastructure and demographic changes influenced agricultural 
production. At the same time individual rural livelihoods had to be 
constructed, based on the households access to land. The transition 
from collective to individualized agriculture led to the 
discontinuation of former knowledge sources and practices that 
were often linked to the previous kolkhoz and sovkhoz collective 
farm structures. The examples from the Zarafshan Valley make 
apparent the limitations of agricultural expertise in fostering rural 
economies as farmers’ are reluctant to let expertise guide the 
operations of the individualized household farms.  
Crisis of Agricultural Expertise 
Remote Zarafshani farmers experienced the disappearance of the 
former Soviet advisory system as loss of contacts, expertise and 
subject matter authority. Previous centrally organized knowledge 
and information structures as the agroprom or academic 
insititutions are no longer available or work inadequately. 
Comparable new knowledge and information frameworks that 
systematically provide advice to farmers for instance on relevant 
crops and inputs have not been established. In the Zarafshan Valley 
no meaningful media coverage of local or regional agricultural 
economies bridges this gap. Given the limitations of the public 
sphere and political restrictions of media enterprises, the content 
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and reliability of the provided information are hardly considered by 
farmers either. Only remnants of former networks of agricultural 
research and advice remained operational in the Zarafshan Valley. 
As a consequence, agricultural expertise that is linked to state 
organizations, i.e. as the district agricultural department agroprom, 
is of disputable quality and poorly requested. There is no national 
extension programme of the Tajik state (Shtaltovna 2016). Private 
sector and international NGOs punctually reach out to inform 
farmers in the remote Zarafshan Valley, however their operations 
are timely limited. Potential knowledge sources, as the district 
agricultural department agroprom, are not for all rural dwellers 
accessible.  
Reasons for farmers’ plummeted interest in agricultural expertise 
derive also from missing economic incentives and the difficulty to 
realize an income from agriculture. The crisis of agricultural 
knowledge and expertise in the Zarafshan Valley results not at least 
from the fact that many Zarafshani’ households do not consider 
agriculture as their principal livelihood strategy. Instead, rural 
households consider other knowledge assets more adequate to 
maintain their livelihoods. Farmers’ information priorities orient to 
economic opportunities, option to accumulate farm land or ways to 
safeguard the existing basis of livelihood.  
Contested Credibility of Agricultural Expertise 
Besides the complicated approach to agricultural expertise, the 
crisis of agricultural expertise results also from questions regarding 
its quality and validity. The case of the selecting seed potatoes 
(Chapter 6) demonstrated how knowledge sources on local level 
potentially turn out unreliable and information not trustworthy. 
Farmers cannot easily identify the quality of seed potatoes and rely 
in a competitive context on external expertise and trusted 
information. Accordingly, large swaths of agricultural expertise 
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shifted from formerly public or semi-public domains to individual 
experts, i.e. the locally called `experienced farmers´ who are either 
retired former professionals or simply reputable elder farmers. 
Their knowledge is often outdated, as it is usually not linked to 
former education and training. Thus, the post-Soviet 
individualization of agriculture caused in the Zarafshan Valley not 
only the fragmentation of information, but also the deterioration of 
the quality of expertise. Symptomatically, the situation of 
incomplete and potentially unreliable information regarding seed 
potatoes leaves farmers uncertain. Accumulating credible 
knowledge about elite seeds requires networking with powerful 
elites who control the distribution of the variety. In consequence, 
investments in elite seed material are cancelled by most 
smallholder farmers who deliberately arrange with low quality local 
seeds. The selection process of the seed potatoes shows firstly the 
high degree of uncertainty around agricultural knowledge and 
agricultural expertise. Secondly, it underlines the fact that at the 
conditions of the Zarafshan Valley, agricultural expertise must be 
back-upped with additional knowledge practices in order to be 
verified, credible and thus implemented. In the case of seed potato 
selection, these additional knowledge practices refer to networking 
with elite potato farmers to verify the quality of seeds. This is not 
easily possible for the majority of local farmers. Especially 
smallholder farmers face difficulties to identify and access locally 
adequate, trustable knowledge. Trusted relations to knowledge 
sources are essential, so that knowledge and information can guide 
farmers’ operations. Cases as the selection of potato seeds or 
considering the foundation of a dehqon farm underline how 
Zarafshani smallholder households find themselves unable to make 
informed decisions and therefore opt for maintaining the status 
quo. The impasse to obtain reliable information occurred also with 
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regard to the restructuring of agricultural enterprises, i.e. founding 
of the individual or family dehqon farm. Due to contradicting 
knowledge assets and unclear interference from authorities and 
elite figures, farmers eventually avoid taking decisions. Against this 
background, farmers usually consider only local knowledge assets as 
trustworthy as they seek to triangulate information and proof the 
validity of knowledge through networks and other informants. 
Potential alternative knowledge resources exist, however their 
availability depends on the individual skills to network. As the 
bobogi examples illustrated, the state administration eludes from 
setteling local issues. Claiming meetings with district and sub-
district officials is time consuming and does not necessarily lead to 
clear and reliable information. For average smallholder households, 
the transformation of agricultural knowledge structures is thus a 
source of uncertainty with regard to the poor reliability of 
knowledge. Uncertainty prevents especially smallholder farmers to 
invest in innovations, which are consequently implemented with 
reluctance or not at all. Farmers put priority at identifying reliable 
sources of knowledge, even at the cost of retaliating agricultural 
production. As a consequence, the available knowledge is hardly 
being implemented nor guides farmers operations. Expertise and 
advice appear incalculable especially for small and medium farmers, 
exposing the farm households to economic and livelihood risks, thus 
they abstain from innovation and potential economic opportunities.  
Knowledge Practices to Manoeuver Limited Access 
Orders 
Another important insight from field research is the confirmation 
that the Zarafshani rural economy is a limited access order. 
Limitations in the agricultural sector occur firstly with regard to 
access to arable land. Although there is a general scarcity of arable 
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land in the Zarafshan Valley; however there is no predominant 
regulation how to get access to the available land. The significance 
of access arrangements for rural households in the Zarafshan Valley 
has become evident throughout field research. Negotiation and 
settlement of access arrangements takes place within three 
dominant normative systems: Norms related to Islam, norms 
related to the state and its organizations, as well as norms deriving 
from local values and moralities. These normative systems 
correspond with institutions, organizations and processes that 
negotiate local affairs. The actual negotiation processes have been 
described as meshwork governance arrangements, underlining that 
the nomination and particular constellation of the respective 
institutions, organizations developed differently throughout 
Zarafshani communities. Power and assertiveness of institutions, 
processes and institutions differ significantly even in nearby 
communities. Land access negotiations involve powerful communal 
institutions; however these differ throughout the various Zarafshani 
communities. Similar requests and disputes are differently 
negotiated, what renders predictability and security for local 
farmers more difficult. Following governance processes is an 
essential exercise for rural households in the context of LAO, i.e. the 
strong competition for scarce natural resources, the so called “race 
for assets” (Petrick and Pomfret 2016: 18). As bobogi claims 
underline, farmers in the Zarafshan Valley pay close attention to 
governance arrangements that concern access to natural resources. 
Meshwork governance emerges from the simultaneous and parallel 
presence of normative systems. The pluralism of institutions, 
hierarchies and processes entails that these, potentially bloc or 
compete with each other. With regard to the negotiations of access 
to arable land, changes are apparent in the Zarafshan area as the 
assertiveness of institutions and organizations is not guaranteed by 
 299 
reference to a normative system. State organizations may 
selectively be weak, where local institutions are strong. Examples 
for such phenomena are the relative strength of institutions as 
kalidi Islom and bobogi. Inverse to this is the comparable weakness 
of the state land legislation. The focus on land negotiation processes 
in the Zarafshan Valley shows the competition, overlapping, 
collaboration and bricolage of different institutions and 
organizations, deliberate protracting of processes and even their 
complete avoidance. Zarafshani access negotiations are hybrid as 
they settle on various normative systems. This situation is 
conceptualized as meshwork governance, making explicit a diffuse 
notion of governance in the sense that authority is not a monopoly 
of the State, but shared amongst “competing organizations” 
(Manuel-Navarrete et al. 2009: 3). Sharing and fluctuation of power 
and authority is characteristic for meshwork governance processes, 
which build on and integrate different normative systems. The 
plurality of norms and processes allows farmers to seek power and 
support at different governance forums and networks, what means 
in the framework of the Zarafshan Valley to manoeuver parallel and 
overlapping normative systems. Effectively, different norms varying 
from remnant Soviet values to Islamic rules, determine not only 
moralities in the Zarafshan Valley, but through these also access to 
natural resources. Legally access to land is regulated by the Tajik 
land code. It is state organizations that are in charge to implement 
and observe land reform legislation; however the respective 
authorities are only selectively present on local level. This means for 
the Zarafshan Valley that important decisions regarding the access 
to land are not only taken in the framework of the land code, but in 
different other forums under diverse normative signatures. The 
subsequent parallel and overlapping governance processes have 
caused some negative effects in the Zarafshan Valley, mainly the 
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above displayed unequal distribution of arable land. Consequently a 
high number of poor households emerged and introduced the 
aforementioned “race for assets” (Petrick and Pomfret 2016: 18). 
Government rulings to found individual dehqon farms further 
spurred the complicated competition for arable land. Such political 
encroachment in economic matters exactly constitutes limited 
access orders (LAO). Due to the absent land market and the 
officially finished land reform, any request for additional access to 
land is forced to subcutaneous strategies. Accordingly, Zarafshani’ 
farmers refer to a meshwork of different organizations, institutions 
and processes, which are settled in different normative systems. 
Results are achieved through networking with powerful persons and 
organizations, creating narratives that convince co-villagers or 
mobilizing power resources through payments and patronage. Such 
negotiations are opaque; however display an eventually durable 
arbitration between the interests of farmers, authorities, markets 
and local elites. 
Mobilizing Religion: Bobogi as Knowledge Practice 
Bobogi arrangements are a case in point how governance claims 
build on diverse normative systems present in the Zarafshan Valley 
and eventually structure the access to land. The institution bobogi is 
locally mobilized to determine access to arable land while it refers 
to local values, moralities and the right Islamic behaviour. Bobogi 
arrangements provide governance and turn out very stable in 
Zarafshani communities. As the case of bobogi land distribution to 
the Russian teacher [mualimi Russi] shows, it is still a powerful 
institution in the Zarafshan area. Bobogi arrangements proof the 
presence of meshwork governance, as important issues as the 
access to arable land are not solved on the base of laws, but with 
reference to local moralities. This means at first, underlining family 
values and respect to the ancestors. Bobogi refers to local traditions 
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through narratives of how the arable land was created. Such 
narratives link diffusely to Islamic values by recognizing the dignity 
of the elders and elaborating on the fidelity of the ancestors. The 
diffuse reference to Islam is comparable to the above mentioned 
practise of amri mar’uf in its attempt to enforce a particular 
narrative or perspective. Bobogi requests develop as narrative that 
blends cultural and religious values and believes such as the value of 
the family, respect and subordination to elders and ancestors, or 
the defence of home and property. It is setting interpretations of 
reality and undersigning moral aspects of a commonly assumed 
order.  
Depicting bobogi as religious institution confirms with the popular 
understanding of the Qur’an, which is subsequently hard to contest. 
Individual reputation is relevant, potential shortcomings may cause 
negative effects in local governance processes that often involve 
majority decisions at the maclisi umumi, the board of elders or the 
assessment by the rais. Field work showed that land negotiations 
hardly ever can be solved on local level alone; instead require the 
support of local and sub-district institutions. Local institutions as the 
mahalla or the shuroi deha do not possess the political clout to 
settle durable access arrangements. The mahalla and other local 
institutions may decide for or against access negotiations, however 
lack the power resources to implement these decisions. Ruling on 
access negotiations through the state land laws takes rarely place as 
state authorities seek not getting involve in local access 
arrangements. Further, despite the legal framework of the Tajik 
land code and formalized governance process regarding the access 
to land, district and sub-district authorities work slowly and are 
plagued by notorious ambiguity. Local institutions as bobogi or 
kalidi Islom potentially provide immediate and durable decisions. In 
the Zarafshan Valley, institutions such as bobogi gained significance 
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in governance processes because they undersign religious values, 
which are prevalent in local communities. Reference to bobogi 
effectively influences governance processes, not least because it 
introduces a level of urgency and severity into notoriously 
intransparent and volatile state administration and government. 
Especially in the period after national independence, when the re-
negotiation of access to natural resources was in full swing, 
insistence on religious values potentially provided stable decisions 
and implementation, whereas ruling coming from the central 
government produced uncertain results (Heathershaw 2009; 
Wiegmann 2007). In this regard the examples of kalidi Islom and 
bobogi show how the mobilization of religion is used to manoeuvre 
governance processes on local level; and how to provide 
governance at all. This must be seen in perspective with the general 
development of the Tajik society, continuously struggling between 
the religious and secular foundation of the state (Dudoignon and 
Qalandar 2014; Epkenhans and Nozimova 2013; Nourzhanov and 
Bleuer 2013). Thus, implicitly bobogi requests capitalize on both, 
local moralities and Islamic rules. Farmers maintain bobogi 
narratives to underline their belonging to the particular place. 
However, as bobogi requests may not be verified with evidence, it 
appears firstly as knowledge practice that seeks legitimacy from 
local and Islamic values. The case of the bobogi narrative is also in 
another aspect interesting, it indicates the importance of building 
individualized claims on generalized narratives. Creating a viable 
narrative is a concrete practice for claiming own interests. Local 
governance processes are setting ruling perspectives and 
interpretations of reality, thus deciding if something is considered 
corruption, injustice or against local values. Eventually, such 
processes are setting precedents of what the narrative order is, 
enabling subsequently the establishment of hegemonic 
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perspectives. Hegemonic narratives may mobilize the authority of 
local values or of the state, while levelling out or even criminalizing 
alternative meanings and narratives in society. Imposing the ruling 
narrative determines the generally accepted view by authorities or 
the public sphere on certain subject matters. Bobogi arrangements 
display a hegemonic narrative which is presented as everyday 
knowledge, shared by most rural dwellers and therefore difficult to 
contradict.  
Ariza Letters to Manoeuver Meshwork Governance 
Ariza letters depict another knowledge practice among Zarafshani 
farmers to interfere in governance processes. Ariza as written 
complaints circulate frequently between local communities and 
district authorities in order to intervene in everyday affairs, 
referring to the normative system of the state. Letters are 
submitted to any kind of authority, who may judge the letters and 
potentially takes action accordingly, although, this is not a causal 
mechanism. Many letters are ignored, or worse, cause negative 
repercussions for the sender. The above discussed case of the army 
camp displayed the potential risks involved for letter writers (see 
chapter 8). This means, any non-hostile reaction to ariza letters may 
be considered useful for the sender. Under given political conditions 
in Tajikistan, possible investigations may turn easily against the 
authors of ariza who will then have to provide extra-payments in 
order to close the file. In the realm of agriculture, ariza letters 
underline individual or collective efforts to intervene in rural 
processes by focussing on concrete claims and requests. Farmers 
submit letters with identic issues, often claims for access to land, to 
various state authorities. Farmers’ shopping forums may reach from 
sub-district level up to the presidential office. Issuing ariza letters is 
a knowledge practice that means not only to establish the letters, 
based on the right argument or narrative, i.e. the one that fits with 
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authorities. While ordinary farmers have little occasions to highlight 
their letters to authorities, the case of arizaboz writers exemplified 
how some individuals enforce their writing. Letters are facilitated in 
order to be effective, for instance through networking, the right 
timing, linking to hegemonic narratives and select the right forum of 
addressees. Therefore, knowledge and skills to compile ariza letters 
are highly relevant for rural dwellers, because letters are posing 
both, an option and a challenge to their livelihood. In order to make 
the own request more urgent, complaint letters focus on concrete 
co-villagers or competitors. Pointing at others means to increase 
pressure, either on the respective individual, but also on local 
conflict solving mechanisms. Despite village harmony tinji may be 
disturbed, subsequently the request comes to the attention of elites 
and state authorities. Without such measures many requests are 
simply put on hold. Pending letters in deadlock are rather the norm. 
Stalled negotiations around e.g. land distribution are in most cases 
in the interest of established village elites that benefit from the 
status quo. To overcome such deadlock situations it appears 
necessary to disturb the communal status quo. Denunciations to the 
ecology or corruption department provide an example for 
fabricated conflicts (see chapter 8). However, the effectiveness of 
claims made through ariza letters remains weak as long as they do 
not clearly link with power structures. Most letters are dismissed by 
authorities, only a few ariza actually lead to state interventions. 
Complaint letters potentially manoeuver meshwork governance in 
rural areas by referring exclusively on the normative system of the 
state and its authorities. For instance juxtapose ariza writers the de 
facto meshwork of governance processes in the Zarafshan Valley to 
central ideological narratives of the state. This does not necessarily 
lead to action from the side of state authorities. However, as the 
view on the professional letter writers [arizaboz] corroborates, 
 305 
authorities are responsive to ensure dominance over the rural 
society. Skilled writers thus outline political components of rural 
processes, strengthening the hegemonic narrative of the regime.  
The Co-production of Limited Access Orders  
The reality interpretations offered by ariza letters potentially settle 
the political landscape of the community by transposing the 
authoritarian features of the Tajik political system to rural areas. 
Thus, ariza have a significant impact on how agriculture is practiced 
in the Zarafshan Valley. Letters lead to interventions of state 
authorities in rural areas, whereas the actual issue of the letter is 
secondary as it serves as pretext to demonstrate power. Many ariza 
letters in the Zarafshan Valley refer to issues around access to land, 
land use and conflicts with competitors. Current neopatrimonial 
governance practices allow authorities on various pretexts as 
religious terrorism, corruption or libel to intervene with virtually any 
household in rural communities. This capacity of the state is 
exploited by ariza writers to employ the authoritarian power 
resources of the state to interfere in local affairs. Rural dwellers are 
constantly exposed to interventions of authorities or investigation 
from state departments. Examples such as the Darvonho case or the 
deliberate investigations of the ecology department underline how 
authorities may interfere in agricultural practices. Interventions 
display the power resources of the state, but implicitly also those of 
the sender who is able to mobilize authorities. It is common post-
Soviet governance practice that rural dwellers may never be sure to 
have met legal requirements, thus remain vulnerable to authorities.  
Submitting complaint letters to authorities was common in pre-
modern Central Asian cultures. It has been a widespread practice in 
the Soviet Union, fostered by the communist party and the state to 
control society from within (Fitzpatrick 1996; White 1983). Letter 
writing was part of the inner control culture of the Soviet Union that 
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contained denunciations, whistle-blowing and general suspicion 
towards non-locals, foreigners, which were generalized as agents 
(Lampert 1985). Such practices structure the public sphere and 
were promoted in the Soviet Union as kind of popular participation 
in interior politics and homeland protection (Fitzpatrick 1996). 
Much of this attitude and security logic appears to have prevailed in 
Tajikistan today. As Driscoll and others demonstrated, governance 
practices of the Tajik government and state are deeply Soviet (2015; 
Herbers 2006; Markowitz 2013; Roy 2007). Submitting complaint 
letters to the Tajik authorities refers thus to remnants of such Soviet 
moralities. Ariza letters affirmatively appeal to the normative 
system of the state, i.e. referring to dominant state narratives or 
hegemonic perspectives, and eventually serving authorities as 
pretext for interventions. Identifying such narratives and 
perspectives within the de-politicized, post-Soviet public sphere and 
in context of incomplete information is actually not easy. The so 
called arizaboz, skilled and knowledgeable local writers, frequently 
produce letters upon which authorities are ready to intervene in 
rural communities. Complaint letters, serve to exercise power and 
state control in rural areas. Arizaboz effectively survey the rural 
community for potential wrongdoings of rural dwellers and 
information worth to report to authorities. Accordingly, letter 
writers effectively serve as regulatory force on behalf of 
governmental authorities, threating to report any state critical or 
independent behaviour on local level. Ariza letter writers refer on 
particular perspectives on everyday affairs that imitate statements 
of the president, i.e. denouncing alleged cases of corruption, 
opposition or religious manifestations, or the abuse of authority on 
local and district level. This way certain hegemonic narratives are 
claimed and interpretations of reality are imposed even in remote 
rural areas as the Zarafshan Valley. Ariza letters co-produce and 
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sustain for instance limited access orders by re-establishing and 
setting the institutional frame of what is considered correct and 
incorrect or legal and illegal, by tempting state entities to act. The 
normative system of the state, i.e. the president, the state ideology 
with related institutions, norms and processes is perpetuated and 
maintains the limited access orders in place. As the above examples 
of the arizaboz or the role of the ecology department highlight; 
ariza letters seek to link to the ideological framework and 
hegemonic narratives of the state as these are most likely to lead to 
positive results for the sender. Denunciations potentially provide 
immediate benefits to the sender, which outweigh complaints of 
spoiling the reputation of the village and compromising village 
peace tinji. The sheer quantity of ariza circulating is therefore an 
indicator for the strength and assertiveness of the state in rural 
areas, as letter writers assume a reasonable chance to get a 
response to their claim. In this regard, ariza letters are no simple 
expression of farmers, but a reference to the actual presence of the 
state in remote areas. Ariza letters provide a concrete chance that 
the respective requests are addressed, thus they anticipate the 
possible interference of authorities. Professional letter writers as 
arizaboz, by creating hegemonic narratives and maintaining limited 
access orders, thus fulfil the role of a government proxy in rural 
areas.  
Shifting Epistemic Cultures in the Zarafshan Valley 
The cases outlined above illustrate how post-Soviet transformation 
processes as the individualization of agriculture require farmers to 
focus on new knowledge assets. Knowledge sources and farmers 
approach to agricultural advice changed in the Zarafshan Valley. The 
findings underline how in particular smallholder households actually 
are not aiming for agricultural advice. While it is difficult for 
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Zarafshani rural households to secure a livelihood mainly from 
agriculture, much attention is scheduled towards safeguarding the 
principal requirements for farming. The vast majority of Zarafshani 
farmers pursue mixed income strategies; they do not focus on the 
professionalization of agriculture as full-time farming seems no 
viable livelihood. Farmers’ renunciation of agricultural expertise 
while engaging in knowledge practices as bobogi and ariza 
underlines the common perception that especially networks and 
skills regarding governance arrangements guarantee the basis of 
rural livelihoods, i.e. the access to arable land. This view is 
confirmed by cases as the female farmers Hokima or Nasirat that 
show how farmers are being deprived of rights and property. 
Maintaining subsistence production and ensuring the household 
livelihood requires participation in village affairs as access 
arrangements to natural resources as arable land plots, pastures or 
water presuppose agreements within the local community. These 
are, as displayed above, not free of conflict. Everyday negotiations 
require skills and knowledge practices to underline the validity of 
claims and demonstrate authority in governance processes.  
Bobogi and ariza arrangements provide ample evidence for 
meshwork governance throughout the Zarafshan Valley. Settling 
agricultural matters in the Zarafshan Valley means dealing with 
complex meshwork arrangements, involving institutions, 
organizations and processes from different normative systems. 
These governance processes evolve not as binary situtations, but as 
contemporaneous meshwork of different interpretations of reality 
(Wirklichkeitsinterpretationen). Ambivalent political and economic 
contexts require rural dwellers to develop flexible responses to the 
different types of interpretations of reality, i.e. negotiating 
normative perceptions of order. In the Zarafshan Valley, 
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interpretations of reality correspond with particular knowledge 
practices, which can be schematized as follows. 
 
Table 7  Zarafshani knowledge practices related to normative systems. 
Source: The author 
As displayed in the precedent table, knowledge practices seek to 
provide meaning and make sense by connecting to the prevailing 
normative systems. Reference to normative systems is essential for 
the local perception and establishment of order. The findings show 
that in the Zarafshan Valley hegemonic narratives make either 
reference to the Tajik state and its representatives or to Islamic and 
local values. Accordingly, related interpretations of reality comprise 
authority in processes of meshwork governance. The farmer as 
single independent actor may decide for various interpretations of 
reality therewith considering potential options along meshwork 
arrangements. The findings from the Zarafshan Valley indicate that 
there is a large room for manoeuvre as the interpretation of state 
legislation and religious practices are not clear cut.  
Farmers seek to link with powerful networks in order to reduce the 
ambiguity of such processes. Everyday knowledge practices as ariza 
letters realize these linkages, for instance access to networks of 
powerful people, authorities or powerful individuals. Knowing about 
Knowledge Pracitices  Interpretations of Reality 
Reference to Normative Systems 
Bobogi The promise of belonging to the  
rural community 
Ariza The promise of a neopatrimonial  
strong state 
Reference to external 
knowledge, e.g. donor 
expertise 
The promise of rationality and 
progress 
 310 
personnel and working procedures of the district tax office, the 
jamoat, the ecology department, the district governor [hokim] etc. 
is considered a priority by local farmers as through these 
organizations the implementation of decisions is actually taking 
place in the Zarafshan Valley. On the contrary, knowledge of 
statutory law has hardly been concerned by rural dwellers. Instead 
of insisting on the abstract legal system, farmers understood that 
networking is required to solve problems through locally established 
governance mechanisms. References to Islam display another 
knowledge practice useful to impact on local arrangements. The 
demonstration of religious values and lifestyle serves villagers to 
enhance and justify for instance individual bobogi claims. Making 
Islamic lifestyle explicit is an effective knowledge practice to 
outcompete competitors in local governance processes by 
underlining the own belonging to the normative system of Islam. 
This way, everyday knowledge practices are central means to 
safeguard and maintain the households’ livelihood and to 
potentially realize economic growth too. The findings reveal that 
farmers’ interests in rural Tajikistan are currently not developing 
towards specialized agricultural expertise, but towards knowledge 
practices to manoeuver governance arrangements. Thus, the 
research reveals that in the Zarafshan Valley the previous 
“engineering-oriented” (Van Assche et al. 2016: 38) epistemic 
culture in Soviet rural areas is substituted by individual farm 
management. With regard to knowledge, this individual farm 
management dismisses agricultural expertise in favour of 
knowledge practices to manoeuvre everyday governance processes 
to maintain the rural livelihood. 
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Epistemic Cultures Co-produced by Meshwork 
Governance Arrangements  
Epistemic cultures are subject to change. They create, warrant and 
dismiss the knowledge that is constructed in society. Research 
findings indicate that the shifts of Zarafshani’ epistemic cultures 
towards governance-oriented knowledge practices result 
predominantly from complex and unpredictable meshwork 
governance arrangements. Zarafshani farmers approach to 
knowledge reflects an ambiguous assemblage of normative systems 
and uncertain meshwork governance arrangements, which is poorly 
predictable and requires continuous attention.  
The view on epistemic cultures displays the environments of 
knowledge production and its use. Underlying Tajik knowledge 
cultures, ideologies and hegemonic narratives are enforced by the 
neopatrimonial authoritarian state. The cult of personality around 
President Rahmon, which de facto impedes any critic of political, 
social or economic developments in the country, is one example. In 
recent years the Tajik government created uneasy feelings towards 
practising Islamic belief, equalling believers with political 
opposition. In rural areas, lower tier authorities, local elites or 
informants as arizabos frequently use vague and general 
accusations for their individual intentions.  
Referrence to Jasanoff’s terminology makes explicit how rural 
epistemic cultures are co-produced together with local meshwork 
arrangements. Under conditions of the neopatrimonial 
authoritarian Tajik state, local governance is conceptualized as 
meshwork governance of institutions, organizations and processes 
that relate to different normative systems, e.g. the state, local 
values and Islam. In this regard epistemic cultures in the Zarafshan 
Valley are co-produced with meshwork governance arrangements, 
reacting on the modified preferences of individualized farm 
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households. The crisis of agricultural expertise recognized in the 
Zarafshan Valley made evident that farmers orient towards other 
knowledge assets. Farmers approach knowledge and information 
that suits their everyday needs, which turned out in the Zarafshan 
Valley as intensification of networking with potential power 
resources. Networking may provide a competitive advantage in 
obtaining the right seed potatoes or collecting the required 
documents to set up the individual dehqon farm. The findings 
illustrate how epistemic cultures shift in the context of the 
individualization of agriculture. Agricultural expertise without 
facilitation and support by trusted relationships, references to 
power resources or administrative guarantees may not be 
implemented. Failures of agrarian expertise, as e.g. regarding seed 
potatoes, indicate that agricultural knowledge is out of use as long 
as individual actors are not equipped with contextual, everyday 
knowledge about the right support network, which allows valuating 
knowledge assets and putting expertise into practice.  
The findings further show how certain knowledge or the use of 
knowledge may become a resource of power within meshwork 
governance processes. Ariza and bobogi are knowledge practices 
potentially able to accumulate power to make an impact on 
governance processes. Thus, in the Zarafshan area, agricultural 
production requires the skilled combination of agricultural expertise 
and knowledge practices. Outbalancing these diverse knowledge 
assets to optimize agricultural production is even for local farmers 
no simple effort. Limited access orders in Zarafshani agriculture are 
pervasive, which means that farmers e.g. are not allowed to cut 
apricot trees on their land plots due to unclear administrative 
regulations such as for instance the arbitrary interventions of the 
ecology department. Farmers obey to such implicit regulations, as 
behind these rules stand organizations, institutions or processes 
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that are able to exercise power and punish rural households. Thus, 
eventually knowledge practices to circumvent prohibition and 
sanctioning out-compete the expertise of adequate production 
practices. In everyday life farmers judge institutions for their 
assertiveness, i.e. their capacity to sanction.  
The Negative Co-production Cycle in the Zarafshani’ 
Agriculture 
As noted earlier for Tajik rural areas, uncertain meshwork 
governance conditions lead to a situation of ontological insecurity 
among rural dwellers (Boboyorov 2013b), resulting in short-term 
arrangements with negative impact on farming. As a consequence, 
smallholder farmers limit themselves to subsistence farming, 
abandon agricultural production completely or neglect farming as 
minor relevant to maintain the household’s existence. With regard 
to agriculture, the current epistemic culture in the Zarafshan Valley 
is determined by the negative co-production cycle of meshwork 
governance and knowledge practices to safeguard livelihoods. Due 
to farmers’ perception of uncertainty, the local epistemic culture 
orients towards safeguarding property, maintaining access to land, 
mobilizing power networks; while it disregards at the same time 
long term investments, seed selection or soil improvement. With 
regard to Zarafshani agriculture, the current mode of mobilizing 
knowledge and knowledge practices is negative. Uncertain 
governance processes request knowledge practices, at the cost of 
developing agricultural expertise and implementing innovations. 
This constellation is cementing the poor economic perspectives of 
smallholders. Thus, large parts of Zarafshani smallholder farm 
households have stopped orienting towards economic growth 
through agriculture. Rural dwellers see improvements to their 
livelihoods deriving mainly from non-agricultural labour. The 
negative co-production cycle of local epistemic cultures indicates 
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why farmers are selectively unable to make informed farming 
decisions; making it difficult to re-start the agricultural sector in 
remote rural areas.  
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10 Epistemic Conditions and Agricultural 
Development 
Recapitulating the starting point of this research, the study set out 
to analyse individualized farmers approach to knowledge in 
marginal agricultural areas in Tajikistan. Focussing on post-Soviet 
expertise and knowledge practices, the research asked, which 
knowledge farmers’ request and mobilize in order to maintain the 
individualized agricultural production and everyday rural 
livelihoods. To begin with, the findings demonstrate that farmers in 
the remote Zarafshan Valley are operating individually, with little 
occasions and incentives for collective action. Thus, in the research 
area the post-Soviet individualisation of agrarian structures has 
been thoroughly. Under the conditions of the neopatrimonial 
authoritarian state combined with economic limited access orders 
LAO, individualized farmers face difficulties to participate in political 
processes. Networking with important persons and the skilful use of 
knowledge practices are strategies of individualized farmers to 
pursue own interests. The findings corroborate the initial hypothetic 
assumption that the reluctant economic development of the 
agricultural sector in the Zarafshan Valley is not related to the 
availability of knowledge and information. The findings verify a crisis 
of agricultural expertise, because it does not guide farmers’ 
operations. Farmers request credibile and trusted sources of 
agricultural expertise before they deliberate about its potential 
implementation. Such confirmation is not always available. The 
findings demonstrate the poor request of agricultural expertise and 
illustrate that the reluctant agro-economic development in marginal 
rural areas as the Zarafshan Valley is not caused by deficits of 
agricultural expert knowledge.  
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Following Flyvbjergs claim of an interdisciplinary social science 
approach (2001), this study puts the focus on values and rationales 
that guide farmers’ decisions how to maintain production and rural 
livelihoods. The research contributes empirically to the 
comprehension of how knowledge is approached among farmers in 
the Zarafshan Valley to maintain rural livelihoods. The wide 
distribution of knowledge practices as bobogi and ariza underlines 
that Zarafshani farmers approach, use and production of knowledge 
is closely related to governance processes on various levels. Thus, 
the political economy of the neopartimonial authoritarian state and 
the conditions of meshwork governance structure the way how 
farmers organize knowledge and expertise. 
Throughout post-Soviet agricultural transformation, Zarafshani 
epistemic cultures moved from professional agricultural expertise, 
as established by the former collective farms, towards individual 
knowledge practises. The perspective on epistemic cultures 
demonstrated how other types of knowledge became important to 
individualized households. Zarafshani farmers focus on knowledge 
practices for being involved in political processes to ensure access 
to natural resources, markets and administration became apparent. 
Concentrating on knowledge practices as bobogi and ariza, farmers 
place priorities on networking to interfer in governance processes. 
Consequently, this entailed that in the Zarafshan Valley distinctively 
negative epistemic conditions emerged, creating structural 
problems for agricultural expertise. The individualized agricultural 
sector in the Zarafshan Valley requires twofold governance 
arrangements. At the one side, state induced LAO entail the 
competition over natural resources and other assets. On the other 
side, ambiguous governance arrangements as meshwork 
arrangements implement decisions despite contradicting normative 
systems in place. So is, for instance, the national legislation to 
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protect civil rights or businesses matters against intrusive practices 
of local elites or subregional authorities rarely applied. The findings 
demonstrate that in particular access negotiations to arable land 
unfold as meshwork governance, with highly flexible justifications, 
procedures and implementations. As the individualization of 
agriculture coerced farmers to actively design and shape 
governance processes, making use of the outlined knowledge 
practices, in order to maintain rural livelihoods.  
On another aspect, the conceptional contribution of the research 
lies in displaying the co-production of knowledge and governance as 
an interlaced process in rural Central Asia. The findings show that at 
present time agricultural related knowledge in the Zerafshan Valley 
comes into being co-produced as assemblage of different normative 
systems within local meshwork governance arrangements. 
Assumingly, similar forms of meshwork governance occur elsewhere 
in Central Asia among comparable authoritarian state regimes. Co-
productionist thinking (Jasanoff 2004) underlines the permanent 
mutual exchange between governance processes and the social 
construction of knowledge. Epistemic cultures, which display “in a 
given field” how people know what they know (Knorr-Cetina 1999: 
1), create and warrant the use of knowledge. The perspective on 
epistemic cultures emphasizes the prevalence of governance 
oriented knowledge practices in Zarafshani rural communities. The 
framework of epistemic cultures refers to the phenomenon that 
knowledge assets not necessarily complement each other, but are 
being blocked and restrained by contradicting normative orders. 
Analysing smallholders’ approach to knowledge through the 
concept of epistemic cultures proves that Zarafshani households 
barely consider agricultural advice and expertise to maintain 
livelihoods. Thus, the findings detail that the individualized 
agriculture in the Zarafshan Valley so far did not follow the 
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development paradigm of a positive correlation between the 
individualization of property and increased production efficiency 
development (Rizov 2004; Verdery 2004). Only very few 
individualized farm enterprises actually focus on increased 
agricultural productivity. The majority of Zarafshani smallholder 
households is exposed to poverty and pursues a part-time 
agricultural livelihood, i.e. maintaining subsistence production. 
Respectively, a large proportion of individually producing farmers 
dismissed the significance of specialized expertise. The massive 
reduction of full-time agricultural livelihoods in the Zarafshan 
Valley, explains partially farmers reduced interest in agricultural 
expertise. It is in this regard difficult to determine the relation 
between access to quality agricultural expertise and livelihood 
standards in the Zarafsan Valley. However, it is apparent that the 
crisis of agricultural expertise is not favourable for improving 
neither rural livelihoods nor market oriented agricultural 
production. The challenging context to agricultural expertise in the 
Zarafshan Valley underlines the evident shift of epistemic cultures 
that took place in resprect to the previous, highly specialized Soviet 
agriculture. Credibility became an essential characteristic for 
knowledge assets. Therefore media and advisory services are hardly 
considered. The selection of seed potatoes showed the necessity of 
trust to verify knowledge assets. Technical advice is mainly provided 
through local networks, which are considered reliable, although 
these structures are hardly open to external expert knowledge. 
Uncertainty regarding agricultural expertise has consequently 
detrimental effects on farmers’ investments and production 
practices: As a result, farmers do neither invest in most productive 
elite potato seeds, nor do they act pro-actively to become individual 
dehqon farmer. 
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Thus, the present study documents that in the course of agricultural 
restructuration processes Zarafshani smallholder farmer’s interest 
in agricultural expertise and advice is reduced to immediate local 
requests. In contrast to the previous Soviet expertise system, 
individual farm households developed a critical relation to expertise 
and advice, which they find difficult to implement.   
Overcoming the Negative Co-production Cycle 
In contrast, the findings make explicit how Zarafshani smallholder 
farmers seek being involved in governance processes that 
potentially ensure access to natural resources, markets and 
administration. Farmers’ developed knowledge practices that 
facilitate participation in governance processes. The common 
distribution of bobogi, ariza and networking with the administration 
confirms the change of epistemic cultures among individualized 
farm households in the Zarafshan Valley. Farmers are inclined 
towards safeguarding property, gaining access to land and 
mobilizing power networks, instead of long term investments, seed 
selection or soil improvement. The uncertainties of meshwork 
governance arrangements request everyday knowledge practices, at 
the cost of developing agricultural expertise and implementing 
innovations. Such epistemic conditions are effectively cementing 
the economic perspectives of smallholder farmers. Not 
accidentially, the majority of Zarafshani households produce only 
occasionally for the market. LAO mean limited access to resources 
as input and land, but also limitations for the development of 
knowledge. Namely smallholder farmers face massive difficulties in 
accessing meaningful knowledge and information, which results 
consequently in the reduction of agricultural innovation. These 
findings make apparent that current epistemic conditions in the 
Zarafshan Valley are not conducive for agricultural production as 
they are not designed to increase productivity and the share of 
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livelihood coming from agriculture. In consequence, Zarafshani rural 
dwellers potentially drop out of agriculture in favour of alternative, 
non-agricultural livelihoods, and continue to do so. New knowledge 
assets that are taken-up, co-produced and reinforced are not 
primarily related to agriculture. Instead Zarafshani farmers feel 
obliged to build complex and complicated resilience strategies, 
which consume significant resources. In the neopatrimonial Tajik 
state, networking and knowledge practices are central to increase 
the households’ resilience against natural or economic shocks and 
lack of administrative assistance, which may challenge the very 
basis of rural livelihoods. Against the assemblage of diverse 
normative systems and highly flexible meshwork governance, rural 
dwellers seek support by a mix of organizations, processes and 
institutions. The present study identified in three normative systems 
that determine agricultural matters in the Zarafshan Valley: Islamic 
religion, state authorities and local values and traditions. Knowledge 
practices such as bobogi and ariza are striking examples for attemps 
to mobilize power by making reference to explicit normative 
systems. Both knowledge practices, bobogi and ariza, focus on 
interference in local governance processes, thus, are not conducive 
for agricultural production. It is in this regard that the situation 
among rural dwellers in the Zarafshan Valley appears as negative 
co-production cycle with local epistemic cultures indicating why 
farmers are selectively unable to make informed farming decisions. 
Zarafshani epistemic cultures are dominated by knowledge practises 
that emerge co-produced by meshwork governance. In 
consequence, epistemic cultures emerge together with local 
meshwork arrangements and limited access orders, and unfold 
negatively, i.e. in disfavour of agricultural knowledge.  
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Reshaping Epistemic Conditions 
Tajikistans LAO’s thus entail a negative co-production cycle, which 
appears the main reason for the limited production, use and 
dissemination of agricultural expertise. Potentials and impact of 
agricultural advisory services in Tajikistan are therefore limited. The 
findings of the present research illustrate why the individualization 
of agriculture in the Zarafshan Valley has not led to increased 
productivity and specialization of farmers. Neopatrimonial post-
Soviet authoritarian states have difficulties to formulate and 
implement coherent agricultural policies (Petrick and Pomfret 
2016). In the case of Tajik remote rural areas, the policies of 
agricultural individualization turned out as challenge especially to 
smallholders’ livelihoods. Limited access orders combined with a 
race to access natural resources established unfavourable epistemic 
conditions for agricultural expertise. The findings demonstrate that 
smallholder farmers lean towards knowledge practices, as they have 
in the context of meshwork governance only little incentives to 
approach specialized agricultural expertise. This is one reason for 
the protracted agro-economic performance in remote rural areas: 
Uncertain governance conditions are not favourable for farmers to 
implement new knowledge. Deliberate governmental voids along 
LAO and meshwork arrangements leave a vacuum that allows at the 
one hand site more powerful actors to employ uncertainty in their 
interest. At the same time will those actors who are less connected 
and less powerful have difficulties to ensure the own interests. 
Under present conditions, Zarafshani farmers’ incentives lie with 
following up governance processes. Agricultural expertise needs 
facilitation to be considered on local level that means concrete 
support by local elites to increase the room for manoeuver within 
LAO environments. Due to the neopatrimonial authoritarian policy 
making in current Tajikistan, general political settings in the capital 
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have direct impact on how the agricultural sector develops in 
remote rural areas. Thus, the results of my research indicate that 
the rehabilitation of expertise in the Tajik agriculture is not primarily 
linked to the restructuration of agricultural advisory services, but to 
efforts of creating reliable governance conditions in rural areas. This 
entails also to recognize the potential role of local elites and 
partially their material requests due to their function of 
representing the integrity of the state in rural areas.  
Macro processes such as shifting epistemic cultures have policy 
implications for the whole of Tajikistan. Crosscutting processes as 
the individualization of agriculture, the emergence of limited access 
orders and meshwork governance enrole the whole of the rural 
society. Against these conditions, one central task is to re-start the 
co-production cycle of knowledge and local governance in a positive 
way, i.e. in favour of knowledge and the development of the 
agricultural sector. In the case the Zarafshan Valley this would mean 
to reduce farmers request for governance related knowledge 
practices. Stabilizing governance means reducing meshwork 
governance arrangements in favour of formalized processes and 
clearing the role and significance of normative systems. Such 
clearance would potentially incentivice farmers turning their focus 
on agricultural expertise. The findings broadly outline that 
uncertainty deriving from meshwork governance arrangements 
slowed down investments in individualized agricultural production. 
The absence of stable and predictable governance processes 
prevented farmers from taking economic risks, making investments 
in the individual dehqon farm or pursuing temporal access 
arrangements. Stabilizing governance processes, i.e. reducing 
meshwork uncertainty, eventually allows farmers to approach to 
the required agricultural expertise. Thus, communication channels 
as media, telephone and internet may increase impact, as well as 
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state organized advisory services and administrative structures such 
as the district agricultural department [agroprom]. Information 
sources and advice concern technical expertise on production 
matters, but also regarding the competent overview and valuation 
of state agricultural policies. Such efforts to strengthen the public 
sphere would belong to a non-authoritarian modernisation project 
that goes beyond the agricultural sector. The post-Soviet republics 
in Central Asia have difficulties to embark on such a model of 
national modernisation, however as experiences in Kirgizstan and 
Kazakhstan show, are not impossible. Further research is required 
to seek pathways for the gradual transformation in favour of 
agricultural expertise. With regard to the Tajik rural development, 
research is needed to identify policies that render the state 
authoritarian modernisation programme efficient, provided the 
state develops a vision for the aspired rural development.  
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